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This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of an external review of Sida’s 
support to mine action activities between 2001 and 2009 undertaken by COWI A/S and Channel 
Research. The review provides an overview of Sida’s engagement in mine action during the decade, 
as well as assessments of the relevance of relevant Sida policies and strategies, and the results 
achieved through support to global organisations and country level programmes. The review 
included country field visits to Sida supported mine action programmes in Iraq and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The methodology applied was based on the evaluation frameworks of OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee and Sida, focussing on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, 
sustainability and impact, as well as the IMAS Guidelines for Evaluation of Mine Action. 
 
The Mine Action Sector Context 
The Review Team presents an assessment of the current state of the mine action sector and notes that 
focus has shifted from hard technical issues to socio-economic issues and links to development 
activities. Tools and methods for clearance have improved and the donor community including Sida has 
generally followed and supported these developments with considerable financial allocations. Donors 
are now placing increased focus on outcomes, whereas most implementing organisations still report 
mainly on output. This poses a challenge to the organisations who are often not adequately equipped to 
address the broader socio-economic and developmental issues. The Review Team observes that over the 
years, the mine action sector has been allowed to work in isolation from other sectors and has not been 
subjected to conditions and requirements applied to other parts of humanitarian and development 
assistance, including capacity building, sustainability and exit strategies. The findings on Sida supported 
mine action programmes generally underpin this general sector trend, although the lack of coherence 
between mine action and other types of interventions is often in contradiction to policies and overall 
objectives of the implementing organisations. 
 
Relevance of Sida’s mine action policy and country strategies 
Subsequent developments in the mine action sector shows that many of the points in Sida’s policy paper 
for supporting mine action from 2002 are still highly relevant. Sida appears however not to have 
promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing partners, and it is not supported by an 
implementation strategy. This has resulted in a missing link between policy directions and decisions 
regarding implementation. Another finding is that mine action is invisible in a number of Sida’s country 
strategies and not subject to any strategic considerations or approach. As a consequence progress and 
results are not measurable according to normal standards. As Sida moreover does not have in-house 
technical expertise on mine action, many of the programmes supported have been allowed to continue 
without sufficient technical accountability in terms of documented results, and this is a cause for 
concern in light of the substantial investments from Sida’s side in the sector. The Review Team 
concludes that consistency between policy and implementation is limited. 
 
The Review Team recommends: 
• More active monitoring from Sida incl. from country offices, including periodic visits to 
programmes.  




• Sida to ensure technical expertise in mine action internally in Stockholm or through employing 
external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality assurance of 
programmes.  
• Implementation agencies should be held to their promises, through accountability vis-à-vis their 
stated objectives. Next phase funding should not be provided unless objectives are fulfilled. 
• Clear strategic principles be developed to uphold quality and measurability in programmes 
supported, and monitoring systems and procedures be made more cohesive.  
• Mine action to be integrated in Sida’s country strategies (in relevant countries) and an action plan 
be developed to support implementation on the mine action policy. 
 
Relevance of support to global organisations 
The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. 
Furthermore, the choice of supporting key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's funding 
to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the Review 
Team also finds relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's contributions 
are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relates well to Sida objectives in terms of national 
capacity building. The support to UNMAS appears to complement UNDP as they are present and active 
on mine action where UNDP is not or is unable. Similarly, the Review Team also finds that the support 
to GICHD and Geneva Call has been relevant to Sida's Mine Action Policy, particularly in relation to 
knowledge development. 
 
The Review Team recommends: 
• Greater effort could be made to identify and report at outcome level (i.e. on results achieved) and to 
identify development impacts more clearly.  
• Sida to continue pressing for clear guidelines on GICHD's advisory and evaluation roles, and to 
urge for continued focus on development impact. 
• Sida support to change to core support: single Swedish contribution to core costs (MFA & Sida 
together). 
 
Relevance of country level support 
The Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with national 
priorities as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action 
authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. The relevance in relation to the seriousness of 
mine contamination is not clear in all cases, as for example DRC according to available information is 
not seriously affected in contrast to a much more contaminated country like Iraq. Relevance in relation 
to population needs and vulnerability is generally not documented in the programme, with the exception 
of DDG in Iraq having included socio-economic parameters and employing a project manager with a 
broader development background.  
The Review Team recommends: 
• Adding socio-economic expertise to key staff including managers. 
• Introducing socio-economic surveys for needs assessments and baselines. 
• Targeting programmes towards most vulnerable groups as a first priority. 
• Including improvements in living conditions in mainstream project elements such as objectives, 
activities, indicators, outputs, outcomes, to feed into reporting on development related progress and 
challenges. 
• Sida to consider focusing on countries facing serious contamination– or countries where links to 
other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes are considered useful. 
 




Effectiveness and efficiency 
The technical operational base of the programmes reviewed is strong and well developed. Planning 
processes and programme management are undertaken in a very effective and efficient manner, and the 
quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective land release processes is 
generally very high. Reporting tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land 
release level and not on outcomes. This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme objectives which 
in most programmes also include broader socio-economic elements. Achievement of objectives related 
to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional authorities, and the national staff is 
not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the documents reviews this aspect appears 
often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed unevenly and in more informal ways at 
the level of national authorities.  
The Review Team recommends: 
• More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting to be introduced in order to ensure 
that all objectives are reported on. 
• These requirements be enforced and reports only addressing output level and technical aspects not 
to be approved. 
• New funding should not to be allocated until satisfactory reporting from previous phase is in place. 
 
Sustainability 
In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action 
authorities and contains elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good 
potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, although some of them could benefit from 
a more systematic approach. There is a risk that some organisations are caught in a dilemma between 
leaving national capacity and making themselves redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on 
one hand, and a desire to keep activities going and keep up their business on the other.  
The Review Team recommends: 
• Capacity building strategies become a standard requirement in all mine action programmes 
supported by Sida, and these strategies be based on negotiations with national mine action 
authorities in order to ensure ownership and transparency. 
• That reporting on progress on capacity building becomes mandatory in annual reports. 
• That all programmes develop strategies for sustainability and exit including benchmarks for exit or 
for re-assessment of exit dates. 
 
Impact 
Documentation of impact is an area that the mine action sector has been struggling with for many years, 
and this review has found no shortage of good intentions but very little documentation of impact. Two 
significant achievements are however  notable in this area: the DDG manual for impact monitoring now 
being rolled out, and MAG’s long-awaited process of developing an impact monitoring tool based on 
community data already being compiled as part of the organisation’s community liaison work. 
Considering that other organisations (like NPA and GICHD) are also developing toolboxes on this, one 
might raise a question of possible coordination and cost savings among organisations. Despite the good 
intentions and tools underway, the conclusion of the Review Team is that no documentation of impact 
has been traced in any of the programmes reviewed, and it raises concerns that such a vital element of 
results documentation have been allowed to take so long to develop. 
The Review Team recommends: 
• Sida to maintain close dialogue with DDG to follow the practical use of the new manual. 




• Sida to encourage DDG and MAG to keep a high level of information between them and exchange 
ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring. 
• Sida to liaise with GICHD to strengthen its coordination of methodological development related to 
impact monitoring in mine action. 
GICHD 
While limited compared to other aspects of Sweden's support to mine action, the contribution to 
methodological development and knowledge management through GICHD is a valuable and relevant 
complement to the operational support provided elsewhere. The Review Team found that the Centre is 
interested in pursuing a close dialogue and partnership with Sida.  This is relevant in view of the 
complementarity between the work of the Centre and Sida's policy and interests.  At the same time, the 
Review Team finds that the logic for Sida's very specific programme support is less clear than it once 
was and that a move to core support could be considered.  In this case, it would make sense to also 
consider combining the Swedish support into a single contribution. 
The Review Team recommends: 
• Sweden to continue its support of the GICHD and provision be made for core support. 
• Sida, in its dialogue with GICHD, to encourage the development of practical guidelines relating to 
the Centre's advisory and evaluation roles in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest arising. 
• Sida, in its dialogue with GICHD, to encourage the further development of operational guidelines 
relating to linking mine action with development.  





This document presents the results of an external review of Sida’s support to mine action activities 
between 2001 and 2009 undertaken by COWI A/S and Channel Research. The Review Team 
comprised Elsebeth Krogh (team leader)(COWI), Tim Lardner (COWI/Lardner Associates), 
Laurent de Valensart (Channel Research), and Julian Brett (COWI). 
The overall purpose of this external review is to provide Sida with a comprehensive assessment of the 
support provided from Sida to mine action activities between 2001 and 2009.  This will feed into Sida's 
planning of its future engagement in the area. The primary intended users of the review within Sweden 
are the management and staff of Sida, the Swedish MFA, and the MSB.  The secondary intended users 
are the implementing partners, e.g. UN agencies, MAG and DDG, not least in relation to the two 
country studies that were undertaken during the review in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Iraq.  Another secondary intended user is the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD). 
 
The Review Team would like to thank management and staff of the mine action organisations 
visited in Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo for planning and facilitation of visits and 
hospitality and logistical assistance during our country visits. Sincere thanks also go to the national 
mine action authorities, Sida representatives, UN representatives, non-governmental organisations 
and other stakeholders consulted. We would also like to extend our gratitude to resource persons 
met at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva Call and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Geneva.  
 




2 Mine action: A sector in transition 
2.1 Key mine action developments and donor trends 
Global mine action has received in the region of USD 3.7 billion during the last decade1 of which 
Sweden has contributed USD 178 million (around 5%).  
In the early days of mine action, focus was very much on the clearance of mined areas and the numbers 
of mines and square metres of land cleared.  Much has however changed, and the mine action industry 
had become much more directed towards softer, but more meaningful outputs.  Tools used by mine 
action actors have developed and improved at the operational level (for example, metal detectors are 
significantly more effective and reliable than ten years ago) as well as at the implementation level (for 
instance, the increasing use of impact monitoring systems is helping operators to deliver mine action to 
the right places at the right time). 
Additionally, operating methodologies and processes, such as technical and non-technical surveys as 
well as the relatively new “land release” concept, have improved significantly the effectiveness of 
programmes. The many lessons learned in the sector as a whole have undoubtedly led to the delivery of 
a more focused product and something of greater benefit to the beneficiaries of mine action activities, as 
well as the international community, including donors. 
The donor community, including Sida, has followed this development closely and has shifted its focus 
so that funding processes now recognise the importance of impact, outcomes and results, monitoring, 
participatory approaches and focus on beneficiaries rather than purely the number of mines removed and 
square metres cleared. As our report shows, however, there continues to be a need to extend these 
positive developments further and optimise the outcomes of mine action efforts. 
In addition, in a number of countries, the traditional mine action NGO implementers are coming under a 
certain degree of competition from commercial operating companies who provide effective results in 
certain areas – mainly operational -  which may well complement the work of the NGOs by allowing 
them to focus on the more impact focused areas of work. 
2.2 Defining mine action 
Although the clearance of Remnants of War (and more recently Explosive Remnants of War {ERW}) 
has been undertaken to some degree or other for many hundreds of years, the formalised “Mine Action 
industry” only became more broadly understood and accepted at the end of the 1980s, following the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Here, the effects of mines and ordnance were seen publicly to be 
inflicting large numbers of casualties upon the civilian population.  
Mine Action entails much more than removing landmines from the ground and is, indeed, much more 
than just landmines. The UN’s five pillars of mine action2 outline actions ranging from teaching people 
                                                   
1 Landmine Monitor 2009 – between 1998 - 2008 




how to protect themselves from the danger posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) to 
advocating for a mine-free world.  
The United Nations states:  “Mine action is not just about landmines. In many countries, unexploded 
ordnance, or UXO, poses an even greater threat to people's safety. UXO comprises bombs, mortars, 
grenades, missiles or other devices that fail to detonate on impact but remain volatile and can kill if 
touched or moved. Some of the main sources of UXO are cluster bombs. Today, mine action 
programmes typically address problems of landmines, UXO and "explosive remnants of war (ERW)," 
which include UXO and "abandoned ordnance," or weapons left behind by armed forces when they 
leave an area”3. 
Central to Mine Action is the focus on people and mines. According to the International Mine Action 
Standard’s definition, mine action is “...not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, 
and how they are affected by landmine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination. 4 The 
objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live 
safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed 
by landmine and ERW contamination, and in which the victims’ needs can be addressed”.  
 
Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities: 
• mine risk education (MRE) 
• humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance 
• victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration 
• stockpile destruction, and 
• advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines. 
 
2.3 The nature and scope of the mine problem 
Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) mutilate, kill and may create serious socio-economic blockages 
that act as barriers to development and deny people their basic rights. In 2008 (the most recent year with 
reliable data available), more than 70 countries and 7 areas not internationally recognised5 reported 
landmine casualties6, of which Afghanistan, Lao PDR and Cambodia are generally regarded as the most 
mine and unexploded ordnance affected countries with the greatest number of civilian victims.  Of the 
main countries in which mine action is, or has been, supported by Sida, the following table provides an 
overview of recent casualty rates:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Mine Risk Education; humanitarian demining (mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance); victim 
assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; stockpile destruction; and advocacy against the use of anti-
personnel mines. 
3 http://www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=what_is_mine_action  
4 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, IMAS 04.10 
5”Areas not internationally recognised” is the terminology referring to those areas not internationally recognised as 
states – the likes of Nagorno Karabakh, Western Sahara, Palestine, South Sudan. 
6 Landmine Monitor, 2009. 
















Source: Landmine Monitor, 2009. 
Most countries have experienced a decrease in casualties over the years. This may partly be due to 
increased and improved mine risk education (leading to a higher coverage), better knowledge and 
avoidance of mine-affected locations. In some countries, the casualty decrease may be explained by 
mine clearance progress. However, it should be noted that the collection and maintenance of the 
statistics regarding mine casualties are dismally poor in many countries. Significant underreporting 
takes place because figures are based on victims that have sought assistance or come in contact with 
mine action personnel. Considering the distances, lack of transport and the extreme bodily harm that 
most accidents result in, mine action experts suggest that in some countries a high percentage die before 
reaching a medical facility and therefore go unrecorded. 
2.4 The international response 
Although mines and unexploded ordnance has affected military personnel and civilians over the last 
century, it is only in the last 20 years that a formalised response has emerged. This stemmed originally 
from the NGO response to the humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Cambodia and other severely 
affected countries.  
2.4.1 International treaties 
There are a number of international agreements and treaties in place that regulate or ban the use of 
mines and ERW under certain circumstances. These instruments are a part of the body of international 
                                                   
7 Although these figures are from a reputable source (Landmine Monitor), it should be noted that all such statistics have 
a factor of unreliability reflecting the logistic and operational challenges of operating in the country concerned.  For 
example, Lebanon’s casualty figures are likely to be far more reliable than those of Somalia or DRC. 
8 This figure represents casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) 
Country Casualties (2007) Casualties (2008)8 
Iraq 216 263  
Lebanon 130 28 
DRC 28 14 
Afghanistan 811 992 
Sudan 91 65+ 
Somalia 74 116 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 30 39 
Nicaragua 15 3 
Cambodia 352 269 
Global total recorded 5,426 5,197 




humanitarian law which seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons. The 
principal agreements and treaties are: 
Mine Ban Convention (1997) and 
follow-up (also known as the Ottawa 
Convention or the Ottawa Treaty and 
referred to in the rest of this report as 
the Mine Ban Treaty) 
Today, 156 States are legally bound by the convention to:  
 
• never use anti-personnel mines, nor to “develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer” them;  
• destroy mines in their stockpiles within four years of the treaty 
becoming binding;  
• clear all mines in their territory,  
• in mine-affected countries, conduct mine risk education and ensuring 
that mine survivors, their families and communities receive 
comprehensive assistance;  
• offer assistance to other States Parties, for example, by providing for 
survivors or contributing to clearance programmes; 
• adopt national implementation measures (such as national legislation) 
in order to ensure that the terms of the treaty are upheld in their 
territory. 
 
Protocol 5 of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (2006) 
The Convention prohibits or restricts the use of weapons which cause 
excessive injuries and have indiscriminate effects on people. Protocol 5 
entered into force in November 2006 and provided an opportunity for the 
international community to deliver effective action against ERW. Protocol 5 
of the Convention aims to: 
• Reduce the risks of explosive remnants of war. This includes 
negotiating responsibility for clearance and providing risk education to 
local populations; 
• Improve the reliability of munitions through voluntary best practices to 
minimise the humanitarian risk of munitions that might become 
explosive remnants of war; and 
• Continue to implement existing international humanitarian law. 
 
Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(2008) 
Article 1 of the convention states that each State Party undertakes never 
under any circumstances to:  
 
• Use cluster munitions; 
• Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; 
• Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party under this Convention. 
 
 
In particular, the Mine Ban Treaty has proved to be an incredibly powerful piece of legislation.  
Statistics indicate some of the impact of the treaty - with average annual casualties now being in the 
region of 5,000 per year9 which is a substantial reduction from the estimated 15-20,000 of the late 
1990s. Not only has the treaty reduced casualties and suffering, it has also focused the world’s attention 
on matters relating to explosive remnants of war and encouraged donors to focus their funding on 
effective reduction of casualties and the associated reduction in poverty.  Currently, the Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU) for the Mine Ban Treaty is located within the GICHD and this achieves effective 
outreach.  With the binding ratification of the CCM taking effect on the 1st August 2010, there will need 
to be an ISU for the CCM.  The location and support to this ISU is currently being hotly debated and is 
politically sensitive.  Sida needs to be aware of the issues around this and consider options for 
continuation, or not, of the MBT ISU. 
                                                   
9 In 2008, there were 5,197 casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Landmine Monitor 2009. 




2.5 Key Stakeholders 
The mine action sector is characterised by the presence of many different stakeholders with a variety of 
interests, including from the United Nations, international and national NGOs, governments in affected 
countries, donor governments, commercial operators, and not least affected population groups. An 
overview of major stakeholders and their role in relation to the principal types or sectors of mine action 
activities is presented in the table below. For more information on the key stakeholders, please refer to 
Annex 3. 
Table 2-2 – Overview of key stakeholders in the mine action sector 
 
Key: -1-   = main role / -2-   = supporting role 
 
Analysis of the coverage, strategies, capacities, and funding modalities of the main stakeholder 
groups understandably reflects the roles and interests of the parties concerned. In general, the trend 
over the past decade has been one of increasing capacity from national mine action authorities and 
centres following support from the UN, GICHD and, to a lesser extent, international NGOs. INGOs 
continue to be the main mine action operators in the field, with funding coming from bilateral 
donors. UN agencies (particularly, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF) receive earmarked and 
unearmarked funding from bilateral donors, including Sida. The UN agencies and INGOs operate in 
the range of contextual settings, including countries in conflict. The NGO Geneva Call is unique in 
its explicit engagement of non-state actors in conflict settings. The key stakeholders and their 























UNMAS -1- -2- -2- -1- -1- -2- -1- 
UNDP -2- -2- -2- -2- -1- -1- -1- 
UNICEF  -1- -1-  -1- -2- -1- 
Mine Affected 
countries 
-1- -1- -1- -1- -2-   
Affected 
governments 
-1- -2- -1- -1- -2-   
Affected populations -2- -2- -2-     
Sida 2 2 2 2 2 2 -1- 
Other major donors -1- -1- -1- -2- -1- -1- -1- 
Commercial 
operators 
-1-       
INGOs -1- -1- -1-  -2- -1- -1- 
National NGOs -1- -1- -1-  -2- -2- -1- 
Peacekeeping 
operations 
-1-      -1- 
NMAA -1- -1- -1- -1- -1- -2- -2- 








The figure presents an overview of the main stakeholder groups in the mine action sector, their 
respective roles and interaction with each other. In the comments inserted for each stakeholder the 
Review Team has related to the findings of this review and expressed the desired change or end 
situation that would follow from our recommendations. For further details on the roles of key 
stakeholders please refer to the matrix enclosed in Annex 3 of this report.




3 Approach and methodology 
This review took place between March and July 2010 and was divided into four phases: 1) Inception, 2) 
Desk studies, 3) Field studies, and 4) Analysis and reporting.  
In the inception phase, the research methodology was developed and approved by Sida before the 
Review Team proceeded to the next phases. The desk study phase comprised an overview of 
performance and results at the overall level from Sida supported mine action programmes in the five 
main priority countries for Sida mine action support (Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan) as 
well as four additional countries (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Somalia). The field 
study phase comprised field studies in DRC and Iraq during which Sida–supported programmes were 
reviewed. In addition, a visit was paid to Geneva for an assessment of the GICHD and for consultations 
with UNDP and the NGO Geneva Call. 
The Review team draw from a series of evaluative questions framed around a number of core issues: 
• Prioritisation: In light of the fact that mine clearance is a high-cost activity it is relevant to see how 
land for clearance is selected and prioritised in relation to the degree of suspected mine and UXO 
contamination and in relation to socio-economic factors and developmental needs. 
• Methods and tools applied in mine action: The combination of Sida support to research and 
methodological development at GICHD and the support to mine action programmes provides a 
unique opportunity for knowledge transfer and learning processes. We attempted to gauge the 
extent to Sida-supported programmes emphasize learning processes and apply latest tools and 
methodologies, such as the land release concept. 
• Degree of local involvement: Active participation by beneficiaries in mine action activities is likely 
to establish local ownership and strengthen local capacity and the potential for sustainability.  
• Linkage to development activities: While this appears in strategies and goals of most organisations 
involved in mine action, it often remains a good intention and only in a few cases has it been really 
implemented in the field. Integration of mine action into development programmes in the countries 
supported is a priority for Sida and we sought to see how this is pursued in the countries supported. 
This external review has assessed the relevance and outcome of Sida supported mine action programmes 
against the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria Relevance, Sustainability, Impact, Effectiveness and 
Efficiency, supplemented by two additional criteria from the IMAS Guide for the Evaluation of Mine 
Action Interventions of 2007, namely Coherence and Coordination. In addition, the UN objectives for 
gender mainstreaming mine action programmes have been used as criteria for assessing the gender 
aspects of the Sida supported programmes.10 
Sida’s priority-setting and management of the mine action portfolio of programmes has been mirrored 
against the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles11, as a considerable part of the funding has come 
                                                   
10 Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes, UNMAS, 2005 
11 Please refer to www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org for a full list of the 23 principles 




from the humanitarian budget line. International best practice for evaluations in fragile and conflict 
affected situations12 has also been considered, since mine action programmes are often found in 
countries affected by conflict, either in-conflict or post-conflict. In addition, the Aid Effectiveness 
Framework based on the Paris Declaration (2005), which is mostly used in connection with 
development programmes (and is partly congruent with some of the GHD principles), is also reflected in 
the analysis.  
The evaluation criteria and the core mine action related issues mentioned above form the backbone of 
the evaluative questions which are included in the Outline Evaluation Matrix in Annex 5. The analytical 
framework used by the Review Team is presented in the diagram below. 
Figure 2 Analytical framework 
 
In the diagram, our understanding of the interaction between the three main elements of the review is 
shown, these being (a) the overall, macro assessment of outcome (the results achieved from Sida's 
support to mine action), (b) the operational, field level and (c) the contribution made to both by the 
knowledge generation from GICHD and activities undertaken by other global organisations.  We see 
this as a dynamic process in which the main elements are interactive. For example, we have asked about 
the effect that GICHD has on agencies working at field level and the contribution that the latter makes 
in return to knowledge generation.  Guiding our overall approach to the review has been the evaluation 
criteria, core issues and overall principles set out in the boxes to the left and the right of the diagram. 
                                                   
12 Please refer to the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragiles States and Situations, 2007 




A mix of evaluation techniques was applied to meet Sida's wish for a quantitative and qualitative 
assessment. Our most important tool was key informant interviews with management and staff of the 
organisations under review, semi-structured using check lists as inputs to open-ended explorative 
interviews. We have triangulated information obtained by using data and information from different 
sources - external as well as internal. We have interviewed a broad cross-section of stakeholders, 
including relevant government authorities, NGOs, UN and other international agencies, and direct 
beneficiaries. Focus group sessions were used in particular in consulting beneficiaries, using an 
adapted, simple most-significant change (MSC) type of approach. It was a limitation, though, that the 
team only had the opportunity to talk to relatively few beneficiaries in Kurdistan and DRC due to the 
thinly populated areas in which the mine action operations were located. At the end of each field 
mission, the Review Team held a feedback session with the organisations under review during which 
core preliminary observations were presented and validated. Where important stakeholders could not be 
visited in person, we used telephone interviews to obtain information from stakeholders. Some 
information was also provided by e-mail. 
The combination of case study countries covered by field visit and other countries covered mainly by 
document review posed certain limitations, as the two groups of countries are assessed at different 
levels. In the field visit countries, the Review Team had a good chance to assess at first hand the extent 
to which operations in the field lived up to the objectives and strategies set out in programme 
documentation and Sida policy. However, in the desk study countries, this was obviously not possible to 
the same degree and the team was reliant to a far greater extent on the documentation made available, 
which was in many cases of varying quality. While a number of telephone interviews were undertaken 
to clarify specific aspects, it was generally not possible to conduct the same level of rigorous analysis as 
with the field visits. 




4 Sida’s engagement in mine action 2001-2009 
This chapter provides an overview of Sida's policy basis for support to mine action, its main partners, 
the funding provided, and the types of interventions supported.  
4.1 Sida’s policy paper for mine action  
The Policy for Sida’s Support to Mine Operations (an internal document from 2002) is based on the 
principle that a given country’s mine problems and the solution to them should be ‘owned’ by the 
country itself. According to the policy, Swedish support to mine operations will primarily be directed to 
countries facing large and long-term mine problems, but also countries coming out of conflict situations 
that have prevented from mine clearance will be included as partners. 13 There is considerable focus in 
the policy on the sustainability and long-term perspective in relation to Swedish support to mine action, 
and national capacity building and integration of mine action programmes in development plans and 
programmes of the countries are strongly emphasised, 
 
Focus areas for Sida’s policy paper for mine action  
• Retaining interest in present programmes 
• Integrating mine action with other development programmes 
• Contributing to building up national structures and capacity 
• Supporting short-term programmes with a humanitarian aim 
• Humanitarian demining, in particular surveys and data collection, expertise where Sweden  
has a comparative advantage, and mine clearance 
• Victim assistance 
• Mine awareness 
• Stockpile destruction 
• Support to the international community in relation to coordination and to the UN 
• Long-term financing, in particular for building national structures 
• Support to transfer of know-how to affected countries. 
 
4.2 Channels and level of support at country and global level 
Since the early 2000s, Sweden has been among the ten largest bilateral agencies supporting mine action 
with annual contributions of around SEK 100 million.14  Out of the total amount disbursed to mine 
action between 2005 and 2009, approximately SEK 364 million was humanitarian funding and SEK 174 
million was allocated from development budgets in Sida. The requirements in terms of length if project 
period, reporting etc. are quite different between humanitarian and development funding. Humanitarian 
allocations are usually delivered as rapid disbursements for up to 6 months with relatively light 
                                                   
13The Policy for Sida’s Support to Mine Operations, 2002 
14 Sida’s contribution to mine action 2005-2009, Internal Memo, Sida Nov. 2009  
 
Review of Sida's Support to Mine Action 2001
requirements to project documentation and reporting, whereas the allocations from development budget 
lines are subjected to a much larger machinery of strategic, monitoring, and documentation demands. 
The support is primarily provided throu
a. International NGOs: supporting delivery of mine clearance, technical capacity building, mine risk 
education and associated activities.
b. United Nations and certain other international organisations (such as the Organisation of 
American States): the support has generally been through un
action and specific country programmes
c. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining: which has provided international 
advocacy, methods development and work rel
d. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB): where the flexible support has been utilised in mine 
action in various countries 
Drawing from the financial information provided to the Review Team by Sida, we can depict the 
approximate distribution of funds between these actors as 
Figure 3: Share of Sida funding to mine action as a percentage
And the distribution according to the main countries supported as shown 
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The Swedish global contribution (SEK 94 million) to the UN, GICHD and Geneva Call covers a large 
number of countries, whereas the bilateral support agreed for the period 2005 – 2009 has been mainly 
focused on five countries (namely, Iraq, Lebanon, DRC, Afghanistan, and Sudan).15  Of the nine 
countries covered by this review, the funding provided and the implementing partners is presented in the 
table below: 
 
Table 4-1: Overview of main recipients and implementing partners 
 
Country Implementing Partners Timeframe Total funding 
(SEK) 
Afghanistan DDG with UNMACA and  MAPA  2005-2010 57.1 million 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Bosnia & Herzegovina MAC, through 
UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme  
2003-2008 22 million 
Cambodia Cambodia MAC through UNDP 2001-2005 58.8 million 
DRC MAG, MSB 2005-2010 62.1 million 
Iraq DDG, MAG, MSB/ICRC 1998-2009 77.1 million 
Lebanon 
MSB with UNOPS and UNMAS Rapid 
Response Plan for Mine Action 
2006-2009 65.6 million 
Nicaragua OAS with IADB 2002-2005 23.5 million 
Somalia MSB with UNDP/UNOPS and UNMAS  2004-2009 51.8 million 
Sudan 
MSB with UNMAS and UN Mine Action 
Office in Sudan, UNMAO, DDG 
2004-2009 40.9 million 
Source: Sida 
4.2.1 Types of activities supported 
Sida has spread its funding widely over the core elements of mine action.  Examples of projects 
undertaken in each of the five “pillars” are: 
Mine Clearance.  The core element of many of Sida’s funded activities has been focussed though Sida’s 
partners undertaking operational programmes in countries including Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, Somalia and 
Sudan.  The description “mine clearance”, as well as pure demining activities, refers also to associated 
activities including technical survey, mapping, marking, clearance, post-clearance documentation, 
community mine action liaison and the handover of cleared land.  More recently, activities under the generic 
description “land release” have come under this description.  Land release is a process that has gained rapid 
acceptance in the global mine action community for its potential to improve efficiency of operations.  Support 
for mine clearance activities has been channelled through MAG, DCA, DDG, NPA, the OAS, and one country 
programme, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre. 
Victim Assistance. This refers to all aid, relief, comfort and support provided to victims (including survivors) 
with the purpose of reducing the immediate and long-term medical and psychological implications of their 
trauma.  Support for victim assistance activities has particularly been channelled through UNICEF activities.  
                                                   
15 The following countries also received Swedish funding within country frames or from the humanitarian appropriation 
during 2005 – 2009:  Albania, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, 
Nicaragua, OPT, Russia, Senegal and Sri Lanka.  




Mine Risk Education. These are activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines/ERW by raising 
awareness and promoting behavioural change including public information dissemination, education and 
training, and community mine action liaison.  Support for MRE activities is a key element of the majority of 
operational programmes supported by Sida.  
Advocacy. In the context of mine action, the term refers to public support, recommendation or positive 
publicity with the aim of removing or at least reducing the risk from, and the impact of, mines and ERW.  
Direct support for advocacy has been primarily through the organisation Geneva Call and their interaction 
with non-States actors. 
Stockpile Destruction. The physical destructive procedure towards a continual reduction of the national 
stockpile.  Support to stockpile destruction forms an element of a number of operationally implemented 
programmes. 
 
As noted in the opening chapter of this report, the mine action area is under constant development and it 
is worth highlighting some examples of this. The Land Release Concept is an attempt to improve cost-
effectiveness of clearance efforts, based on a situational analysis followed by non-technical and 
technical surveys. Sida has supported the development of this concept at both the research level 
(through the GICHD) and at the operational level through a number of implementing partners.  In many 
mine action programmes throughout the world, deminers, machines, dogs and other expensive assets are 
deployed in areas that are subsequently found to be free from hazards. While this gives confidence to 
the end users that the land is safe and allows them access to it again, it does, in the long run, provide 
very poor use of the limited resources available within the demining community. However, a more 
targeted  process that allows the right tool to be used in the right place at the right time will improve 
efficiency and effectiveness and thus allow the limited resources available to the community to be used 
much more effectively, resulting in better value for money for donors and more rapid impact for 
affected communities. 
Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) also present significant opportunities to improve the efficiency of the 
mine clearance process.  Unfortunately, there are as many opportunities for investments to be utilised 
poorly and MDD assets need to be deployed and operated under tight constraints. Meanwhile, 
Community Liaison is a series of activities designed to improve the ability of an organisation to 
implement effective mine action.  Activities include drawing information from communities and 
educating them about the dangers posed by ERW.  
4.2.2 Recipient organisations  
Sida’s core recipient partners consist of key actors in the mine action community whose experience 
provides a broad and well balanced cross section of the whole mine action environment – as shown in 
the overview below. 
United Nations Description Sida support 
UNMAS UN’s mine action coordinating body SEK 5-7 million per year 
UNICEF Mine Risk Education, Victim 
Assistance 
SEK 27,5 million between 2003 & 
2009 
UNDP Capacity Building of national mine 
action authorities 
SEK 10 million per year 




International NGOs Description Sida support 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) Humanitarian organisation. Operating 
in 16 countries.  Co-laureate of 1997 
Nobel Peace Prize through ICBL. 
SEK 83.3 million since 2005 in 
Iraq, DRC and Sri Lanka. 
Danish Demining Group 
(DDG) 
Humanitarian Mine Action Unit in 
Danish Refugee Council. Operating in 
7 countries. 
SEK 125.3 million since 2005 in 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan and 
Iraq. 
DanChurchAid (DCA) Humanitarian Mine Action part of 
broader humanitarian organisation. 
Operational in MA in 6 countries. 
SEK 4.75 million since 2005 in 
Burundi. 
Norwegian People’s Aid 
(NPA) 
Mine Action Dept. in humanitarian 
solidarity organisation. Operational in 
Main 15 countries. 
SEK 16 million in 2005-2006 in 
Angola. 
Other organisations Description Sida support 
Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency (MSB) 
An organisation undertaking rapid 
interventions in emergency situations.  
SEK 171.7 million between 2005-
2009 in 14 countries. 
Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) 
Organisation undertaking research, 
supporting mine action implementation 
and the mine action community. 
Works closely with UN on IMSMA 
standards. Hosts the Implementation 
Support Unit under the Mine Ban 
Treaty. 
SEK 49 million since 2001 (35 
from MFA, 7.3 from Sida, and 6 
from other Swedish sources). 
Geneva Call Neutral and impartial humanitarian 
organisation supporting non-state 
actors in IHL and HR compliance. 
SEK 5 million in 2008-2009. 
Organisation of American 
States (OAS) 
Peace and justice organisation of the 
member states. 
SEK 13.2 million in 2005-2006 in 
Nicaragua (declared landmine free 
in 2010). 
4.3 Findings from the 2001 evaluation 
Prior to this Review, the most recent evaluation of Sida’s contributions to mine action16 was concluded 
almost ten years ago and drew a number of major conclusions as well as a number of recommendations.  
These core recommendations were subsequently fed into the current Sida policy on mine action. The 
Review Team finds that the key recommendations from 2001 are still pertinent.  In table 4-2 below, the 
overall achievement of these recommendations is assessed. 
 
 
                                                   
16 Sida’s Contributions to Humanitarian Mine Action, Sida evaluation 01/06, Harpviken et al, Stockholm, March 2001,  










HMA programmes need to be based 
on solid systems for impact 
assessment and on routines for 
converting results of assessments 
into sound plans and priorities. 
In principle Limited Although programmes often claim to 
have effective impact monitoring 
systems in place, more often than 
not, these are not strong. Examples: 
MAG, DDG. 
HMA organizations should make 
sure that all staff have a basic 
understanding of impact and its 
relationship to HMA. One way this 
can be accomplished is by 
integrating impact sessions in the 
basic training of staff. 
In principle Limited Although basic impact and its 
relationship is often understood to a 
limited degree by technical staff, the 
Review Team saw little evidence of 
inbuilt impact training in technical 
staff.  Examples: Programmes 
visited in DRC and Iraq. 
Sida must require from any HMA 
programme it supports that a 
comprehensive and locally adapted 
system for impact assessment is 
either in place or is being developed. 
In principle Limited In both field visit countries, the 
Review Team was unable, despite 
the claims of the operational 
organisations, to find substantive 
and effective post clearance impact 
monitoring systems in place.  
Sida should, in internal appraisals as 
well as evaluations of HMA, take 
care not to apply simple output 
measures, such as cost per square 
metre, as a proxy for programme 
quality. A similar caveat can be 
applied to relying solely on one type 
of impact assessment, which may 
favour certain factors at the 
exclusion of others. 
In principle Limited Square metres are generally not 
used as indicators by Sida’s 
operators, but there remains some 
difficulty with operational capacities 
understanding of impact monitoring 
mechanisms. No examples seen of 
applying this recommendation. 
Sida must emphasize the building of 
national capacities, both at the 
individual and the organizational 
level, and safeguard capacity-
building during all stages of an 
operation, including the initial 
planning stage. 
In principle To some extent Sida’s implementers are doing 
capacity building but not consistently 
and often without a strategy. 
Examples: MAG Iraq and DRC. 
The coordination between HMA and 
other sectors of reconstruction and 
development needs to improve. The 
view that HMA is a technical sector 
apart from other parts of 
humanitarian assistance remains 
prevalent. In order to improve 
coordination between HMA and 
other humanitarian assistance, they 
must be integrated at the early 
planning stages and steps must be 
taken to ensure that plans are 
updated to accommodate new 
demands. 
In principle Limited Mine Action still sees itself as a 
separate entity and there is often a 
major challenge to integrate into the 
broader humanitarian assistance 
sector. 










In general terms, there is a need to 
ensure that in-kind contributions to 
HMA constitute a relevant response 
to the particular needs of the 
recipient country. In-kind 
contributions that are motivated by 
the donor country’s needs to build 
competence or to support its own 













While the principle is sound, there 
are examples of where this has 
failed badly. MSB’s deployment to 
DRC has not been entirely 
successful. 
Sida should continue its secondment 
of technical advisors, as long as it is 
able to ensure full relevance of skills 
through dialogue with hosts and to 
uphold good recruitment procedures. 
No TA should be seconded unless 
competence-building is a central 
aspect of the mandate. Sida should 
expand its recruitment base in order 
to respond to requirements in all 
areas of HMA, such as impact 
assessment. 
Yes Yes This appears to be implemented well 
and contributes significantly to the 
capacity building of national 
authorities and bodies. MSB’s 
secondments and capacity building 
projects are good examples of this. 
Sida needs to closely monitor the 
progress of the dog project in 
Cambodia. Historically, the project, 
implemented by the Swedish Armed 
Forces, has been a failure, with 
major flaws in the organizational set-
up as a key problem. Sida needs to 
ensure its ability to withdraw from 
the project unless significant 
improvements take place. 
Yes Yes  Project is closed. 
Sida should not assume that 
personnel involved possess a basic 
understanding of humanitarian 
assistance when they employ 
Swedish capacities in HMA. Sida 
needs to take greater responsibility 
in terms of building the necessary 
expertise and establishing relevant 
institutional arrangements, drawing 
on its broad experience in Swedish 
capacity-building for development 
cooperation. 
No No The MSB intervention in DRC 
showed significant lack of 
understanding of the basic principles 
of humanitarian assistance. 
Sida needs to apply longer funding 
horizons 
No No Funding horizons reasonable as far 
as the Review Team could see. 
Closer monitoring would need to be 
applied if funding periods are to be 
made longer. 










Sida needs to maintain personnel 
with HMA competence that can 
advise and build competence 
amongst other decision makers 
within the organization. 
No No The Review Team believes this is a 
major weakness in Sida’s internal 
capacity. 
 
4.4 Lessons learnt since the 2001 evaluation 
The 2001 evaluation clearly pointed to some major weaknesses in the mine action sector, and the current 
review has found that most of these are still present in relation to projects and programmes supported by 
Sida. A number of lessons can be learnt from the developments since the evaluation took place and the 
policy was formulated. These include the need for: 
• a stronger push from donors regarding outcomes and impact 
• different competency profiles of staff, particularly staff with humanitarian and development 
experience  
• a more strategic approach to building national capacities  
• linking with development activities and national development plans, and  
• the lack of mine action expertise within Sida can lead to a risk of inadequate monitoring and quality 
assurance. 
 
These issues are taken up and discussed in the remainder of this report. 
 




5 Compliance with Sida’s policies and strategies 
5.1 Relevance of Sida policies and strategies for mine operations 
The Policy for Sida’s Support for Mine Operations was produced in 2002 and is thus based on the 
experience of the 1990s (and the evaluation of 2001), when donors started allocating substantial 
amounts of funding to mine clearance operations. At the same time, global advocacy efforts led to the 
banning of anti-personnel mines in the Mine Ban Treaty signed in 1997 and put into effect from 1999.  
As the fourth largest donor in the sector, Sweden gathered important experiences from the 1990s, as 
documented in reports from 2000 -2001.17 One of the important findings also supported by international 
assessments was that the mine action activities that emerged and grew in volume during the 1990s were 
dominated by highly specialised technical experts with little connection to development cooperation. 
Costs were extremely high compared to other sectors, effects and results were rarely evaluated, 
coordination was weak, and mine action developed into an isolated sector.  In its policy document, Sida 
pointed to the need for a new direction in mine action, balancing the urgency of the mine problem with 
consideration of longer-term post-conflict rehabilitation and development aspects. In particular, Sida 
wished to give more prominence to in-country capacity building and considering social needs in a 
broader sense.18 
The focus areas defined by Sida in the policy are largely based on the experience mentioned above and 
all circle around aspects of coordinating and integrating mine action with other development activities, 
and strengthening in-country capacity and ownership.  
This policy paper is now eight years old now and does not reflect the process of implementation of the 
Mine Ban Treaty or recent agreement on the Cluster Munitions Convention. However, the subsequent 
developments in the mine action sector show that many of the points are still highly relevant. For 
example, very few (if any) of the mine action organisations have managed to establish an effective link 
to development activities and most are still struggling with documentation of results and impact beyond 
the output level. Some have prioritised capacity building of national mine action authorities and made 
some headway in that area, but few have reached the point of sustainable in-country capacities and exit 
strategies for the international organisations. 
Surprisingly, the Review Team did not come across anybody related to the Sida-supported mine action 
programmes in the two field visit countries who had heard about Sida’s mine action policy. This could 
of course be explained by its age and the turnover of programme staff in the countries since 2002, but it 
also suggests the possibility that Sida has not promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing 
partners.   
                                                   
17 Preliminary report and analysis of Swedish support for different forms of mine action and a preliminary policy for 
future support (SEKA, 2000-02787/10) and  Sida’s Contribution to Humanitarian Mine Action (Andersson, Harpviken, 
Millard, Hjellman, Strand) Sida Evaluation 01/06. 
18 Policy for Sida’s Support for Mine Operations, Sida 2002 




The status of the mine action policy never went beyond that of an internal Sida document, used as 
guidance by the focal points for mine action in Sida.19 Given the lack of knowledge of its existence 
amongst implementing partners, it seems not to have been enforced or promoted to any significant 
extent outside Sida. Rather, the implementing partners stated that the donor interest (shown by donors 
across the board) in linking to development and documenting socio-economic impact is a recent trend 
felt during the past couple of years. In principle, this trend is acknowledged by them as relevant, but 
there is a widespread view that they should nonetheless concentrate on their core business of ‘getting the 
contamination out of the ground’ and that broader development efforts are outside their scope of work.  
The apparent lack of knowledge of Sida’s mine action policy indicates a possible missing link between 
the policy priorities of Sida and implementation on the ground. While parts of the policy relate to the 
selection and assessment of projects and could be considered internal Sida issues, it also mentions two 
focus areas that could have had significant impacts on the direction of the mine action programmes at 
country level if followed.  These are, ‘Integrating mine action with other development programmes’ and 
‘Contributing to building up national structures and capacity’. 
A further issue that could be addressed by a strategic and action oriented document could be the choice 
of countries to be supported in mine action by Sida. Until recently the funding has been spread among 
17 countries, although five priority countries have now been selected: Afghanistan, DRC, Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Sudan. Of these, only Afghanistan and Iraq have had considerable numbers of casualties 
during the past couple of years, while Cambodia and Somalia – countries not included in Sida’s priority 
list – according to pure accident statistics have much more serious contamination than e.g. DRC or 
Lebanon.20 Other considerations could be to avoid ‘aid orphans’ in mine action through strategic use of 
UNDP and other global actors, or coherence with Sida’s humanitarian or development programmes in 
specific countries. This underlines the need for a directional strategy on criteria for choice of countries 
to be supported.  
Another issue of importance is the need for Sida to follow up on programmes to ensure adherence with 
the policy and assure quality and fulfilment of programme objectives. It was found during this review 
that Sida’s monitoring of mine action programmes is not very tight and that implementing partners 
express a need for more feedback and communication from Sida.  
In light of the considerable amount allocated to mine action programmes in the last decade (in the range 
of SEK 100 million per year) it is striking how light the monitoring of progress and quality has been.  It 
appears to have been relatively easy for implementing partners to get their funding renewed from one 
programme phase to the next. This lack of follow up is due to a number of factors, including lack of 
clear monitoring guidelines for this type of programmes, several departments and desks involved with 
unclear assignment of responsibilities, insufficient capacity to assess these specialised programmes, and 
possibly also an imbalance between the political wish to contribute to mine action and the resources 
necessary to manage the level of commitment established.21 
A clearer division of labour between Sida Stockholm and country offices, as well as a combination of 
close monitoring from country offices and the assistance of an external specialised expert could be a 
viable solution for improving the quality assurance. To some extent, GICHD has been used for this 
purpose (through the PAT project). However, as GICHD is an actor in its own right, it might be 
questioned whether this close-to-Sida advisory role is best placed there. If mine action remains a priority 
                                                   
19 Ref. interview with the former mine action focal point Alf Eliasson 
20 Landmine Monitor 2008 and 2009 
21 There was a standing order for a number of years that app. SEK 100 million should be used for mine action. 




area, it might be relevant to employ internal specialised expertise to ensure appropriate quality 
assurance. This also resonates with the findings of the 2001 evaluation. 
Relationship to Sida country strategies 
A finding from the Iraq study was that mine action is not mentioned in Sida’s country strategy for Iraq 
that otherwise focuses on the two sectors (i) Democracy, governance and human rights and (ii) Trade, 
industry and financial systems.22  The strategy includes a quite elaborate country analysis and current 
challenges faced. It even touches upon the situation of refugees and internally displaced people and the 
importance of the link between migration and development without any reference to mine contamination 
or Sida’s long-standing support to mine action programmes in the Kurdistan region. It is mentioned that 
almost half of the Swedish development assistance to Iraq in 2003 went to humanitarian aid, but apart 
from that, the strategy does not cover the humanitarian part of the Swedish assistance.  
Sida’s country strategy for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has the overall objective to 
strengthen the conditions for lasting peace and improve living conditions for poor people.23  The 
Swedish assistance is concentrated on three sectors: (i) Peace, reconciliation and democratic 
governance, (ii) Poverty oriented economic development with a focus on agriculture and forestry, and 
(iii) Health with a focus on preventing, addressing and fighting against gender-based violence and 
promote sexual reproductive rights and health. Gender equality has been given a prominent place in the 
strategy, in particular promotion of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and 
security. It is also stated that Sweden will scale up humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced people with a specific focus on women and children. The country analysis states that around 
70 per cent of the poorest groups are dependent on forests and biodiversity for their livelihood, in 
particular in the forest region in the north of the country. In addition, the decisive role of agriculture as 
the primary source of livelihood for the poor is emphasised, again with a particular focus on women 
who are responsible for 75 per cent of the food production in the country. Economic activity in these 
two sectors requires secure access to land and therefore mine action programmes would seem highly 
relevant in this context. Mine clearance is mentioned alongside other security related inputs under the 
peace, reconciliation and deomcratisation strategic cooperation area.24  The results of Sida support to 
clearance of mines and ammunition in Eastern and Northern DRC are mentioned in the strategy among 
examples of specific results of Swedish support. 
The Review Team undertook a selective screening of Sida country strategies from other countries where 
Sida is or has been supporting mine action, and this revealed a rather uneven picture in terms of the 
priority given to the sector. 
In the country strategy for development cooperation with Afghanistan 2009 – 201325 it is mentioned 
under ”Selective measures” that conditions for support to land-mine and unexploded ammunition 
disposal would be looked at, as the threat of mines and unexploded ammunition was seen as adding 
to an already serious humanitarian situation. Land mine clearance was one of five priority 
cooperation areas in Sweden’s country strategy for Somalia 2003-2005, as the mine problem was 
seen as an obstacle to the return of refugees and their reintegration including accessing areas for 
                                                   
22 Strategy for development cooperation with Iraq, July 2009 – December 2014, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
23 Strategi för utvecklingssamarbetet med Demokratiska republiken Kongo, april 2009 – december 2012, Swedish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
24 Ibid. page 4 
25 Strategy for development cooperation with Afghanistan July 2009 – December 2013 




dwelling and small-scale agriculture.26 In addition it is mentioned that Danish Demining Group had 
initiated a socio-economic study of the landmine problem in Somalia during the strategy period. The 
subsequent strategy document for Swedish aid-financed support to the peace and reconciliation process 
and humanitarian needs in Somalia – an ”approach” - from 2007, however, does not mention mine 
action. In the Swedish strategy for development cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina 2006 – 
2010,27 mine action is mentioned as a factor important both for human safety and security and to 
economic development, and it is clearly placed as a priority for Swedish support to the country i.e. 
describing some planned interventions in quite some detail. The country strategy for Cambodia 2008-
2010 states that support to mine clearance activities and infrastructure projects has been phased out, in 
line with Cambodia’s poverty reduction strategy.28 The phase-out strategy for Swedish support to 
Nicaragua June 2008 – December 2011does not mention mine action,29 nor does the Swedish Strategy 
for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan 2000 – 200130 ( no newer strategy was found). 
 
In conclusion it is found that mine action has been presented and argued for as a strategic priority in the 
strategies for Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and DRC, while the sector is not 
mentioned in the strategies for Iraq or Sudan. Cambodia and Nicaragua are both characterised by time 
limited engagement and phase-out. Even though Sida emphasises coordination and coherent approaches, 
humanitarian assistance is not integrated in the strategic thinking in all countries, nor is mine action. 
This leads to the conclusion that mine action would benefit from being more systematically included as 
a strategic priority in country strategies where the sector is in fact prioritised and, as a consequence, 
becomes a mandatory subject in the reporting and subject to more regular assessments and evaluations 
than is currently the case. 
Sida’s humanitarian strategy 
The overall objective of Sida’s work on humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering and 
maintain human dignity for the benefit of people in need who are, or are at risk of becoming, affected by 
armed conflicts, natural disasters or other disaster situations.31 Mine action is highly relevant to this 
overall objective, although Sida’s engagement in mine action is not directly mentioned in the strategy. 
The intention to continue supporting the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) – now MSB – is 
however mentioned. In this strategy from 2008 it is indicated that future support to SRSA (which in 
2007 received 8% of the humanitarian budget) will be based on ‘assessed humanitarian needs, demand 
and the comparative advantages, competence and capacity of the SRSA’.32 It is also stated that Sida will 
consult with the Swedish MFA regarding the support to SRSA, which presumably includes support to 
mine action programmes. It is noted that support to mine action may also be included in the allocations 
to the ICRC and UN agencies mentioned in the strategy. 
The humanitarian strategy is based on a strong affirmation of Sweden’s loyalty and adherence to 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the humanitarian principles, as well as the Good 
Humanitarian Donorship Principles (GHD). It also underlines the importance of supporting and 
defending the unique coordinating role of the UN in international humanitarian assistance, as well as 
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backing up the European Union’s Humanitarian Aid Policy. The directional goals of the strategy are 
centred on needs based humanitarian action, local capacity development, preparedness and risk 
reduction, reducing the gap between humanitarian and recovery action, and strengthening coordination 
and adherence to principles in the international humanitarian system.  
At the time of writing the current report, Sida is undertaking an evaluation of its humanitarian assistance 
which will prepare the ground for formulating a revised strategy for the future, updated and adapted to 
current humanitarian challenges such as the increased pressure on human security and protection and 
humanitarian consequences of climate change. It is noted that the humanitarian strategy and the mine 
action policy are by and large consistent despite different publication years. 
5.2 Is there a missing link between policy and implementation? 
An overall assessment of the consistency between the policy paper and the implementation of Sida 
supported mine action programmes on the basis of the review of the implementation organisations 
shows a generally positive picture. However, there are certain areas that appear to lack coherence, 
notably in relation to the linkage between mine action and development, as already noted.  The Review 
team's assessment is provided in table 5-1 below: 
Sida policy focus area (2002) Overall status of implementation (2001-2009) 
Retaining its interest in present programmes (…) but the 
possibility of reappraisal and phasing out shall be kept under 
continuous consideration. 
Fulfilled. 
Sida has normally funded more than one project 
phase. Decision of five main recipient countries. 
Integrating mine action with other development 
cooperation programmes. Sida shall integrate mine action 
in strategies in partner countries affected by the 
consequences of mines.  
Generally not fulfilled. 
Mine action invisible in national development 
strategies and Sida strategies at country level. 
Contributing to building up national structures and 
capacity. The support shall have the aim of contributing to 
(…) sustainable national capacity.  
Fulfilled in terms of training local staff. 
Partly fulfilled in terms of strengthening national 
mine action authorities. 
Supporting short-term programmes with a humanitarian 
aim. Use NGOs or commercial companies in certain 
humanitarian situations where the need of long-term support 
is unclear or it is not possible to create national structures. 
Fulfilled. 
Humanitarian demining. Sida’s support shall focus on 
particular surveys and data collection, expertise where 
Sweden has a comparative advantage, and mine clearance. 
Fulfilled. 
Although Swedish comparative advantage not 
specified. 
Victim assistance. Sida will provide victim assistance within 
the framework of its regular health contributions and through 
its support to organisations such as the Red Cross et.al. 
Fulfilled. 
Mine awareness will be supported within the framework of 
support for mine clearance or as a separate activity. 
Fulfilled. 
Integral part of most mine action programmes. 
Stockpile destruction is not normally supported by Sida 
since it should be seen as a military action rather than a 
development cooperation contribution. 
Not strictly fulfilled. 
Stockpile destruction is an integrated element of 
some mine action programmes supported. 




Support the international community by building up 
coordinating functions for mine action in UN programmes. At 
present, support for this through the UN system is most 
appropriate.  
Fulfilled. 
Sida has provided considerable support to UN’s 
global organisations dealing with mine action. 
Consider long-term financing of support to mine action, 
principally for the building up of national structures.  
(Since) mine action is a long-term activity the forms of 
financing should be suitably adapted. 
Fulfilled. 
Financial commitments are there as part of NGO 
support – but implementation varies. 
Support for transfer of know-how to the countries 
affected. The participation by representatives of the 
countries affected is often limited in international cooperation 
in mine action for financial reasons. Greater participation by 
these countries shall be supported. 
Generally fulfilled. 
This is achieved through the close links 
established between implementing partners and 
national authorities. 
5.3 Options for bridging the gap 
In order to improve the consistency between the levels of policy and implementation, the Review Team 




Intensify monitoring of field programmes: Clarify where primary monitoring responsibility lies, 
initiate more frequent monitoring visits to the programmes and create awareness with implementers of 
Sida’s policy and requirements. Review reports from implementers and do not provide next phase 
funding unless implementing organisations report satisfactorily against technical and socio-economic 
objectives.  




OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM 
Ensure mine action expertise internally in Sida: 
OPTION A: Establish expertise in Sida HQ through employing a staff member with mine action 
background or training of existing staff. 
OPTION B: employ external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality 
assurance of programmes.  
Continue and strengthen the policy priority of linking mine action to development: 
OPTION A: In coordination with GICHD develop programmatic guidelines for implementing 
organisations, thereafter arranging workshops for awareness raising and training. 




OPTION B: Encourage implementing organisations to employ more staff with a development 
background and/or bring in external expertise to develop action plans for linking mine action 
programmes to development initiatives. 
Update Sida’s mine action policy according to subsequent developments in the sector and develop an 
action plan for policy implementation with clear assignment of responsibilities with different units in 
Sida HQ and embassies. 
OPTION A: Maintain a separate mine action policy with an action plan. 
OPTION B: Mainstream mine action in other policies and strategies (humanitarian, country strategies, 
etc.) 
Develop clear strategic principles for how to uphold quality and measurability in programmes 
supported, e.g. through clear criteria for country selection (seriousness of contamination, avoid 
‘orphans’ and coordinate with other donors, or coherence with other Sida programmes?). 
Policy choices: Consider whether political objectives (e.g. fulfilling obligations to Mine Ban Treaty) or 
humanitarian/development objectives should direct decisions on investments and country priorities in 
relation to mine action. 
 




6 Overall results of support to mine action 
In this chapter, the review findings and conclusions on the outcome of mine action projects and 
programmes supported by Sida are presented. The assessment is based on results documented by the 
implementing organisations in the period under review 2001 – 2009 and by information gathered during 
the two country studies of Iraq and DRC, interviews with GICHD and UNDP in Geneva, as well as with 
key Sida and MFA staff. The results are assessed in relation to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, the 
IMAS guide for evaluation of mine action interventions (consistent with the OECD-DAC criteria with a 
few additions), and the Sida policy paper for support for mine operations (essentially based on the 
principles for Good Humanitarian Donorship).   
6.1 Outcome of support to global organisations 
In this section, we review the support provided by Sida to the main organisations working on mine 
action at the global level. These include UN agencies, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD), and Geneva Call. A somewhat greater focus has been placed on GICHD than on 
the other recipients due to the emphasis placed on the Centre's role in our Terms of Reference.  
6.1.1 UN agencies 
As the focal point for mine action in the UN system, UNMAS (which is part of DPKO) is responsible 
for ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmines and ERW through 
collaboration with other UN departments, agencies, funds and programmes.  Sida's support to UNMAS 
is seen as relevant from the perspective of Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy.  It 
also appears relevant in the context of the peacekeeping and emergency settings where UNMAS 
establishes and manages mine action coordination centres, plans and manages operations, mobilizes 
resources and sets mine-action priorities. The SEK 5-7 million a year to UNMAS' mine action 
programmes has been provided as un-earmarked support which is a flexible means of making 
contributions that also reduces transaction costs. UNMAS provides reporting through its annual reports 
which, while not donor specific, are generally outcome related.33 In addition, Sida’s contributions to 
MSB also support UNMAS, who have recently had secondees attached to programmes in  Iraq, Lebanon 
and Gaza. 
Sida’s support to UNMAS has been unearmarked. Although it is therefore difficult to identify specific 
projects as a result, the Review Team understands that UNMAS’ recent successful intervention into 
Somalia was largely funded by Sida contributions through MSB.  As the focul point for mine action in 
the UN, UNMAS has used the Inter Agency Coordination Group (IACG) and country resident 
coordinators as the means of preventing overlap between UN agencies. UNMAS are beginning a 
coordination process through cluster approaches to develop a more transparent and effective 
methodology.  Using UNMAS’annual multi-donor annual report as the reporting mechanism reduces the 
administrative report burden that UNMAS would otherswise have - and thus transaction costs are kept 
low. On the other hand, it is less useful as a means of monitoring the use of Swedish funds.  
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One of UNMAS’ advantages lies with it being the only UN agency completely dedicated to mine action 
issues without the distractions that the other agencies involved in mine action have. In its coordinating 
function, it also takes the lead in monitoring the UN's Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy. The 
strategy has four objectives to be achieved by 2010: 
1. Reduction of death and injury by at least 50 percent. 
2. Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 
percent of the most seriously affected communities. 
3. Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and 
budgets in at least 15 countries. 
4. Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the 
same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries. 34 
It is difficult to identify precisely how well these objectives have been achieved – in part because the 
baseline was not identified in a number of cases.  However, UNMAS informed the Review Team that 
good progress has been made regarding objectives 1 & 3.  Objective 2 is proving more difficult to 
measure. The list of countries working with UNMAS has expanded since 2006 and this appears to have 
made it difficult to achieve objective 4. The current strategy is under review and is likely to be revised 
in the early part of 2011. 
Sweden's support to UNDP has been channelled to 20 or so countries plus to the global advocacy 
partnerships between UNDP and NGOs (such as Landmine Action UK and others).35  The funds have 
supported a range of activities from enabling critical support (e.g. in Senegal and Colombia), to capacity 
development (e.g. in Uganda and Yemen), to mine action activities like clearance, victim assistance and 
mine risk education (in Senegal, Albania, Yemen, etc.), and to generation of small scale economic 
recovery programmes linked to clearance (Lebanon). The funding has also enabled mine-affected states 
to complete their treaty obligations in relation to clearance provisions under Article 5 of the Mine Ban 
Treaty (e.g. in Malawi, Zambia, Albania).  
UNDP is prioritising capacity development and treaty obligations in the support provided to national 
mine action authorities and affected states.  One such project is the Completion Initiative which targets 
affected countries with a modest residual problem which a concentrated effort can address and treaty 
obligations fulfilled. The Review Team notes that, while this approach is necessary to achieve 
completion, it does raise questions regarding the opportunity cost of focusing on residual contamination 
which may or may not be an actual problem in relation to risk and/or access to productive land. 
An example of UNDP's capacity building and policy support role is provided by the Clearing for 
Results project in Cambodia (which benefitted from modest Sida support). Since 2006, UNDP has 
helped the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) with planning, prioritization and regulation of 
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mine action in Cambodia. According to a recent review, the project has made "considerable headway in 
affecting broader sector reform, most notably in the targeting and application of mine action assets, as 
well as the systematization of survey and land release approaches. There is also firm evidence that the 
project has been pivotal in consolidating the institutional and operational functioning of the CMAA".36 
UNDP informed the Review team that the community-based system used by the project for planning 
mine clearance activities is designed to ensure that clearance responds to community needs and 
therefore maximize the development impact.37 
 
Similarly, UNDP's support to the Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP), with a significant Sida 
contribution, appears to have been both relevant and effective. IMAP has been evaluated twice, firstly 
by GICHD in 2006 and more recently by an independent consultant in 2010. The two assessments differ 
considerably in their technical detail, with the 2006 GICHD review carrying greater technical weight. 
Both reviews found the Programme to be effective in supporting the development of national capacities 
due to the quality and continuity of the UNDP technical advisers (which were gradually reduced as the 
national authority gained strength). A significant achievement appears to have been the programme's 
Community Integrated Mine Action Plans which combine clearance, technical survey, marking and 
MRE and result in prioritisation of areas for clearance that take into account demand for settlement and 
economic usage.38 Despite this, and interestingly, it is only the latter (2010) review that provides details 
of development impact where it is noted that areas cleared include "sites with tourism potential, 
agricultural areas and infrastructural projects".39 
 
Sweden provides global, multi-year, flexible funding for UNDP's mine action programmes, which is 
appreciated because of the flexibility it offers. Reporting on the support is provided on a country by 
country basis and focuses almost exclusively at the activity and output level.40  Aside from 
demonstrating that a programme is active, the Review Team finds that the value of this as a means of 
monitoring deliverables against Sida's Mine action Policy and UNDP's own strategy is questionable. In 
their future dialogue with UNDP, the Review Team therefore recommend that Sida investigate whether 
this can be strengthened.  
Sida's support to UNICEF's Office of Emergency Programmes has been used to build and mainstream 
mine action and small arms capacity. In UNICEF's Global proposal to support the implementation of 
UNICEF mine action, 2006-2009, the overall purpose is set out as to help enable UNICEF to meet its 
commitments in its Core Commitments for Children (CCC) in emergencies, UNICEF's Medium Term 
Strategic Plan (2006-2009), and the UN Mine Action Strategy (2006-2009). The proposal covers both 
mine action and small arms activities and Sida's funding is divided between the two thematic areas. 
From this allocation, UNICEF's programming staff distribute the funds to country programmes and 
global activities relating to mine action and small arms/violence reduction. While the two areas appear 
complementary rather than overlapping, the Review Team suggest that it might be useful to distinguish 
them more clearly in financial and narrative reporting (see below). 
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In North West Pakistan, over 2.5 million people have 
been displaced as a result of armed conflict.  The use 
and presence of landmines/ERW posed a direct threat to 
the lives and safety of returning IDPs and local 
communities which has been made worse by the 2010 
floods.  In 2010, using LASAC funds, UNICEF HQ 
deployed a mine action specialist for two weeks to 
support the country office and other partners in 
developing and implementing an emergency response.  
During the mission a coordination group was 
established, emergency mine/REW risk education 
messages and materials developed, and 27 people from 
partner organizations trained on implementation of 
emergency MRE. 
UNICEF's Mine Action Strategy (2006-2009) highlights four key result areas which the Review Team 
sees as relevant in relation to Sida's own Mine Action Policy. The four Areas are: Mine Risk Education; 
greater integration of mine action and small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) into 
UNICEF's humanitarian, human rights and 
development activities; increased compliance 
with political and legal instruments relating to 
landmines, ERW and SALW; and advocacy 
and assistance for landmine survivors. The 
strategy notes that activities under these 
headings will build on existing programmes, 
be capable of being sustained, focus on areas 
with high concentrations of casualties, reduce 
risk for high risk groups and support 
rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.41 
From the documentation seen by the Review 
Team, these objectives appear to have have been followed through in the activities supported by Sida. 
UNICEF mine action interventions are located within its Landmines and small arms cluster (LASAC) 
which is part of the Child Protection Section. Capacity for mine action is maintained at both 
headquarters level as well as at country level. UNICEF staff explained to the Review Team that their 
approach is to work through local implementing organisations to the extent that this is possible, 
providing training and enhancing capacity with specialists from UNICEF's global team where required, 
as the example from Pakistan in the box above illustrates. It was noted that an important issue is the 
need to ensure that local organisations maintain their capacity and "currency" in relation to emerging 
trends and developments within the sector. In this respect, GICHD knowledge products, for instance on 
MRE and IMAS (to which UNICEF contributed), are reportedly valuable educational tools.42  
UNICEF's reporting on the use to which Sida's funds were put is essentially output based and appears 
consistent with the programme log frame set out in the global proposal. The May 2009 report states that 
they helped facilitate the provision of technical guidance and assistance to country and regional offices, 
develop emergency mine risk education tools and training, research and knowledge management, and 
support to strategic coordination. Countries benefitting from Sida supported mine action interventions 
have included Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iraq, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines and 
Sudan.43  Although both the mine action and small arms areas are covered in the narrative reporting that 
has been seen by the team, there is not a sufficiently detailed breakdown of financial expenditure to 
show the actual division in practice.44  Given that Sida's support to LASAC falls under the general 
heading of "mine action" this is potentially misleading.  To increase clarity, an option would be to use 
distinct funding lines in the future and report against the two areas separately. 
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There was a reasonable consensus amongst the mine action actors consulted during this review that 
these three UN agencies each fill a key and important role within mine action.  UNMAS, as the key 
coordinating agency, is able to justify its central role in the coordination of mine action and in the 
implementation of effective mine action programmes where governments are unable to fulfil the role 
themselves.45. UNDP fills an important position working with governments and supporting the 
development of those nations and their programmes.  Both agencies are seen to be distinct and in 
general operating in separate environments.  There are a few occasions where UNMAS have overlapped 
to fulfil functions that UNDP may well fill in other places (for example, in Sudan, UNMAS have just 
recruited a development advisor in south Sudan where UNDP were also providing a development 
advisor {although UNDP are now in the process of closing the whole of their Sudan mine action 
programme}), but in general, overlaps are few.  UNICEF have such a unique role that the likelihood of 
overlap is very small and it seems important that core funding is maintained for them. 
6.1.2 GICHD 
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Disarmament (GICHD) is considered highly relevant 
to Sida's policy for support to mine action operations, where support for transfer of know-how to the 
countries affected and contributing to building up national structures and capacity are highlighted as 
priorities. The Centre contributes directly and indirectly to these aims, including through its knowledge 
development activities, its support to mine action standards (IMAS), the MBT Implementation Support 
Unit (ISU), its evaluation activities, and information management, as well as through the provision of 
training, research, workshops and technical advice to NMAAs. The Centre's global reach is also a 
relevant factor: in 2009, for example, the Centre undertook activities (in the form of training, research, 
workshops or technical advice) in 64 countries.46  Currently receiving around 7% of the overall Swedish 
contribution to mine action, the support to the Centre contributes to the latter's role as an enabling actor 
and it thus appears as a strategic choice given the overall success of the GICHD in its core roles. 
The relevance of the Centre to the overall mine action context was considered in a recent evaluation of 
GICHD commissioned by the Swiss Government and GICHD itself.47  Here it was observed that there is 
a generally positive view amongst stakeholders of the relevance of the Centre's products, particularly 
amongst National Mine Action Authorities and Centres. It should be noted, however, that the Centre 
also has its detractors, some of whom "felt that the Centre was wholly unnecessary and irrelevant".48  
Relevance was also considered in an earlier evaluation of GICHD's support for technology and mine 
action standards from 2008.49 The following assessment draws from both evaluations as well as from 
interviews with a number of stakeholders. 
As noted earlier in this report, Swedish funding to GICHD is provided from the MFA and Sida through 
core and programme funding respectively. In the latter case, the support has been provided to the 
Programme Advisory Team (PAT), which was initially established to support Swedish mine action 
interventions in Cambodia but was latter broadened to cover other countries.  Support has also been 
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channelled through a pool fund to sponsor participants from Mine Ban Treaty signatories at meetings of 
the States Parties.  
GICHD's advisory services appear relevant, although their quality and usefulness depend upon the 
skills of the staff employed. It was noted by one interviewee that it can be useful to have GICHD as a 
non-partisan resource. However, the Review Team notes that there are a number of other sources of 
independent advice, including former mine action operators working on an individual consultancy basis, 
as well as commercial companies. This suggests the importance to GICHD of ensuring an appropriate 
focus (matching its capacity to demand) and ensuring that services offered are of high quality.  
The Review Team notes that there has been discussion recently in GICHD's Advisory Board regarding 
potential conflicts of interest arising where GICHD undertakes evaluations in countries where it has 
itself taken a role. The Centre's response has been that it is aware of the concern and will be 
concentrating more in the future on evaluation training.50  This issue is relevant to Sida given the 
support that has been provided to the PAT project which provides advisory services as well as 
occasional evaluations. It is unclear what the actual effect of this close relationship has been, for 
example in relation to Cambodia where GICHD was involved in both advisory and evaluatory roles. 
Such proximity generally goes against good practice for evaluations.  The Review Team therefore 
recommends that, in its further contacts with GICHD, Sida urges the Centre to develop guidelines for its 
evaluation and advisory services in order to increase transparency and avoid possible conflicts of 
interest. 
The PAT inputs appear to have been relevant and helpful. Most PAT reports are relatively detailed and 
include assessments of follow-up since the previous assessment, status of operating capacity, 
shortcomings, organisational linkages, gender, work plans and practical recommendations. While the 
Review Team has not had an opportunity to assess their impact, the consistent use of the same PAT 
personnel for most of the missions to Cambodia and Afghanistan will have contributed to continuity of 
experience, in principle enabling PAT to better monitor progress and provide advice.51  A further 
advantage of this system for Sida will have been the reduced transaction costs through the on-call 
facility. However, while these advantages apply to the advisory role, they need to be weighed against 
potential conflicts of interest that could arise if the same organisation was to be involved in evaluations.  
With regard to the Sponsorship Programme, the Review Team assesses the objective of facilitating 
participation by signatories at Mine Ban Treaty events to have been relevant.  The key meetings 
supported under the Sponsorship Programme can be seen as having a catalytic effect which, while 
difficult to define, helps maintain momentum in the MBT. The modality used (i.e. pooled funds) is also 
relevant as it represents a joint effort. However, the Review Team questions the logic of this role being 
drawn from Swedish development funds given the political objectives involved. We note that funding 
from Sida to the Sponsorship programme stopped in 2008. 
The Review Team was asked by Sida to assess GICHD's contribution to knowledge development.  
Overall, our findings concur with those of the separate evaluation of GICHD which reveals that most 
mine action actors are appreciative of GICHD's technical knowledge products, particularly IMAS and 
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).The IMAS provide important 
benchmarks (which implementing agencies and NMAAs then incorporate into their own SOPs) and 
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GICHD provides a useful, and impartial, service on behalf of UNMAS in keeping them regularly 
updated. The development of IMAS also allows the possibility of "compliance" monitoring.  
It is possible that the generally positive view of the Centre from NMAAs reflects the greater needs of 
these national actors for accessible information and advice.  Meanwhile, the IMSMA, which is a 
technical database designed for mine action operators in the field, is used in more than 50 mine action 
programmes globally.  The system has been upgraded to enable remote access which according to 
GICHD has improved its responsiveness.52  
The 2008 evaluation of GICHD's support for technology and mine action standards concluded that the 
Centre provided an impartial and authoritative source of advice on technology and standards and that it 
had made a significant contribution in both areas. In relation to technology, it was noted that GICHD 
had been very active in relation to the International Test and Evaluation Programme (ITEP) and in 
relation to standardisation. The role in relation to mine action standards was equally well reviewed, 
including GICHD's own initiatives to help countries develop their own standards. There was, however, a 
need to improve its programming processes and particularly in relation to the linkage between overall 
goals and the activities needed to achieve them in order to ensure correct prioritisation (greatest 
impact).53  
There is a generally positive view amongst stakeholders of the Centre's effectiveness, although, there are 
some detractors.54 Again, NMAAs were found to be the most favourable and the work of the ISU was 
also regarded favourably. However, a number of interviewees consulted in the separate evaluation of 
GICHD expressed concern about the currency of some of the Centre's staff, noting that they had been 
"away from the field for too long" which might have an effect on the way in which the Centre's products 
are received. The Centre's management informed the Review Team that it is responding to this concern 
by taking steps to ensure greater throughput of staff. MSB's seconded dog expert who has been with the 
Centre for over ten years is one such case.  
The Centre's operating methodology in relation to its knowledge products typically involves a 
participatory process in which key stakeholders are involved throughout the development and 
subsequent outreach process.  An example is the development of MRE standards together with 
UNICEF. This is seen as an effective way of drawing from field expertise, perspectives and experience 
from different actors, and outreach. And thus it has some capacity building spin-offs as part of the 
process.  
In relation to the effectiveness of its outreach and capacity building of NMAAs, the Centre's ability to 
maintain contacts and disseminate its products is important.  In general, the success of this role depends 
upon the appropriateness of the inputs and the ability of the advisor to maintain momentum through 
sparring and follow up. Delivery through relevant languages also appears very important. In the GICHD 
evaluation, it is noted that some organisations appeared frustrated at the perceived "lack of 
communication between GICHD staff and key actors with a long time presence in affected countries." 
Language was also raised as an issue affecting overall effectiveness of inputs and being worthy of 
greater attention. 55 It is also noted that the choice of participants for training events is important and 
there has been some concern that the Centre has not consistently targeted the right recipients. The 
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GICHD evaluation recommended that the Centre "identify key indicators of quality associated with the 
delivery of its services and products".56 
In relation to information management, the Review Team understands that the utility of GICHD's 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is being increased and ensuring its broad 
availability is included in the current GICHD strategy as a main activity.57 
In relation to coordination and the overall coherency of its approach, GICHD should be responsive to its 
international stakeholders, including the Advisory Board and donors.  The minutes of Board meetings 
indicate that substantive discussion takes place on key issues - normally these are related to GICHD 
strategy and activities but the broad participation also facilitates useful linkages to other organisations 
and initiatives. This is regarded as contributing to overall effectiveness and efficiency.   
The Review Team considers that GICHD's overall objectives are generally well targeted towards 
achieving a sustainable response to the threat of mines.  This occurs mainly through their work relating 
to knowledge development (as part of which the quality and relevance of the Centre's publications is 
important), through the regularly updated IMAS, and through training and capacity building services to 
national mine action authorities. The focus on training the right people is seen by the Review Team as 
important because the NMAAs have a key role in ensuring sustainable national responses in the medium 
to long term.  The PAT project contributed to sustainability in this way.  
GICHD also has work streams on linking mine action to development and on impact monitoring, where 
they see their contribution as being mainly in area of standards and training. At the time of finalising 
this report, for example, the Centre's key person responsible for this area was providing training on 
M&E for mine action operators in Azerbaijan. The Centre's current focus on improving national M&E 
processes is seen to offer potential to help sustainability through making mine action more outcome 
orientated.58 Meanwhile, the Centre's work on linking mine action to development (which includes a set 
of guidelines updated in 2009) responds to one of the primary gaps seen by the Review Team amongst a 
significant part of the sector.59 
A key group of stakeholders are national authorities around the world. The Centre attempts to respond to 
the needs of NMAAs and is undertaking a needs assessment in collaboration with them. The Review 
Team finds it somewhat surprising, however, that this process has not been in place earlier (although it 
is appreciated that it had been done informally through working contacts). The Review Team notes that 
such processes often work best when facilitated and that GICHD should be in a good position to provide 
such facilitation (at least from a technical perspective - it may be necessary to also look at pedagogic 
aspects of the processes involved).  As part of the needs assessment, it would also be useful for the 
Centre to investigate the degree and spread of its products that are considered by stakeholders to be most 
useful. Those which demonstrate low levels of currency or uptake should be dropped. This will help 
maintain the Centre's relevance and focus. 
GICHD remains very keen to maintain its connection to Sweden. The Team's interviews with Sida and 
the Swedish MFA indicate a desire from the Swedish side for more information about GICHD's outputs 
and outcomes. There is a wish to see the use to which Sweden's funding has been put and the effect that 
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it has had in terms of facilitating results. While the Review Team observes that there is a considerable 
amount of information available on GICHD's website, some of it is quite old and there would be value 
in GICHD's reporting being more regular and more concrete in terms of results as well as outputs. At 
the same time, the Team suggest that Sida and the Swedish MFA could be more demanding in their 
dialogue regarding the issues that they regard as important. 
A further period of support should reflect progress on the key issues highlighted in the separate GICHD 
evaluation, particularly in relation to the continued relevance of its products and activities to key 
stakeholders. It should also involve greater responsiveness from GICHD towards reporting.  The 
Review Team notes that a request from Sida at the end of 2009 for a summary of activities implemented 
using Sida support was, at the time of drafting this report some six months later, still outstanding. This 
tardiness risks a situation of diminishing confidence from one of the Centre's major donors. 
6.1.3 Geneva Call 
Sida has provided three year non-earmarked funding to the INGO Geneva Call, which is seen as a 
flexible and predictable way of supporting the organisation that is also in line with Sida's Mine Action 
Policy. The nature of Geneva Call's work requires a high degree of flexibility and ability to respond to 
opportunities that may arise.  
The Review Team understands that a separate and more in-depth review of Geneva Call's work is 
underway in parallel to the present evaluation. This section of the report will therefore provide a brief 
summary of the organisation's perceived relevance and leave further assessment to the other review. 
Geneva Call's main purpose is to engage with non-state actors (NSAs- typically rebel movements) to 
gain compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law.  In relation to mine action, 
the organisation has developed a niche focused on persuading NSAs to respect international 
humanitarian norms in line with the Mine Ban Treaty. The relevance of this is that anti-personnel mines 
have often been a weapon of choice for NSAs given their low cost and availability.  In addition, the fact 
that NSAs may control territory means that there can be problems of access for mine action agencies 
with the consequence that communities receive less assistance than they need.  
In response, Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment provides a mechanism for engaging with NSAs, who 
are not eligible to enter the Mine Ban Treaty, and securing their commitment to adhere to its norms.  
Geneva Call's 2008 Annual Report notes that, by the end of 2008, 35 NSAs from ten countries had 
signed the Deed of Commitment and that seven NSAs had destroyed stockpiled mines and Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs).60  In its 2010 strategy, Geneva Call also draws attention to the potential to 
engage NSAs on child soldier and gender issues while addressing compliance with international 
standards on mines.61 Sida's support to the organisation can thus be seen as also being strategically 
relevant from these perspectives.  
Geneva Call does, however, operate in what can be a grey area with obvious political, reputational and 
security risks both to itself and to its donors. The organisation's management is well aware of this - and 
the issues were also highlighted in Sida's extensive internal assessment memo prior to the 2008 grant.  
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Apart from the annual reports, the Review Team has not had an opportunity to review other reporting 
from Geneva Call to Sida. 
6.1.4 Conclusions on support to global organisations 
The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. 
Furthermore, the choice of supporting the three key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's 
funding to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the 
Review Team also find relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's 
contributions are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relate well to Sida objectives in terms of 
national capacity building. UNICEF has the main role amongst the UN agencies for support to MRE and 
survivor assistance in emergencies as well as more stable situations. This enables it to act as a 
complement UNDP and UNMAS. The Review Team would emphasise the importance of these UN 
agencies pursuing a coherent and coordinated approach in countries where each is present.  
Similarly, the Review Team also finds that the support to GICHD and Geneva Call has been relevant to 
Sida's Mine Action Policy, particularly in relation to knowledge development. In the case of Geneva 
Call, the Review Team would highlight the results achieved so far in relation to engaging non-state 
actors as well as the potential political, reputational and security risks. It is important that the latter are 
managed and that Sida maintains a close dialogue with Geneva Call.  
In relation to GICHD, the Review Team would like to highlight the organisation's knowledge 
development and dissemination roles, its research, evaluation and capacity building functions, its 
hosting of the ISU for the MBT, and management of IMSMA (which is a key to mine action 
management in all countries).  The location of these functions in one place make GICHD unique and a 
valuable asset for the mine action community. That said, to preserve these comparative advantages, it is 
important that the Centre maintains a role that is demonstrably non-partisan and neutral so as to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest.  An effort should also be made to ensure its many products reflect the 
needs of its stakeholders, particularly national authorities. 
The Review Team sees that GICHD is relevant to Sida’s mine action policy and that its PAT project has 
contributed to capacity building of national and international implementers. Regarding the Sponsorship 
Programme, which Sida has also supported, it is difficult to see clear outcomes; however, the support 
has enabled national capitals from poorer states to be heard internationally and it has maintained 
momentum on mine action in these countries.  Overall, with regard to GICHD, the Review Team finds 
that there is an argument in favour of Sida switching to core funding in a possible future collaboration.  
However, this should be predicated on a deeper dialogue and more regular reporting from GICHD's 
side. 
Finally, and based on the documentation reviewed (which is not necessarily complete), the Review 
Team considers that greater effort should be made amongst all of the global organisations to identify 
and report at outcome level (i.e. on the impact achieved) and, as part of this, that there should be a clear 
identification of development impacts, including in relation to gender equality. The Review Team note 
that for this to happen, a result driven approach needs to be in place during project/programme 
formulation, including the setting of baselines and relevant indicators.  





• Sida should continue to allocate a proportion of its funding available for mine action to the key UN 
agencies, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. The allocation should be specifically for mine action (and 
not mixed with, for example, support to violence reduction) in order to ensure a better linkage to 
Sida's mine action policy.  
• Sida should continue to support GICHD. It could consider a change to core support for GICHD 
with a single Swedish contribution to core costs.  However, GICHD must improve its reporting and 
strengthen its dialogue with Sida in order to better communicate the results of its activities and their 
linkage to the needs of its stakeholders. 
• Sida should also consider more stringent requirements regarding reporting from other global 
organisations so that the results of mine action interventions in terms of impact, including 
humanitarian and development impact, are more clearly displayed.  
6.2 Outcome of support to country level projects and programmes 
In this section we present the assessment of Sida-supported mine action programmes at country level 
against the evaluation criteria presented in chapter 3. 
Countries covered in the assessment are Iraq and DRC (based on field visits) and Afghanistan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and Nicaragua (based on desk studies). A 
presentation of findings and conclusions regarding Iraq and DRC is presented in chapter 7. 
6.2.1 Assessment of relevance 
We have assessed the relevance in relation to Sida and recipient country policies, seriousness of mine 
contamination, and the needs of affected population groups - including gender aspects of relevance. 
Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with national 
priorities as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action 
authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. In many cases the programmes were started 
upon request of the mine action authorities and high relevance in this respect, as well as alignment with 
national priorities, has therefore been secured from the outset.  
The relevance in relation to the seriousness of mine contamination is not clear in all cases, as for 
example in DRC which according to available information is not seriously affected by landmines or 
UXO.  As a contrast to this, Iraq is said to have significant contamination, making the relevance of 
investing in mine action much higher there.  
The Review Team finds that, while all the implementing organisations display a high emphasis on 
improving conditions for people affected by mines and UXOs in their overall strategies and objectives, 
this is rarely transformed into concrete knowledge gathering on specific needs and priorities of different 
groups in the population. The Review Team believes that a much better targeting vis-à-vis vulnerable 
groups could be achieved through systematically conducting socio-economic surveys as part of the 
needs assessment process to inform priority decisions on where to operate. This could also help 
establish a baseline for the operational areas that could be used for impact monitoring and assessment 
throughout the project cycle. Despite good intentions at the overall level, socio-economic aspects have 




not really been prioritised or followed through in the mine action sector, and many of the programmes 
have developed as ‘project islands’ in isolation from ongoing development initiatives around them. An 
exception from this among Sida partners is DDG which has made some attempts to systematically 
include socio-economic parameters in objective hierarchies and indicators, and also started employing 
project managers with a broader development background than typically found amongst mine action 
technical experts.  
RELEVANCE 
ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES 
High relevance in relation to national strategies 
and priorities. 
Programmes well coordinated with national mine 
action authorities and/or UNMAS (in countries with 
no functioning national MA authority).  
DRC: MSB & MAG aligned with MACC. 
Iraq: MAG aligned with IKMAA & GDMA. 
Afghanistan: DDG aligned with UNMACA. 
Cambodia: GICHD providing advisory services to CMAC. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: The BiH Mid Term Development 
Strategy has mine action as a priority sector. 
Somalia: MSB and DDG contributions aligned with UN 
strategy. 
Lebanon: MSB support on request from UNMAS and 
assisting LMAC. 
Sudan: MSB support to national and regional mine action 
centres. 
Relevance not clear in all cases in relation to 
seriousness of mine and UXO contamination. 
This is a comment to Sida’s country priorities in 
relation to mine action support. 
HIGH RELEVANCE: High Sida investments in highly 
contaminated countries: Iraq, Afghanistan.  
LOW RELEVANCE: High Sida investments in countries 
with relatively low contamination: DRC, Lebanon, 
Somalia, Sudan. Low Sida investments in countries with 
high contamination: Cambodia.62 
Little documentation of relevance to the needs 
of specific population groups affected by mines 
and UXOs –although socio-economic goals 
aspects mentioned in overall programme 
objectives. 
This is a comment to the implementing 
organisations’ choice of operational areas in a 
given country. 
Much better targeting could be achieved vis-à-vis 
vulnerable groups through conducting socio-
economic surveys as part of needs assessment 
processes. 
DRC: Limited knowledge, not documented. 
Iraq: MAG building general knowledge in Kurdistan, but  
needs assessments not found. DDG maintaining focus on 
civilian population in context of crisis and including brief 
needs assessments in project documents. 
Nicaragua: Humanitarian and development (socio-
economic) goals mentioned in project documents at 
general level. 
General: No systematic practice of needs assessments 
focusing on socio-economic factors found with 
implementing organisations. 
6.2.2 Assessment of effectiveness and efficiency 
The effectiveness of Sida-supported mine action programmes is assessed against the degree of 
fulfilment of objectives of the interventions including actual release of land, the fostering of local 
capacities, and the extent to which activities previously hindered by landmines and UXOs have been 
resumed. To highlight efficiency the operations have been assessed with respective to how economically 
inputs and resources are converted into outputs.  
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The technical operations base of programmes reviewed in Iraq and DRC is strong and well developed. 
Planning processes and programme management are undertaken in an effective and efficient manner, 
and the quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective land release 
processes is generally very high. But effectiveness is not only about technical mine clearance. Reporting 
tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land release level and not on outcomes. 
This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme objectives which in most programmes also include 
broader socio-economic elements such as return to land, resuming economic activities such as 
agriculture, improving income etc. 
Achievement of objectives related to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional 
authorities, and the national staff is not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the 
documents reviews this aspect appears often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed 
unevenly and in more informal ways at the level of national authorities.   
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 
ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES 
 Generally high effectiveness in technical 
operations, clearance and release of land  
Iraq and DRC: First class technical base and management 
system observed during field visits. 
Varying effectiveness in fostering local 
capacities 
Iraq: MAG training local deminers but no systematic approach to 
building capacity with mine action authorities. 
Afghanistan: DDG support to MAPA has increased capability of 
an Afghan independent organisation. 
Cambodia: Evaluation 2004 showed that the Cambodian Mine 
Action Authority (CMAA) was judged at the time to be "weak and 
ineffective…….and largely ignored".63   
Lebanon: MSB effectively delivered results and added value to 
the Lebanese authorities. 
Sporadic documentation of effectiveness 
on resuming of activities previously 
hindered by mines/UXOs  
Iraq: This aspect covered by MAG through case studies in 
reports but not aggregated. 
DRC: MAG not able to document convincing results of the high 
investments. 
BiH: Effectiveness documented in evaluation report (cap. 
building, field operations, land clearance).64 
Nicaragua: Studies indicate a direct link between mine 
clearance and subsequent improvements in development 
indicators. 65 
Sudan: DDG effective in reducing risks for returnees, other 
community members and staff of humanitarian organisations. 66 
Organisations reporting almost solely on 
outputs rather than outcomes and socio-
economic effects. 
Iraq: MAG documenting no. of direct and indirect beneficiaries 
but not how they benefit. 
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6.2.3 Assessment of sustainability 
The sustainability of the programmes under review is assessed from the point of what steps have been 
taken to ensure alignment with future needs and priorities in the countries and to what extent national 
capacity is built to ensure continued management of the mine and UXO contamination. 
In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action 
authorities and contain elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good 
potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, even though some of them could benefit 
from a more systematic approach. Not all programmes have developed capacity building strategies as 
such, or systematic processes of transfer of knowledge with an eye on an exit strategy. There is a risk 
that some organisations are caught in a dilemma between leaving national capacity and making 
themselves redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on one hand, and a desire to keep 
activities going and keep up their business. This is underlined by the fact that several humanitarian mine 




 Tight coordination with authorities generally ensure 
alignment with future needs 
Iraq: MAG and DDG operations tightly coordinated with 
national/regional MA authorities and contain elements 
of capacity building and skills transfer. 
DRC: National mine action authority not in place. Likely 
that DRC will need continued external support for many 
years to come, but until the degree of contamination is 
clarified, the question of sustainability remains unclear. 
Cambodia: The support had a sustainability objective - 
The ultimate aim of this has been to enable CMAC to 
fulfil its mandate as the national mine action service 
provider.  
Capacity building not always strategically 
addressed to make INGOs redundant (few exit 
strategies) 
Iraq: National government and Kurdistan regional 
government have access to considerable resources 
from the oil revenue, and Iraq is not a traditional 
developing country. An exit strategy for INGOs and 
Swedish support to mine action is however not in place. 
Afghanistan: DDG provided sustained efforts and 
organisational development. But transition to full 
national control has not been successful due to 
corruption. A GICHD assessment in 2008 concluded 
that "MACA had a strong management team which had 
initiated “excellent” reforms, although it still did not 
have, and should formulate, a formal, written strategy 
and medium-term plan."67 
Bosnia & Herzegovina: BHMAC receiving 95% of its 
funding from the Government by end of 2007, aim for 
full national funding in 2008. Clearly oriented towards 
establishing sustainable national capacities.  
Somalia: Difficulties experienced in continued 
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upgrading of EOD levels and improvement of skills - 
which questions sustainability and whether it has been 
possible to sustain the national mine action capacity. 
Sudan: High focus on capacity building and support for 
nationalisation process of UNMAO in MSB’s 
programme seen as steps towards achieving 
sustainability of the programme.  Likely sustainability of 
operations in DDG’s project in South Sudan would 
benefit from firmer approaches to transition of activities 
to national organisations and the formulation of an exit 
strategy.68 
6.2.4 Assessment of impact 
In order to detect the likely longer term impact of the mine action programmes, the links to other 
development actors and the tools for impact measurement have been reviewed. This brings the focus 
beyond the technical output level and into the broader level of socio-economic outcomes in relation to 
challenges and processes in the specific geographic context around the operations. Long term impact as 
such is difficult to document, and the review has mostly focussed on the likely outcomes and effects 
potentially resulting from the programmes, and on the efforts of implementing organisations to focus 
their activities on the change processes in society that will lead to impact. The result is that 
documentation of impact is not systematically produced, despite some efforts by DDG and MAG. 
Possible reasons for that could be lack of pressure from donors, and lack of awareness of the importance 
of it with implementing organisations. The team considers also, however, the factor of ‘assumed 
impact’, i.e. that once the obstacles to resuming activities on contaminated land have been removed, 
people will automatically start occupying the land again, start farming etc. 
IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES 
 Good intentions but very scarce documentation –
donor pressure likely to change that. 
Iraq and DRC: MAG not documenting impact apart from 
case stories 
Afghanistan: Some impact documentation (DDG) 
Somalia: No reporting on impact (MSB) 
Development of impact assessment tools a 
positive development – although slow and late! 
DDG Impact Monitoring Tool ready for roll-out 
MAG: Impact assessment tool underway 
Lack of documentation of socio-economic 
outcomes and impact is a sector wide problem 
 
Lack of socio economic baselines implies a risk of 
not reaching intended impact – and not tracking 
non-intended impact (*Do No Harm’) 
 
Impact and links to development interventions 
more relevant for DEV funding than for HUM 
funding? 
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6.2.5 Assessment of safety and quality 
In all the programmes reviewed, mine action operations were carried out with adequate consideration of 
safety and guidelines and were clearly up to standards. This goes for the technical surveys, the marking, 
the clearance and the quality assurance procedures. Sida has undoubtedly chosen to work with 
professional mine action organisations and that shows in the high quality of operations.  
All the mine action organisations looked at appeared to have sound operational contingency planning 
and have developed sufficient contacts with the local communities, agencies and authorities to be able to 
responsively react to situations where security is degraded.  DDG has operated in the highly volatile 
area of Basra, south Iraq, for many years with no major security incidents.  The only area of concern 
that the Review Team had in this regard was the reliance that MAG in DRC had on flying with airline 
companies that are blacklisted with the UN and the embassies of that country.  This undoubtedly 
expedites the operations, but does place some of the staff (and the organisation) under a certain degree 
of risk. 
6.2.6 Gender perspectives in supported projects and programmes 
At a strategic level, gender is a key element of a mine action strategy and, in theory, any mine action 
intervention.  The UN Gender guidelines for mine action69 give very clear advice to programmes for the 
development and integration of good practice into mine action programmes.  The guidelines state: “... 
{the} United Nations mine action work plans will address the impact of mine action on women, girls, 
boys and men and seek to involve them to the extent possible in the planning and implementation of 
mine action initiatives” and “Experience of the first version of the guidelines reveals that 
mainstreaming gender in programming leads to better outputs in mine action.” 
Sida’s gender policy70 is “at the centre of Sida’s mission to promote and create conditions for poverty 
reduction in partner countries” and the policy states that “...equality involves ensuring that all human 
beings – women, men, girls and boys – are considered equal and treated equally in terms of dignity and 
rights.” 
Implementers analysed during the course of this review again seem to have clear perspectives, if not 
always policies, on gender issues.  For example, MSB have a Gender equality handbook71 – a guide that 
is primarily intended for MSB field staff and project managers working within international assistance 
for bringing projects into line with the needs of women, men, girls and boys in the project area.  MSB’s 
handbook’s aim is “...to mainstream a gender perspective into all international projects with the 
objective being to live up to all aspects of {UN} Resolution 1325.” 
At the national or project level, things often become less clear, and it is sometimes difficult to identify 
clearly where gender policies are being applied – or even considered to any significant degree - in a 
project.  
In DRC, the projects being implemented by MAG and MSB appear to have a reasonable gender balance 
within the programmes although it is not always clear where the gender issues are considered in the 
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project design. MSB does have very good guidance for project designers72 but again, it is difficult to see 
whether this has been integrated into any of the programmes. The team did not see any formal 
documentation for either organisation indicating that gender had been taken into consideration, although 
the documentation reviewed for the DCA element of the project was focused on using a gender 
approach where possible. 
MAG DRC does report on project beneficiaries73 in Equateur and discusses the fact that women and 
children have a tendency to be more at risk, due to women being the primary users of many mined 
routes and the tendency of children to play with dangerous items they find.  In the same report, MAG 
reports that some of their interventions were particularly beneficial to women. 
In Iraq, MAG has included gender disaggregated information in their Community Liaison activities, 
including the economic roles of women and men.74 When asked about the possibility of fielding female 
deminers (which the Review Team has indeed come across in other countries as e.g. South Sudan and 
Jordan), the issue was explained by cultural obstacles. In the Mine Risk Education activities, strong 
gender equality focus was however observed in relation to the beneficiaries of the teaching as well as 
the teachers employed.  
The ex-post evaluation of the IMAP programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that the UNDP 
gender equality guidelines for mine action programmes have been presented in awareness raising 
workshops, resulting in the formulation of intentions to advocate for female demining teams, 
incorporate gender into data management, encourage women to take up management positions, gender 
sensitize key policy documents and offer gender training for key partners. The progress on these 
objectives will be followed up later, but the systematic approach to gender mainstreaming of the 
programme is notable and could be used as a best practice for inspiration. 
6.3 Emerging trends and variations in outcome 
Overall, the Review Team finds the combination of support to the UN system, the GICHD and country 
level mine action programmes an appropriate way of potentially achieving an impact right from the 
international policy level to the situation of affected population groups in a range of countries. 
Through the support to UN organisations involved in mine action, Sida acts in accordance with the 
Good Humanitarian Donorship principles. The support is provided to mutually complementary agencies 
and plays no doubt an important role in strengthening coordination and oversight. It moreover gives 
Sida access to crucial joint multi-donor fora important for donor harmonisation and joint prioritisation. 
The Review Team would emphasise the importance of these UN agencies pursuing a coherent and 
coordinated approach in countries where each is present and sees it as important that Sida takes a 
leading role in pushing for this.  
The support to Geneva Call has led to results in engaging non-state actors and to GICHD to building 
capacity with implementing agencies, and developing and disseminating key knowledge and research in 
the sector.  
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The country level programmes supported are all found to have a strong technical base and are generally 
effective and efficient in achieving the planned outputs. At the same time the links to other relevant 
humanitarian or development interventions are generally not secured by the implementers nor pushed 
very hard for by Sida. Despite a few exceptions it is a pattern that reporting from the programmes does 
not go beyond output, and therefore a systematic assessment of outcome and impact is difficult to 
undertake. It is the assessment of the Review Team that this is primarily a question of inadequate 
baseline data, monitoring and documentation rather than lack of impact. It poses a risk to the future 
prioritisation of mine action by donors if the gap in documentation is not addressed rather urgently. 
Similar observations have been made in relation to activities of global organisations where the outcome 
in some cases can be difficult to trace.  
The Review Team considers, therefore, that greater effort should be made to identify and report at 
outcome level (i.e. on the impact achieved) and, as part of this, that there should be a clear identification 
of development impacts, including in relation to gender equality. The Review Team note that for this to 
happen, a result driven approach needs to be in place during project/programme formulation, including 
the setting of baselines and relevant indicators.  
Some notable best practices have been identified by the Review Team, such as the impact monitoring 
tool developed by DDG, some cases of employment of managers with a development background 
(DDG, MAG), the documentation of case stories by MAG, gender mainstreaming by UNDP in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as well as successful capacity building of national authorities by MSB. 
6.4 Options for Sida 
Options for Sida to optimise relevance of support to country level interventions: 
• In its dialogue with implementing partners, Sida should encourage the attachment of socio-
economic expertise in the organisations’ recruitment of key staff including managers. 
• Sida should consider requiring all implementing partners to introduce socio-economic surveys for 
needs assessments and develop baselines to provide data from which to monitor results. Reporting 
on development related progress and challenges should be a standard requirement. 
• There should be a focus on programmes which target most vulnerable groups (i.e. clear their areas 
first and other places later). 
• Sida should consider choosing focus countries after assessing seriousness of contamination and 
then ensure linkages to other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes where possible 
Options for Sida to optimise effectiveness and efficiency 
• More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting should be introduced in order to 
ensure that all objectives are reported on. The comprehensive LFA formats applied by DDG could 
be used as a model for this. 
• Sida should enforce these requirements and not approve reports only addressing output level and 
technical aspects. 




•  New funding should not be allocated until satisfactory reporting from previous phase is in place. 
Options for Sida to optimise sustainability 
• Capacity building strategies become a standard requirement in all mine action programmes 
supported by Sida, and these strategies are based on negotiations with national mine action 
authorities (or de facto national authorities) in order to ensure ownership and transparency. 
• That reporting on progress on capacity building becomes mandatory in annual reports. 
• That all programmes develop strategies for sustainability and exit including benchmarks for exit or 
for re-assessment of exit dates. 
Options for Sida to optimise impact 
• Sida follows the practical use of DDG and MAG’s new manuals closely and maintains a dialogue 
with them at country level in order to gather experience and documentation. 
• Sida encourages DDG and MAG to keep a high level of information between them and exchange 
ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring. 
• Sida liaises with GICHD to strengthen its coordination of methodological development related to 
impact monitoring in mine action, enabling it also to draw from the other initiatives that are on-
going and perhaps ultimately lead to the creation of IMAS giving guidelines for impact monitoring. 
Options for Sida to optimise gender equality mainstreaming 
• Sida enforces its gender policy and the UN gender guidelines for mine action in all supported mine 
action programmes through awareness raising and dialogue with implementing partners. 
 
• The gender mainstreaming approach applied in the Bosnia & Herzegovina programme could be 








7 Results from mine action in DRC and Iraq 
This chapter presents further details on results from Sida supported mine action programmes in the two 
field visit countries Democratic Republic of Congo and Iraq. The field visits provided the Review Team 
with the opportunity to meet implementing partners, national authorities, beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders on location and compile primary data that will exemplify and inform the findings and 
recommendations of this review. The list of persons consulted is enclosed in Annex 2. 
7.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo 
The findings on Sida supported mine action interventions in DRC are based on a field visit to MAG and 
MSB/DCA programmes in DRC between 14 June & 6th July 2010. The visit to the MAG programme 
was the second attempt – the first being cancelled off for security reasons.  At the time of the mission, 
the Sida teams were not working and the team was thus unable to see any ongoing operations by the 
Sida sponsored teams.  This was due to the Sida grant period up to April 2010 being completed and the 
fact that MAG was still awaiting confirmation of further funding from Sida for the next two years.  
Confirmation of this funding was received while the team was in Mbandaka. 
7.1.1 The mine problem in DRC 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been affected by landmines and ERW as a result of more 
than 15 years of conflict.  Contamination is from Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), including unexploded 
sub munitions, as well as from significant quantities of Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). 
Although the conflicts affected the whole country, it appears that the most heavily affected areas are 
those from the north of Equateur province, through to the south of Katanga province – areas where 
Sida’s two operational support projects are being implemented. Although there are scarce data available, 
most incidents appear to be as a result of casualties carrying out normal subsistence activities (farming, 
travelling, hunting and collecting food/water/wood).  Ammunition stockpiles also pose a significant 
threat to the population. To date, there has been no complete national survey.  As of November 2008, a 
total of 2,004 suspected hazardous areas (SHA) had been identified throughout the country. The UN has 
declared the provinces of Equateur, Katanga, North and South Kivu and Province Orientale to be the 
most heavily affected.  
DRC is an incredibly difficult and challenging environment to operate in.  Logistics are one of the 
largest hurdles for not only operational activities, but also in order to gather data in order to understand 
the scale of the problem.  Between 1999 and 2008, 1,696 casualties were recorded.  In 2008, 14 
casualties were reported, compared to the previous years’ figure of 22. Casualties are reported 
throughout the country, but the figures used are most likely significantly under reported because of the 
serious logistical challenges in the country. 
Mine Action in DRC is coordinated centrally, in the absence of a government body, by the United 
Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) which is under the remit of the UN Mission in 




the DRC (MONUC75).  UNMACC maintains de facto responsibility for planning, managing and 
monitoring all mine action activities on behalf of the government.  There are two Congolese civil 
servants working as the focal point for mine action in the DRC government, but unfortunately both were 
unavailable for meetings for the duration of the field visit.  The MACC was established in 2002 but until 
recently, the capacity of the UNMACC was generally considered to be poor.  With the recent 
recruitment of several key positions, it now appears that capacity has improved and coordination is 
becoming more of a reality.  The challenges of operating in DRC do not, however, assist in this 
coordination process.  
A national strategic plan for DRC in draft form now exists but is still under development and discussion.  
The plan has three phases: 1) National General Mine Action Survey (GMAS), 2) Technical survey of 
high and medium priority mine and ERW affected locations. Continue MRE and launch a victim 
assistance project, and 3) Technical survey and clearance of remaining areas. The DRC is a signatory to 
the Mine Ban Treaty which obliges it to have identified and cleared all known mined areas by (in 
DRC’s case) 1st November 2012.  It seems unlikely that the country will achieve this goal. 
7.1.2 Sida support to mine action in DRC 
During 2008, Sida contributed $3.5 million out of a total $12.5 million to mine action in DRC.  Total 
contributions disbursed between 2005 to date have been 62 million SEK. This figure does not include 
the latest grant to MAG, or the Sida support through the UN VTF to the UNMACC. Sida supports 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) (who have been 
operating in DRC in support of DanChurchAid (DCA) since 2008 and more recently in direct support of 
the UNMACC as well).  
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)  
Operations in the DRC since 2004  Equateur, Katanga, and Casai Oriental provinces.   
22 international and 179 national staff. 
5 multi-task teams76, one rapid response team, six community 
liaison teams (3 MAG teams, 2 Humantas Ubungi77, and one ECC 
MERU78 team).   
3 Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW)/Conventional Munitions 
Disposal (CMD) teams  
 
                                                   
75 MONUC changed its name on 30th June 2010 to MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo) but this report refers to MONUC as the mission in place at the time of the mission. 
 
76 Capable of mine clearance, survey and marking 
77 Humanitas Ubungi is a Conglolese NGO. 
78 A local partner faith-based organisation operating in Casai Oriental. 




The Sida funded element of the 
MAG programme has been 
operating in Equateur province 
since November 2005 over 
three separate grant periods (at 
the time of the mission, a 
further grant for 24 months 
starting in June 2010 had been 
agreed by Sida).  For the last 
two grant periods, the capacity 
has consisted of one Manual 
Clearance Team (MCT) (also 
referred to as a multi-task team 
(MTT) and one Community Liaison Team (CLT).  In the grant commencing 2010, this capacity expands 
to include a Survey Team (ST) to support the UN MACCs goal of undertaking a national General Mine 
Action Survey (GMAS) (although there is still some debate between the UNMACC and the operators as 
to how this process will be undertaken). In addition to these core operational assets, Sida has supported 
the costs of expatriates such as Technical Field Manager (TFM), Community Liaison Manager (CLM), 
Technical Operations Manager (TOM), Country Programme Manager (CPM), Finance Manager (FM), 
Logistics Coordinator (LC), Field Coordinator, and Programme Officer. 
 
MSB  
Direct operational support to DanChurchAid’s 
(DCA) Demining capacity in Katanga Province 
(Kabalo region
79
) since 2008 
One Mini-Minewolf machine (MMW)  
Seven Mine Detection Dogs (MDD)80 
Technical support to the UN MACC since 2010  Information management specialist. 
 
In 2008, MSB initiated an operational project designed to support the capacity of DanChurchAid 
(DCA)’s mine clearance programme in the Kabalo area (Katanga province).  The project was intended 
to provide a Mini-Minewolf machine (MMW) as well as eight Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) to improve 
the operational efficiency of the DCA programme, which was started in 2006. The implementation of 
the project was plagued with problems and a mid-term review undertaken in February 201081 noted 
significant operational failings in the programme. This assessment took place some four months after 
the mid-term review and provides some updates. 
In early 2010, MSB seconded an information management specialist to the UN MACC in Kinshasa at 
the same time as six additional information clerks were deployed to the MACC to assist with the 
significant backlog of data entry.  The advisor is currently training these six members of staff in 
                                                   
79 It is important to note that the Sida support refers to the support to MSB only within the constraints of DCA’s operations and as 
such, the evaluation only looked at operations within the Kabalo region, where MSB are directly supporting DCA. 
80 The original concept was to use eight dogs. Unfortunately one died and there are now only seven. 
81 A Wolf and Eight Dogs: Mid-Term Review of MSBs Demining Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2007-2009, 
Lardner & Nissen, Oslo & Geneva, March 2010 
As an example of this, MAG’s Community Liaison Teams have identified 10 
Suspected Hazardous Areas in an around the community of Ikela. One of 
these is a road leading to an abandoned coffee plantation.  The programme 
had given this task a high priority by making an informal assessment of the 10 
tasks based on the belief that it reopening the road would provide employment 
to many in the local community once the factory and plantation had reopened. 
However they had failed to communicate with the owner of the plantation to 
find out whether he intended, or wanted, to reopen the factory and plantation.  
This task is used as an example in the final report for the 2008-2010 grant and 
reports an example of increasing opportunities to reconstruction and 
development by communities.  The Review Team does not believe that the 
analysis of the data is sufficient to state that this task will deliver such results 
and indeed, would question the significant allocation of resources to this 
particular project. 




conjunction with the UN Information Management officer as well as overseeing the data entry and 
rationalisation process and assisting with the upcoming IMSMA NG implementation process. 
7.1.3 Assessment of results 
Relevance 
In a context like the one in DRC where government structures are not strong the organisations under 
review have been found to align well with UNMACC, local government and other actors such as the 
military. 
MAG has operated in DRC for a number of years without any real guidance from the UNMACC.  
During this time, the organisation developed its own system for prioritising and tasking. With the 
strengthening of the UN MACC over the last 12 months, the programme is operating in a rapidly 
changing environment.  MAG has worked closely with the MACC to support the ongoing process of a 
national survey – the GMAS in DRC. However, much of the process of prioritisation seems to be done 
in an informal manner, with teams on the ground making assessments that focus the clearance teams.  
This process is again being addressed by the introduction of a formalised process. MAG maintains a 
good active dialogue with UNMACC as well as the military and local government, and is strongly 
supporting the national focal point for mine action in the DRC government. 
In the case of MAG it appears that the only real interaction with populations comes when demining 
teams visit communities because of isolation due to geography.  The Review Team found no evidence 
that an overall assessment of needs of different groups has been carried out. 
The relevance of the MSB project in the Kabalo area can be questioned82, considering the absence of 
casualties in the area since 2005, the lack of surveys of the area and a clear perspective on the scale of 
the problem. The broader impact on communities around Kabalo is still unclear and neither MSB nor 
DCA were able to substantiate the value of the work undertaken. Despite recent efforts from DCA, the 
integration of mine activities in broader development efforts remain difficult in the MSB area of 
intervention (Kabalo), but coordination efforts with development agencies have greatly improved. 
 
As no indication of overall assessments of the needs of population groups affected by mines or UXOs 
has been found, the Review Team cannot establish to what extent the targeted areas are relevant in this 
respect. Steps have been taken by DCA to strengthen survey capacity and integrate mine action with a 
food security programme, and this is a positive new direction potentially leading to a better foundation 
of the tasking in the future. There are no socio-economic analyses available at this stage for the Kabalo 
area. A national “Survey and MRE Coordinator” was appointed by DCA in October 2009 to cover the 
pre- and post- clearance assessments (among other survey activities) and DCA has employed a part time 
international survey consultant throughout the course of the project.  
Effectiveness and efficiency 
During the period 2008 – 2010, MAG removed 13,000 items of UXO. However, a more detailed 
analysis of data kept since the beginning of February 2009 records that between February 2009 and June 
2010, a figure of 806 items of UXO, of which 490 were Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) were removed.  
This indicates that Sida supported MCT cleared 319 items of rockets, mortars, grenades and improvised 
                                                   
82 As also mentioned in the mid-term review 




aircraft bombs over a period of 16 months. As an illustration of the effectiveness of MAG’s operations 
in DRC, the specific objectives for the grant period 2008-2010 as per the proposal in February 2008 are 
shown in the table below. 
Table 7–1: MAG DRC Objectives 2008 - 2010 
 Objectives State (and comments) 
1 Reduce threat of death & injury in S Equateur & Mbandaka Achieved 
2 Increase opportunities for reconstruction & development by 
communities and other NGOs to deliver wider relief & 
development activities 
Achieved 
3 Immediate and emergency response to requests from other 
NGOs delivering wider relief and development activities 
Achieved to limited degree 
4 Develop community awareness through CL & MRE Achieved 
5 Develop exit strategy for Equateur to be determined by (mid 
2009) and achieved (by 2010) 
Not achieved 
 
The team recognises the MAG programme’s impressive capacity to implement and operate the 
programme in the DRC given the operating environment - political, physical and environmental.  The 
operational element of the programme is very strong and Sida are undoubtedly getting good value from 
MAG in this respect. MAGs technical operations, as far as the team could ascertain, appear to be solid, 
strong and safe. This was based on discussions with the technical staff of MAG and assessment of MAG 
procedural documents.  The vast majority of tasks undertaken by the Sida sponsored teams (who have 
operated in eight operational areas over the last two years) were UXO removal tasks with very few mine 
clearance projects being undertaken.  The MCTs always deploy with an expatriate Technical Field 
Manager attached to them, essentially due to the logistical and environmental conditions that MAG says 
tend to result in relaxation of technical and safety norms.  While it is expensive to have an international 
member of staff with the MCT, it does tend to ensure maintenance of a high degree of professional 
competence. There is no doubt that the MAG capacities in Equateur enable the organisation to work in 
an operationally professional manner. 
The current structure of the MAG programme has the Technical Operations Manager (TOM) as the line 
manager of both the Technical Field Managers (TFM) as well as the Community Liaison Managers.  
Given the TOM’s experience and focus, it seemed to the team that this structure is not the most effective 
and that it would make more sense to provide the CLMs with a line manager whose expertise lies in the 
area of community liaison rather than the delivery of effective mine and UXO operational clearance 
capacities. At the moment there is effectively one international CLM attached to each community 
liaison team. As mentioned before in the context of TFMs in MCTs, this is an expensive way of doing 
things and although MAG is moving toward reducing the CLM ratio, the current status quo is very 
expensive. Although MAG refers to SALW in its proposal, the operational capacity funded by Sida does 
not include any dedicated SALW capacity.  
Operating a programme with a specific focus on capacity development and national ownership requires 
cultural sensitivity. It was a minor concern to the team that none of the three Sida funded TA in South 
Equateur was able to speak even a very basic level of French.  It is clear globally that the recruitment of 
Francophone advisors is difficult, and MAG has advanced significantly in recent months in recruitment 




processes and recruitment of Francophones, but the Review Team believes that there could be more 
focus on the development of non-French TA’s ability to speak French. (On a positive note, it should be 
noted that one of the advisors had some knowledge of Lingala – the local dialect). There may be a need 
to ensure specific training/education in the cultural awareness of expatriates working in the country.  
MAG has a very well developed system of monitoring and evaluation globally and has a specific team 
allocated to this, the (International Development and Evaluation Team) IDET team.  The IDET team last 
visited the MAG DRC programme in September 2008 and a copy of the report was provided to the 
team. The report is thorough and detailed and appears to be well integrated into MAGs quality 
processes.  Many of the previous reports recommendations seem to have been followed up, but the focus 
is very much on the operational side of the programme with little oversight of the community liaison 
and socio-economic factors.  Given that the effective implementation of the programme relies on the 
clearance teams actually operating in the right places, the team strongly believes MAG should consider 
including a community focus in the IDET team as well as operational staff. 
At the national level, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation 
(NG) is in the process of being rolled out throughout DRC.  In the meantime, database management 
nationally is weak.  MAG has recently begun to rationalise their database management processes.  
Under the more recent Sida projects, the recording of Sida funded teams since the beginning of 2009 has 
been effective and systematic.  Before this, however, recording mechanisms appear to have been poor 
and data lost.  MAG should be congratulated on their recent improvements, but should take note of the 
concerns about the period before the beginning of 2009. 
When it comes to MSB’s operations in DRC, a number of significant improvements have taken place 
since the project evaluation in February83, where a number of major problem areas were identified. The 
MDD are now fully operational, which together with the MMW and used together with the DCA 
deminers operating manually greatly increases the number of square metres surveyed/cleared per day. 
There is now much closer coordination with DCA with the very positive prospect of merging project at 
the beginning of 2011.  
The Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) supported by MSB have been operational since the end of February 
2010.  As of the end of week 20 (mid-May), the MDD had processed a total of 26,500 m2 since the 
beginning of the project. The MDD are now capable of reaching a level of 2,000 m2 surveyed per day. 
The dogs have found one anti-tank mine which has been destroyed. The MMW began to operate at the 
end of February 2009. Land cleared by the MMW up to the end of 2009 totalled 125,837 m2. In 2010, 
up to the end of week 20 (mid-May), the MMW figure was 3,630m2. The MMW has not thus far located 
any items of UXO. 
 
According to DCA, no new victims of mines or UXO have been reported since 2005 in the Kabalo area. 
The project document84 stated in March 2008: “the expected result (of the project) is therefore a 
significant decrease of reported mine incidents” and “...to date, 2010 victims have been recorded in the 
UNMACC-DRC database (892 killed and 1,118 injured) since 2002. The figures are expected to rise 
dramatically as more information is gathered from hitherto inaccessible areas”.  It appears that while 
the project document recognises the ongoing general threat to the population, the use of resources is not 
targeted and the actual impact in the Kabalo area seems to be limited. 
                                                   
83 “A Wolf and Eight dogs”, Mid-term Review of MSB demining activities in the DRC 2007-2009, Tim Lardner, Lars 
Peter Nissen, March 2010 
84 Assessment memo, “Support to the SRSA in the DRC for Mechanical Mine clearance activities”, 2008-2010 





With regards the broad implementation of the Kabalo project, there is a clear distinction (clarified in a 
cooperation agreement between DCA and MSB) in roles for the two organisations.  DCA is responsible 
for the tasking, implementation and day-to-day management of the demining programme, whereas in 
theory, MSB is purely operating in support of DCA with the provision of MDD, MMW and medical 
support. Conceptually, socio-economic surveys, impact assessments and issues surrounding linking 
mine action with development projects generally come under the responsibility of DCA. While this may 
make operational sense, it remains a broader question as to whether an operation of such a size (the 
MSB intervention is overall valued at 46 million SEK) should be implemented on the basis of absolute 
trust in a partner without any cross checking internal responsibility by the organisation. 
 
An MSB international admin/finance officer has been based in Kabalo since March 2010 and the 
management seems under control. There are currently two local logistic officers operating in Katanga: 
one in Kalemie (DCA) and one assistant (MSB) in Kabalo. The (MSB) international admin/finance 
Officer in Kabalo is overall in charge of logistics as well. Pending new funding, MSB and DCA 
operations in Katanga are planning to merge their administrative capacity in January 2011 and 
discussions are ongoing regarding practical modalities. If confirmed, the MSB admin /finance officer 
post in Kabalo would be removed. MSB (and DCA) staff met during the course of the mission seems 
very dedicated and professional. International staff turnover, however, remains high, due perhaps to the 
heavy workload and the working conditions. New rules implemented by Sweden early in 2010 have 
reduced the attractiveness and competitiveness of salary packages by imposing a taxation of 25% on all 
international salaries. MSB and DCA have separate accommodations in the same locations (villages of 
Kasumba and Suya). The MSB medic is not allowed to take care of DCA staff.  There may be some 
scope for combining and cost-sharing. No MSB or DCA staff had received the ToR of this review 
(including the MSB country manager), and none of the MSB staff (with the exception of the head in 
Kabalo) had heard of the mid-term evaluation report of the MSB’s demining activities85. None of the 




The Review Team has looked into elements of the two programmes that could be seen as efforts to 
pursue future sustainability of activities, such as cooperation with and capacity building of and local and 
national authorities, linking up with development actors in the areas, as well as preparing exit strategies. 
In a country characterised by weak governmental structures, sustainability is not the easiest goal to 
achieve. It seems however that serious efforts are being made by DCA to liaise with other actors on the 
ground and link mine action to broader development efforts, while MAG appears to be working more 
detached from government structures. 
The evaluation team was unable to meet the Governor in Mbandaka. A meeting took place with the 
General in charge of the military command in the area, who complained about the fact that MAG does 
not inform him on their current activities. Development and humanitarian organisations interviewed 
were overall positive on MAG interventions. Some however raised concerns over the fact that MAG 
works independently from any government structures, which questions the issue of ownership and 
sustainability at the end of the funding. Unfortunately, the team could not meet their local NGO partner 
                                                   
85 “A Wolf and Eight dogs”, Mid-term Review of MSB demining activities in the DRC 2007-2009, Lardner & Nissen, 
March 2010 
86 Assessment memo, “Support to the SRSA in the DRC for Mechanical Mine clearance activities”, 2008-2010. 




“Humanitas Ubangui” (HU), as they were not in Mbandaka at the time of the evaluation. HU will 
provide the staff for the CLT in south Equateur under the supervision of a MAG CLM.  It is the 
intention that this advisor will be phased out by the end of 2010 and the team will be able to operate 
independently.  The Review Team was not convinced that this will happen in such a timely manner. Aid 
agencies are not involved in post-clearance activities and development projects. Those interviewed said 
they have not been approached on that matter. There seems to be no link between technical operations 
and development. At a local level, there is some good feedback regarding involvement of beneficiaries 
in MAG’s programme. Community Liaison (CL) activities for instance involve communities in 
identifying hazards. No exit strategy exists at the moment, although this was promised in MAG's 
February 2008 proposal. 
 
Relations and exchange of information between MSB and the local authorities are very good as 
expressed by the territory administrator and the Army officer in charge of Katanga province. DCA is 
currently implementing a food security project in Nyunzu and Kabalo with WFP. Despite good 
intentions the links between these programmes and the MSB/DCA demining activities are not always 
clear. There is no clear evidence at this stage that cleared land would be taken into account in DCA 
development programmes. DCA’s coordination efforts with other agencies appear to be good. OCHA 
coordination meetings have taken place since May 2010. Two monthly meetings have been organised so 
far (hosted by WFP and FAO) and DCA was present at one of these, in March 2010. DCA is well 
known by the agencies operating in the Kabalo area87. The team gained the impression that coordination 
and communication between actors in Kabalo has improved significantly recently and that there is much 
potential for key actors to work closely together – including DCA and MSB.  MSBs profile in Kabalo 




Apart from a few MAG case studies and some general remarks in reporting from MSB to UNMACC the 
impact of the mine action interventions supported by Sida in DRC are not documented. It appears that 
some degree of tools development is taking place in MAG as well as DCA but they have not 
materialised into any systematic documentation of impact. 
 
There are no comprehensive post-impact studies carried out in relation to MAG’s programme in DRC. 
The documents available are limited to three “cases studies”. The social and economic impact of MAG 
interventions in Equateur is at this stage unknown. Case studies in themselves are interesting, but not 
representative and therefore difficult to get an objective perspective from.  The team was made aware of 
an ongoing process of the introduction of a formalised post-impact assessment reporting mechanism, but 
this implementation is significantly later than the initially proposed delivery of objective “post 
clearance impact assessments” that were included in the MAG January 2007 proposal to be 
implemented in the last 3 months of 2007 as well as being a core element of the proposal for 2008-2010 
and 2010-2012. In the view of the team this is a major failing. It is understood that the majority of work 
being undertaken in Equateur relates to spot tasks rather than SHA, which makes a post clearance 
impact assessment process more challenging, but this does not detract from the fact that Sida has been 
funding the project since 2007 in the belief that there is a post clearance impact reporting system either 
in place or about to be put into place. 
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“Providing safety from mine accidents to people in Kabumba on the areas 
mechanically cleared” 
Providing agricultural land for the people in Kabumba (all cleared land in 
Kabumba is used for agriculture). The land cleared with the MMW is in fact 
already ploughed and will produce more crops than land only prepared by the 
local method of pick-axes. 
Providing with repair/rebuild of road for vehicles and trucks, opening access 
for vehicles (I.E. development/aid/other) to previously not reachable and 
therefore isolated villages on east side of river in direction South from Kabalo 
towards Kasinge village. 
Providing employment for people that can support their families and relatives; 
and stimulate the local economy by buying merchandise and services. 
Especially Kanteba, Kabumba and along the recent repaired road where there 
was practically no cash economy before. 
Contributing to the local economy by procurement, construction and renting of 
facilities”. 
Likewise, there are no socio-economic analyses or impact surveys available at this stage for MSB 
supported activities in the Kabalo area. A standardised methodology is currently being developed for 
survey operations and a draft was made available to the team88. The aim of this manual is to provide 
staff with “...a reference for training, operations, and general conduct in the area of survey operations”. 
DCA has designed pre-and post-clearance assessment questionnaires asking questions to individuals on 
socio-economic activities in the target areas. The Review Team received a completed pre-clearance 
questionnaire regarding a village near Kabalo89. However, the Review Team was unable to locate any 
post-clearance assessments undertaken within the Kabalo area.  
 
According to paperwork provided by the DCA survey and MRE coordinator, the clearing of the road 
and land South of Kabalo (Nzofu-Munekela line) benefit an estimated 480,000 persons90. No clear 
indication was provided on how this 
figure had been calculated. The MSB 
project document91 mentions a 
similar number of expected 
beneficiaries (450,000 direct and 
indirect), in total for South, West and 
Manono Territories (although only 
110,000 in the Kabalo area of 
operations). 
 
The text box on the right shows an 
example of a general and non-
quantitative description on project 
impact from the “MSB yearly report 
to UNMACC” for 2009 and the 
monthly MSB report to UNMACC 
for April 2010. 
  
7.2 Iraq 
The findings on Sida supported mine action interventions in Iraq are based on a field visit to MAG’s 
programme in Kurdistan between the 29 May and 3 June 2010, interviews with DDG in Copenhagen 
and ICRC in Geneva (regarding the now ended support from MSB), as well as review of relevant 
documents. While the Review Team thus had the opportunity to study MAG’s field operations, the 
activities of DDG and MSB were reviewed through document studies and interviews, as the Team was 
unable to visit South and Central Iraq for security reasons. This limitation has caused a bias in the level 
of detail in the assessment of MAG versus DDG and MSB. 
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89 The village of Munekelwa 
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7.2.1 The mine problem in Iraq 
Iraq has been affected by mines and UXO as a result of several conflicts over the last 25 years.  The full 
extent of the problem is not currently fully understood, although a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was 
undertaken between 2004 and 2006 in all but four Governorates.  Those Governorates that were not 
covered in the initial survey have more recently been surveyed, but the results are not yet publicly 
available.  It is believed that the remaining four Governorates level of contamination is low. Iraq is 
divided into essentially two regions – the virtually autonomous northern Kurdistan region (often referred 
to as KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government) and the South-central region.  Both regions are heavily 
contaminated with mines and UXO, but the north has a more significant landmine problem, whereas 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) poses the most significant threat to the population and development 
of the south-central region.  The current security threat in the south-central regions is significant and 
adds a large additional burden to the cost of undertaking operations in the region.  KRG has a much 
smaller security threat, but again, this does add to the costs of operations. The basic results from the LIS 
indicate significant levels of contamination in the Iraqi Kurdistan area in the north of the country, and 
moderate levels in the southern area. The figure below indicates the level of contamination found by the 
LIS. 
Figure 1 - Impacted communities from LIS92 
 
 
Iraqi Kurdistan consists of seven governorates, all of which are ERW affected, which are coordinated by 
two regional authorities – the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA), based in Erbil and 
covering the provinces of Erbil, Dahuk, Mosul and Kirkuk and the General Directorate of Mine Action 
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(GDMA), based in Sulaimaniyah, and covering the governorates of Sulaimaniyah, Diyala and Salah ad 
Din. 
7.2.2 Sida support to mine action in Iraq 
Sida has been providing support to a number of operations in Iraq over the last 10 years through three 
partner organisations: Mines Advisory Group (Kurdistan Region), Danish Demining Group (Southern 
Iraq), and MSB (support to ICRC). 
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)  
Operations in Iraq since 1992  600 staff currently deployed in 5 (of 7) governorates in 
Iraqi Kurdistan.   
 - 16 Mine Action Teams 
- 4 Conventional Weapon Disposal Teams 
- 11 Community Liaison Teams 
- 2 Mechanical Teams 
- 2 Mechanical support Teams 
- 3 Mine Detection Dog Teams 
- 1 Mine Detection Dog support Teams 
Sida supporting - 2x Mine Action Teams (MAT) 
- 1x Community Liaison Team (CLT) 
- 1x Mechanical Team 
 
MAG has been established and has an unbroken period of operating in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992, an 
impressive achievement given the tumultuous history of the region in recent years.  Although the 
environment has changed significantly, MAG has maintained an independence which has probably 
served them well.  In particular, the organisation made a conscious decision to opt out of the “Oil for 
Food” project managed by UNOPS.  MAG also stayed operational and present throughout the 2003 
conflict in Iraq – the only mine action organisation to do so. 
Danish Demining Group (DDG)  
Operating in Southern Iraq since 2003, 
the only International Humanitarian Mine Action 
organisation operating in south Iraq. 
Basra region conducting Battlefield Area Clearance 
(BAC) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
operations.  
4 multi-skilled (EOD) Quick Response Teams (QRT) 
 Capacity building of national staff. 
From 2005 all the field operations were conducted by 
national operators supervised by national managers, 
field supervisors and team leaders with minimum 
international technical support. 
 National Iraqi NGO established 2007. 
 In 2008, with donations from Sida DDG operation into 
the neighbouring governorate of Dhi Qar. 
 
In 2003, DDG deployed a team from their Afghanistan programme to Baghdad to assess the 
opportunities to support the mine action sector in Iraq. Although under pressure following the Canal 




Hotel bombing in August 2003, DDG remained present and eventually established itself in Az Zubaya 
in Basrah and more recently in Nazaria. In 2005, DDG assisted in the establishment of a national 
demining organisation – Rafadain, who subsequently commenced (and have maintained a capacity to 
undertake) independent clearance operations in 2007. 
SRSA - now MSB -has been providing operational support through the International Committee of the 
Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) in Iraq since 2006.  The modality of the support has been primarily the 
provision of technical experts who were seconded directly to ICRC’s mine action programme. The 
modality of these activities has been very much welcomed by the ICRC. When the most recent financial 
agreement between Sida and MSB for support to Iraq was concluded in 2009, the ICRC continued the 
arrangement utilising its own funds – something that seems to vindicate the degree of success of the 
project, from the end user’s perspective. 
7.2.3 Assessment of results 
Relevance 
DDG has made some attempts to liaise with the Regional Mine Action Coordination Centre (RMACC), 
which is the southern regional office for the National Mine Action Centre but the capacity is not really 
there yet for a reciprocal partnership. The mine action sector is moreover highly politicised in Iraq and 
apart from the mine action authorities the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Environment are 
major players. 
DDG has been liaising with sheiks and other authorities in the local areas and often gone through 
lengthy negotiations before they could start operations. The organisation liaises with beneficiaries such 
as farmers and schools in the areas and tries to involve them in planning and prioritisation. The Review 
Team finds that DDG’s steps towards ensuring as high a relevance and alignment as possible in relation 
to needs and national priorities are as far as is possible in a difficult security situation as the one in 
Southern Iraq.processes 
 
The status of the national mine action strategy for Iraq that has been prepared recently is not entirely 
clear, and the strategy does not cover the Kurdistan Region. Therefore it is more relevant for MAG to 
align with of the two regional mine action authorities IKMAA and GDMA. The Review Team found 
that MAG maintains good relations with the regional authorities and that the MAG operations are 
coordinated with their priorities, although strategies as such are not yet in place. MAG would like to see 
the national and regional mine action strategies merged together and integrated into broader 
development strategies for the region, and the organisation has discussed this with IKMAA at several 
occasions. MAG sees its role as that of encouraging IKMAA to further this process and has been raising 
the issue at national level, e.g. meetings on the national mine action strategy in 2009 and 2010. MAG 
continues to lobby for IKMAA presence in the UNDP-led national level discussions on the mine action 
strategy and for closer links between these discussions and other relevant ministries and donor agencies. 
The Review Team found that MAG is playing a very important role in this regard based on the 
organisation’s long-standing experience and knowledge of the sector. 
 
MAG is well aware of other strategies and policies of KRG and has used information from the KRG 
website in strategic planning. The Review Team was informed of the five-year development plan for 
agriculture in the Ministry of Planning, but learned that MAG had not yet seen a copy of this and, as a 
consequence, they have not aligned to this plan in their strategic planning. However, MAG has 
supported the agricultural sector in the region for 18 years and knows the situation well, and this 




knowledge has been used to make informed choices in relation to priorities in the programme. At the 
national level, MAG is well acquainted with the Iraqi national (development) strategy. However, this 
does not address mine action except for one reference to mine contamination being one of the obstacles 
to development. 
 
The Review Team found that the mindset in MAG Iraq is not oriented towards integrating their mine 
action operations with development programmes in the region. At community level, a systematic and 
well functioning bottom up approach is applied, but at the overall strategic level there is no reference to 
development strategies or programmes in the documents made available to the Team. The Team was 
informed by MAG that decisions about operations and prioritisation are made strategically to link with 
the different phases of regional development, but the Team was not able to identify which development 
activities at the regional level were considered and how. MAG also informed the Team that their 
strategies are based on data gathered from communities, local authorities, development organisations 
and based on development strategies. The data collection at community and local authority level was 
confirmed during the Team’s visit to mayors' offices in three municipalities and visits to mine action 
sites, whereas the reference to development organisations and development strategies was not specified 
in any detail.  
 
The Review Team found little evidence of MAG Iraq using overall socio-economic statistics at region 
or governorate level, such as OCHA’s vulnerability maps etc., when priorities are made for geographical 
areas of operations. This raises the question whether the mine and UXO contamination comes first as a 
parameter for choice of area, and to what extent the situation and needs of the population are considered.  
As the overall aim of the programme is ‘reducing the impact of RoC (Remnants of Conflict) on 
individuals, communities and organisations’93 it would have been logical to establish an overview of 
socio-economic parameters and use that as a basis for geographical priorities. The Review Team 
acquired some of the thematic maps produced by OCHA and found that they contain important 
information on e.g. IDPs, vulnerability, living conditions, food insecurity etc. that would be relevant for 
choice of geographical focus of mine action programmes.  Even though the data is associated with 
insecurity and sometime a bit dated, it would be a possibility to link more closely to OCHA’s data 
collection department in order to ensure that the information obtained is as correct as possible.he 
 












 extent possible in a complicated security environment. 
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Effectiveness and efficiency 
Although the security environment in South-central Iraq is poor, DDG has had no security incidents 
since 2003 (with the exception of one vehicle stolen through an incident that appears to have been 
undertaken by a disgruntled former member of staff).  DDG puts this down to a combination of 
providing good employment conditions, hiring all staff locally and good liaison with local community 
leaders.  Security is something that DDG takes seriously and regular assessments and re-assessments are 
undertaken.  In addition to this, 20% of DDG’s costs are spent on security.  
The major challenge (aside from security) that DDG has been dealing with over recent years has been 
the challenges of operating in a constrained environment that has effectively prevented them from 
undertaking any operational work.  The government of Iraq introduced a mine action “ban” preventing 
all operators from undertaking activities in the south and centre of the country.  This was ostensibly for 
security reasons, but has prevented significant work being undertaken in the country.  The ban was 
introduced in December 2008 and remained in place until 19th May 2010, when DDG undertook their 
first demolition. Sida’s representative in Baghdad is well acquainted with the problems resulting from 
the ban and recently made an assessment of whether the work should be continued or not and concluded 
positively. Sida has also taken part in a donor meeting called by the U.S. to discuss issues with 
Ministries of Environment and Defence around this issue.94  
From an operational perspective, DDG has “lost” 18 months productivity due to the ban, which is 
difficult to define as an effective use of resources, but did maintain their training capacity and survey 
and MRE activities. Now not under the constraints of the ban, the organisation is focusing on continuing 
survey activities to develop the understanding of the extant situation as well as focusing on operational 
activities close to Basra, where there appears to be heavy contamination. Because of the ban on mine 
action DDG has not been productive between December 2008 and May 2010.  This is serious for the 
effectiveness of the programme but the decision to focus on capacity building and MRE during that 
period was probably be the best option considering the alternatives (which in effect would mean closing 
down the entire operational setup). Part of the difficulty has been that the ban has not had a fixed 
timescale and there has been hope that it would be rescinded on many occasions. Among other 
initiatives, DDG has been very successful in its capacity building project with the local NGO Rafadian. 
DDG is interested in implementing the land release concept in Iraq but is concerned because a 
framework of national standards does not exist yet. The Review Team believes that DDG would be well 
placed to take the lead on furthering this process. 
The technical operations base of MAG in Iraq is extremely strong and well developed.  As a programme 
with almost 20 years experience in the region, MAG has established itself well and undertakes much 
focussed survey and clearance operations. Operational planning processes in both the headquarters in 
Erbil and the regional office in Dahuk are extremely impressive and the operations staff should be 
congratulated for their structured approach to planning and operations.  In particular, in the Dahuk 
office, the Field Technical Manager (FTM) is running the operations in an exceptionally effective 
manner with enthusiasm, clarity and vision. At the field level, the operational site visited was well 
managed and the national site manager was thorough and clear.  Sound clearance principles – including 
effective land release processes – were being implemented resulting in an efficient and impressive use 
of resources at that particular location.  The team was very satisfied with the quality of the product and 
had no doubt that within the bounds of the technical operations; it would be very difficult to improve on 
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the process.  In addition, at the local level, the involvement of the local population, local and regional 
authorities, and the national staff was very well established and successful.  
In terms of efficiency of operations, the team was impressed with the processes – in particular the 
process and methodology of land release and the technical approach seen on the site visited in Girki 
Husseni, Dahuk province.  The way that MAG utilises flexible teams provides an efficient way of using 
resources at the operational level.  In addition, the use of mechanical assets in a flexible manner further 
reinforces the efficient use of assets that MAG employ.  This gives benefits not only for Sida, but to 
other donors and stakeholders. 
 
One concern that the team had during its time in KRG, was that on some occasions, it seemed that this 
efficiency was at the expense of some degree of capacity development and local involvement.  On 
occasions, it appeared as though the key processes and elements of the operational part of the 
programme were driven by expatriates with great operational experience, but much less local 
understanding.  While it is understandable that programme expatriates are keen to get results and to 
“make things happen”, there were some concerns that this excluded the experienced and qualified local 
staff due in part to the cultural differences. 
Sustainability 
DDG has shown a strong commitment to ensuring sustainability of operations through extensive 
capacity building, working with local authorities and NGOs, and through replacing expatriate staff with 
national and local staff in a gradual manner.  Furthermore, DDG seems to coordinate as much as 
possible with the national mine action authority in Baghdad. 
MAG operates in close coordination with both Regional Authorities (de facto National Mine Action 
Authorities) in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah who notionally coordinate mine action in the region. Both 
authorities essentially approve MAG’s annual plans for clearance in their areas of responsibility 
following MAG’s presentation of those plans to them. In addition, the authorities also undertake initial 
accreditation and subsequent monitoring and quality control activities of the operational assets of MAG.  
Although this concept fits with international best practice, the reality is that MAG’s experience 
significantly outweighs the capacity of both authorities and the process is a much more symbiotic one, 
where the authorities are gaining experience and skills from MAG throughout the process.  This is 
something that MAG seems to do well although it is an informal process. While there is undoubtedly a 
reasonable relationship between MAG and the regional authorities, the Review Team finds that there is 
room for improvement in this process.  Although capacity building of the regional authorities is not 
strictly within the mandate of MAG, and in addition, the regional authorities have a reasonable capacity 
already, we felt that there may still be some room for improving the relationship at a technical level.  
 
MAG has worked with national organisations/entities since 2005, including the Iraqi National Guard, 
the Peshmerga, Iraqi health and social care organisations, Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization 
(IMCO) as well as NGOs such as Al Ghad, Work for Peace etc. One example of this kind of partnership 
is that data gathered during MRE delivery to IDPs in Kirkuk by Al Ghad organisation, MAG’s national 
partner in Kirkuk, has identified the need to distribute food to IDP families.  Al Ghad provided these 
details to donors and managed to get funding for food distribution from OCHA. MAG informed the 
Review Team that a strategy for partnership with national NGOs is included in the MAG business plan 
for 2010–2011 involving MRE, financial training and other activities. The team has subsequently 
reviewed the business plan and learned that there is a description of planned activities for continued 
development of strategic partnerships with the three national NGOs IMCO, Al Ghad, and Work for 
Peace. It is also mentioned that the goals of these partnerships is to build capacities with these 




organisations to work in areas where MAG is not able to operate due to security concerns (such as Basra 
and Mosul).95 The organisations receiving support from MAG are expected to carry out activities 
directly related to mine action such as MRE, so this kind of partnership cannot be regarded as MAG 
linking up to broader development activities and organisations in the areas of operation 
 




















The Review Team found that MAG’s approach to involvement of beneficiaries is very well organised 
through the community liaison (CL) processes prior to and during operations. The CL system used by 
MAG is very impressive and probably at the forefront in the mine action sector. Basic information in 
communities is gathered prior to operations through basic household interviews and consultations with 
local authorities, and village profiles are drawn up based on that.  As part of the pre-operations survey, 
community members are asked about their preferences in relation to clearing of mine and UXOs, and 
their inputs feed into MAG’s priority-setting for which areas and locations to clear and in what order. 
During operations, contact is maintained with the communities, and a post-clearance visit is paid to the 
sites by CL staff. In this way, the activities are very comprehensive and provide strong direction and 
support to tasking mechanisms. The Team also found that the CL staff are well trained and experienced 
to do the job, and that guidelines and documentation related to the CL processes are excellent. 
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The Impact Monitoring Tool developed by DDG has been in place since 2009 and will be implemented 
in the Iraq programme following the restart of mine clearance in mid-2010. According to the DDG 
annual report to Sida for 2009, the baseline part of the impact monitoring was completed in Iraq in 
relation to MRE activities in 2009. (For further description and assessment of DDG’s impact monitoring 
tool please refer to section 8.1 of this report.) Despite MAG’s overall emphasis on impact-driven 
interventions96, the field visit to the Kurdistan programme showed that surprisingly limited focus is 
placed on impact assessment despite the excellent rapport established with communities and the 
information gathered prior to and during operations in a specific area. As one of the important global 
actors in humanitarian mine action known to be very strong in community liaison, MAG should be 
expected to have potential for becoming a leader in this field. Work on developing an impact tool has 
been in progress in MAG for quite some time without delivering tangible results as yet. The Review 
Team learned that the methodology is still being refined and that a former staff member in Laos had 
been visiting recently to test the tools. An amended version of the village survey forms will be rolled out 
and used as baseline, based on data collected since 2008.  
 
The lack of ability to document impact after almost two decades of operation in the area is difficult to 
assess as anything other than a lack of management priority to this area despite the positive intentions 
used in MAG’s brochures and project proposals to donors. Until now the documentation presented to 
Sida on results has been in the form of narrative case studies from different project locations. These case 
stories are very informative on the situation at the very local level and some of the results of MAG’s 
operations and will probably contain important information that can be aggregated and used for an 
overall assessment of impact.97  
7.3 Overall assessment of mine action in DRC and Iraq 
Despite different geographical contexts the Review Team can draw a set of similar conclusions from the 
two country visits: 
• Strong technical capability and high professionalism in mine clearance operations 
• Good working relations with regional and national mine action authorities and the UN 
• Increasing capacities of national and regional mine action authorities 
• Absence of systematic strategies for capacity building and exit plans of implementing 
organisations 
• Concerns about the results of the programmes from the perspective of impact and socio-
economic outputs. 
Specific conclusions in relation to the two field countries are presented below. 
7.3.1 DRC  
The team recognises the MAG programme’s impressive capacity to implement and operate the 
programme in the DRC given the operating environment - political, physical and environmental.  The 
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operational element of the programme is very strong and Sida are undoubtedly getting good value from 
MAG in this respect. 
The Review Team had however  serious concerns about the results of the MAG programme from the 
perspective of impact and socio-economic outputs. Given the investment in the project, even taking into 
account the challenges and additional costs of operating in DRC, it is difficult to quantify the results 
from the work undertaken.  With the additional factor of the fact that there is no post-clearance impact 
monitoring system in place, the team was not convinced that the outputs from the project justified the 
expenditure by Sida. 
Since the project evaluation in February98, where a number of major problem areas were identified, a 
number of significant changes have been made to the MSB programme which is considered very 
positive. 
The relevance of the MSB project in the Kabalo area can however be questioned, the broader impact on 
communities around Kabalo is still unclear, and neither MSB nor DCA are able to substantiate the value 
of the work undertaken. In terms of sustainability, the government demining structure is not functional 
yet and there is no national staff in key management positions. The DCA philosophy does, however, 
emphasise capacity development and indications were positive in this area.  
7.3.2 Iraq 
MAG’s approach to community liaison is very impressive and probably leading in the mine action 
sector as a whole. Community Liaison activities are carried out effectively and provide strong direction 
and support to tasking mechanisms. The Review Team also found that the Community Liaison staff are 
well trained and experienced to do the job, and that guidelines and documentation related to the liaison 
processes are excellent. 
 
MAG’s efforts in terms of developing national capacities, documenting impact and linking to 
development activities and actors are less convincing, and this leads the Review Team to question 
whether the programme in Kurdistan matches the priorities presented in project proposals to Sida as 
well as MAG’s own strategies.  The programme management has so far clearly concentrated on the 
technical operations side and has so far developed no systematic approach to capacity building of mine 
action authorities, linking up to development actors or documenting socio-economic impact of their 
operations (although a methodology for this is apparently underway).  This lack of focus on capacity 
building and socio-economic issues has so far not been questioned by donors, but as issues around 
sustainability and comprehensive approaches are coming more and more in focus among donor agencies 
these years, the pressure to show results in these fields from mine action programmes is likely to 
increase. It would therefore be a wise strategy for MAG to place more attention to these issues the 
coming years, including ensuring appropriate competencies with staff through e.g. recruiting more staff 
members with broader development backgrounds at management level. 
Due to security constraints, the Review Team was not able to visit DDG in South Iraq.  Based on a desk 
review and meetings with DDG in Copenhagen, the team believes that the operation is being undertaken 
in an effective manner and the Sida should generally be happy with the work that DDG is undertaking 
on behalf of them.  Notwithstanding the 18 months where DDG was not productive, DDG appears to be 
taking an approach that links closely with Sida’s policy. 
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7.3.3 Recommendations to the DRC and Iraq programmes 
 
General  
• At the moment, the real scale of the problem if mines and UXO in DRC is unclear.  A process, led 
by the UNMACC, to undertake a national survey is key to the understanding and prioritising of 
mine action in DRC.  The team recommends that Sida encourages all its key partners in DRC to 
continue to support this process at the same time as continuing to undertake their current activities99 
• All of Sida’s key partners in DRC and Iraq are lacking in the area of socio-economic analysis.  
They should be encouraged to continue the development, and as rapidly as possible implement 
thorough socio-economic M&E mechanisms. 
 
MAG 
• MAG should be encouraged to reassess the appropriateness of their exit strategy development 
• MAG should be encouraged to strengthen their current integration with other development actors 
and as part of this process strengthen their prioritising and tasking mechanisms 
• MAG international staff in DRC should be encouraged to develop their language skills 
• At an international level, MAG should be encouraged to strengthen the socio-economic element 
within their IDET team 
 
MSB 
• Given the significant investment already made into establishing the DRC programme, and the costs 
that would be incurred to close the programme down, the team suggests Sida considers favourably 
that the successes of the previous six month of the MSB programme be taken as an indication of the 
potential development of the programme and that Sida continue to support the MSB programme to 
support DCA in Katanga province. 
• MSB should be encouraged take a more pro-active role in the relationship between themselves and 
DCA in DRC 
• MSB should be encouraged to develop a more open dialogue with their key partner, DCA, with 
regards the significance and priority of the area(s) they are working within 
 
DDG 
• DDG should continue its work on socio-economic baseline indicators and implementation of the 
impact assesment tool and provide documentation as inspiration to the mine action sector as a 
whole. 
• DDG should document its results in capacity building and local ownership in the mine action 
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8 Overall results of the review 
8.1 Conclusions 
The changing mine action sector context 
The response to mines and other ERW has changed enormously over the last 10 years and focus has 
broadened to include both the hard technical issues asa well as socio-economic factors, such as impact 
on the broader situation of the affected population groups and links to development activities. Tools and 
methods for clearance have improved and the donor community including Sida has generally followed 
and supported these developments with considerable financial allocations. Donors are now placing 
increased focus on outcomes rather than outputs. This is posing a challenge to the implementing 
organisations who are often not adequately equipped to address the broader socio-economic and 
developmental issues and who thus continue to report mainly on output. Because of the specialised 
competencies needed for mine clearance and the high risks involved, the sector has for many years been 
allowed to work in isolation from other sectors and has not been subjected to the same degree to the 
conditions and requirements applied to other parts of humanitarian and development assistance, 
including capacity building, sustainability and exit strategies. As the competition from commercial 
organisations in the sector becomes sharper (often hired by private companies), the sector is often seen 
more as a profit-making industry than a sector related to humanitarian and/or development assistance.  
This accentuates the need for reinforcing the humanitarian aspect of mine action and the importance of 
basing priorities on population needs, as donors otherwise will find it increasingly difficult to justify and 
prioritise at the global level. 
Continuing relevance of Sida’s policy for support to mine operations 
Even though Sida’s policy paper for supporting mine action is from 2002, the subsequent development 
in the mine action sector shows that many of the points are still highly relevant. However, Sida appears 
not to have promoted this policy directly vis-à-vis implementing partners and has not developed an 
operational strategy for implementing it.  This has weakened the linkage between policy directions and 
decisions regarding implementation.  A symptom of this is that the strategic considerations behind the 
choice of countries for Swedish support to mine action programmes are not very clear. As a result, there 
has been a spread over close to 20 countries over the years with the risk of high transaction costs in 
terms of follow-up and a risk of inadequate quality assurance.  
As Sida does not have in-house technical mine action expertise, programmes supported may have been 
allowed to continue without sufficient technical accountability in terms of documented outcomes and 
impact. The importance of ensuring technical capacities for monitoring was also one of the findings of 
the 2001 evaluation.  The Review Team has seen examples of Sida extension and initial delivery of of 
programme funding based on poor quality proposals and with no systematic assessment of reports from 
previous phases in relation to objectives and expected outcome. Given the amount of funding allocated 
over the past 10 years to the mine action sector this is a cause for concern. The Review Team consider 
that more stringent proposal and reporting criteria coupled with selective programme reviews (with 
other donors where relevant) would significantly increase the quality management of Sida's mine action 
portfolio in the future.   




Weak linkages to Sida country strategies 
The Review Team finds that mine action has been presented and argued for as a strategic priority in the 
strategies for Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and DRC, while the sector is not 
mentioned in the strategies for Iraq or Sudan. Cambodia and Nicaragua are both characterised by time 
limited engagement and phase-out. Even though Sida emphasises coordination and coherent approaches, 
humanitarian assistance is not integrated in the strategic thinking in all countries, nor is mine action. 
This leads to the conclusion that mine action would benefit from being more systematically included as 
a strategic priority in country strategies where the sector is in fact prioritised and, as a consequence, 
becomes a mandatory subject in the reporting and subject to more regular assessments and evaluations 
than is currently the case. 
Continued relevance of support to global organisations 
The support to the UN is in line with Sida's mine action policy and its humanitarian strategy. 
Furthermore, the choice of supporting key UN agencies with a mine action role enables Sida's funding 
to meet a range of needs in both emergencies and situations of peace - a spread of input that the Review 
Team also finds it relevant in view of Sida's development and humanitarian role. UNDP's contributions 
are dispersed and flexible and at an overall level relates well to Sida objectives in terms of national 
capacity building. The support to UNMAS appears to complement UNDP as they are present and active 
on mine action where UNDP is not or is unable. Similarly, the support to UNICEF enables inputs to be 
made relating to MRE and victim assistance. The Review Team would also emphasise the importance of 
these UN agencies pursuing a coherent and coordinated approach in countries where each is present. 
The Team suggests that it would be worth continuing to provide support to these UN agencies but that 
the quality management improvements already mentioned should also apply. 
 The Review Team also finds that the support to GICHD has been relevant to Sida's Mine Action Policy, 
particularly in relation to knowledge development. In the case of Geneva Call, the Review Team would 
highlight the results achieved so far in relation to engaging non-state actors.  With regard to GICHD, the 
relevance will be maintained provided that the Centre ensures clear alignment to the needs of its 
stakeholders.  The quality and timeliness of reporting should also improve. In a sector that is becoming 
increasingly competitive, it is also essential that the Centre maintains its impartiality and neutrality.  
Relevance of country level support 
The Sida supported mine action programmes in general appear to be well coordinated with national 
priorities as most implementing partners have established close links with national mine action 
authorities and/or UNMAS in the countries of operation. In many cases the programmes have in fact 
been started upon request of the mine action authorities and high relevance and alignment has therefore 
been secured from the outset. 
The relevance in relation to the seriousness of mine contamination is not clear in all cases, as for 
example DRC - one of Sida’s priority countries - according to available information is not seriously 
affected by landmines and UXO.  As a contrast to this, Iraq – another priority country - is said to have 
considerable numbers of items still to be cleared, and this points to a much higher relevance of investing 
in mine action.  
While all the implementing organisations display a high emphasis on improving conditions for people 
affected by mines and UXOs in their overall strategies and objectives, this is rarely transformed into 
concrete knowledge gathering on specific needs and priorities of different groups in the population. 
Socio-economic aspects have not really been prioritised in the mine action sector, and many of the 
programmes have developed as ‘project islands’ in isolation from ongoing development initiatives 




around them. An exception from this among Sida partners is DDG which has made some attempts to 
systematically include socio-economic parameters employing project managers with a broader 
development background.  
One sided effectiveness and efficiency 
The technical operational base of the programmes reviewed in DRC and Iraq is strong and well 
developed. Planning processes and programme management are undertaken in a very effective and 
efficient manner, and the quality of field operations including sound clearance principles and effective 
land release processes is generally very high. But effectiveness is not only about technical mine 
clearance. Reporting tends to focus solely on outputs at the technical clearance and land release level 
and not on outcomes. With a few exceptions (notably DDG in Somalia), this is also evident from the 
other countries examined during this review. This leaves a gap in reporting fully on programme 
objectives which in most programmes also include broader socio-economic elements such as return to 
land, resuming economic activities such as agriculture, improving income etc. The Review Team has 
had difficulty in assessing the quality of the interventions in other countries due to the superficial nature 
of much of the documentation available.  This suggests the relevance of periodic field based 
assessments as well as the need to improve and standardise reporting. 
Achievement of objectives related to involving and capacitating the local population, local and regional 
authorities, and the national staff is not reported on systematically. From the projects visited and the 
document reviews this aspect appears often to be well achieved at the operational sites but addressed 
unevenly and in more informal ways at the level of national authorities.   
Good potential for sustainability – and new role for INGOs? 
In general, the programmes reviewed are tightly coordinated with either national or regional mine action 
authorities and contains elements of capacity building and skills transfer. This way they have a good 
potential for leading to sustainable structures and capacities, although some of them could benefit from 
a more systematic approach. Not all programmes have developed capacity building strategies as such, or 
systematic processes of transfer of knowledge with an eye on an exit strategy. There is a risk that some 
organisations are caught in a dilemma between leaving national capacity and making themselves 
redundant (which is good developmental thinking) on the one hand, and a desire to keep activities going 
and keep up their business. This is underlined by the fact that several humanitarian mine action 
organisations have already started – or are considering – moving into the commercial sphere of working 
through private companies rather than governments/donors agencies. 
As discussed in connection with the stakeholder analysis in chapter 2 of this report, a new reality is 
emerging where national mine action authorities in many countries have developed a level of capacity 
that enables them to take a stronger role in tasking and operations. This gives rise to a need for 
rethinking the division of roles between national and international actors and points to a need for INGOs 
to withdraw to an advisory rather than implementing role in countries where the situation is ripe for that. 
Difficulties in assessing impact 
Documentation of impact is an area that the mine action sector has been struggling with for many years, 
and this review has found no shortage of good intentions but very little documentation of impact. Two 
significant achievements are however  notable in this area: the DDG manual for impact monitoring now 
being rolled out, and MAG’s long-awaited process of developing an impact monitoring tool based on 
community data already being compiled as part of the organisation’s community liaison work. At the 
same time, the existence of two almost simultaneous parallel processes is not the most effective way of 




solving this problem. Considering that other organisations (like NPA and GICHD) are also active on 
this, one might raise a question of possible coordination and cost savings among organisations. 
The current status for the Impact Monitoring Manual of DDG is that baseline studies have been carried 
out in South Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, Iraq and are being undertaken at this very moment in Sri 
Lanka. At this stage reports from Uganda and South Sudan have been completed. The authors of the 
reports are the national staff and the reports are good but ‘there is still room for improvement’.100 The 
manual is comprehensive and instructive and seems well suited for capacitating implementers to 
integrate impact monitoring in programmes right from the initial baseline stage.101 
A detailed assessement relating to impact monitoring in the mine action sector is beyond the scope of 
this review.  However, given Sida's interest in the area, the Review Team would like to present a brief 
‘list’ of relevant issues and steps to take in order to continue the improvement of M&E practices in mine 
action programmes: 
• Note that the general trend towards results monitoring has also reached the mine action community 
– increasing interest from donors (and certain NGOs) to see the effect of their work. 
• This results in different requirements depending upon where the view is coming from, ie 
humanitarian, development, economic, impacts 
• The MA community has been good at setting goals and activities but less good at clearly showing 
the linkages and assumptions between them. This review shows that virtually all operators are 
reporting at output level but that very few report on outcomes 
• However, the need to identify and attribute wider impact is clearly recognised by the effort some 
operators (DDG, MAG, GICHD) are putting into M&E and training on M&E 
• Important that donors require operators to include impact monitoring in their programme design 
• Nb. Data needs to be sex disaggregated and multi sectoral 
• Impact monitoring requires the establishment of clear baselines during project formulation against 
which progress can be assessed 
• Indicators (proxy indicators can also be useful) need to be set related to the variables in the 
baseline. May be useful to have process indicators as well as concrete targets 
• There is a need to involve beneficiaries and other stakeholders in this process  
• Problem of attribution – need to consider how big a challenge this is for MA 
• There is a need to take the counterfactual into account – does this raise ethical issues?  
8.2 Lessons learnt 
The major lessons learnt from Sida’s support to the mine action sector during the past decade can be 
summarised as follows: 
LESSON 1: Implementing partners need pressure from donors to increase their focus on impact. 
Since the low focus on impact is a sectorwide characteristic, the lesson learnt is that the operators may 
need a push from outside to improve this. The reasons for the apparent lack of interest in impact are 
mainly the technical background of most staff involved in mine action, and the lack of pressure from 
donors to build up a basic understanding of impact and develop systems for tracking it. Given Sida's 
general interest in knowing the results of its programmes, consideration could be given to supporting a 
workstream on improving programming, implementation and monitoring for impact.  This could take 
                                                   
100 Information from Roger Fasth, DDG, September 2010 
101 Danish Demining Group: Impact Monitoring Manual, www.danishdemininggroup.dk 




stock of and build on the work already being done in this area within DDG, MAG, GICHD, for 
example.  
LESSON 2: A strategic approach for building national capacities is needed in order to make a 
difference. In most programmes, capacity building does take place through cooperation with national 
mine action authorities, but in many cases without a specific strategy with objectives that can be 
monitored and followed up upon. Sida should encourage mine action operators and NMAAs to develop 
clear capacity building strategies. 
LESSON 3: Programme staff of mine action organisations generally do not have sufficient 
understanding of humanitarian assistance or of development, as they have a technical mine action 
background. Some INGOs have already taken steps to employ managers and other staff with a broader 
humanitarian or development background. The sector needs to see more of such initiatives, and Sida 
could push for that. 
LESSON 4. The current lack of mine action competencies within Sida is a limiting factor for 
ensuring quality and for providing advice and support to implementing partners. There is need for 
a balance between overall good humanitarian and development capacity with Sida desk officers and the 
need to bring in specialised technical expertise as and when required. A realistic solution could be to 
ensure that selected desk officers are engaged, have a feel of the sector and hands-on monitoring 
practices, and that specialists are called in at programme level for technical quality assurance on a 
regular basis. 
LESSON 5. The respective roles of national authorities and international implementing 
organisations and the increasing capacities at national level should be reflected in the approaches 
taken by the INGOs in relation to sustainability measures and adjustment of their role from executive to 
advisory. This would encourage the move towards exit strategies for INGOs even though the process 
might meet with some resistance. 
LESSON 6: Mine action organisations are in most cases not ensuring sufficient coordination 
between mine action and other reconstruction and development activities. Despite previous 
reviews, evaluations and strategic intentions, the implementing organisations place inadequate attention 
and resources to socio-economic and developmental aspects, leaving most programmes delinked from 
other development activities in the areas of operation. Mine action programmes need to be linked to 
PRSPs, development plans and programmes, key stakeholders including NGOs on the ground and 
beneficiaries, and good practices need to be developed to strengthen the process. 102 
LESSON 7: The results from mine action programmes are generally documented at output level 
only, and the process of developing tools to document broader outcomes and impact has been very 
much delayed. The realisation spreading in the donor community of this lack of documentation of 
results may cause the mine action sector to become isolated and loose popularity, so this is a rather 
urgent challenge that needs to be addressed. Effective new thinking and change in this area may very 
well require a pressure from outside from e.g. donor agencies. 
 
LESSON 8: While there will be a continuous need for clearing mines and UXOs in a number of 
countries, the sector as a whole needs to document and improve its performance and results in 
                                                   
102 The GICHD guidelines on Linking Mine Action and Development: Guidelines for Mine/ERW Operators, November 
2009 provide some guidance in this right direction. 




order to justify the high costs of such operations. There is an increasing pressure on prioritisation and 
effectiveness that operators need to take seriously. 
 
LESSON 9: There is a continued need for an impartial and neutral centre of knowledge and 
expertise within mine action, capable of being used flexibly in support of the entire mine action 
sector. Relevant and updated knowledge should be freely available for all interested actors in the sector, 
including sharing of evaluations and best practices. 
8.3 Immediate action and options for the future 
8.3.1 The need to clarify future policy framework and organisational anchoring of 
mine action 
From a variety of different angles the findings of this review largely point to a need for firmer 
direction, clearer priorities and tighter monitoring and quality assurance of the mine action 
interventions and organisations supported – at global as well as country level. Recommended action 
points in response to the weaknesses identified in the review are presented in the sections below. 
Before making choices in relation to the future support to mine action it is however necessary to clarify 
the future policy framework for this type of support. Following the reorganisation of Sida in late 2008, 
the mine action policy paper from 2002 no longer has a formal status. Some of the options for Sida to 
consider would be: 
OPTIONS ‘PROS’ ‘CONS’ 
Update and enforce the policy 
for support to mine action as a 
stand-alone policy 
High visibility. Risk of marginalisation if not part 
of mainstream. 
Place mine action in the 
framework of the Government 
policy on security and 
development (including a brief 
section about mine action) 
Clear links to other interventions 
in countries affected by crisis and 
conflict. 
This might fit with UN’s strategy – 
UNMAS is situated within DPKO 
ORLSI and UNDP MA in BCPR. 
Risk of low visibility as one out of 
many themes. 
Adding guiding sections for 
mine action in other policies 
and/or strategies such as the 
humanitarian policy and 
country strategies 
Conducive for linkages and 
coherence between mine action, 
development programmes and 
humanitarian action. 
Will be included in mainstream 
reporting and programme cycle 
management. 
Risk of low priority and funding 
due to competition with a range of 
other types of projects 




Once the policy framework has been decided upon it would be important to develop an action plan 
underpinning the policy priorities and principles, as well as establish a clear central anchoring point in 
Sida, and clear assignment of responsibility and lines of command for other units, desks and embassies 
involved. 




8.3.2 Improving policy compliance and accountability 
Note: It is acknowledged that the future status of Sida’s mine action policy paper has not been clarified, 
but the actions suggested here will be relevant in any case as they address some major weaknesses in 
programme implementation and accountability. 
IMMEDIATE STEPS 
Intensify monitoring of field programmes: Clarify where primary monitoring responsibility lies, 
initiate more frequent monitoring visits to the programmes and create awareness with implementers of 
Sida’s policy and requirements. Review reports from implementers and do not provide next phase 
funding unless implementing organisations report satisfactorily against technical and socio-economic 
objectives.  
 
Establish better linkages between staff working with mine action in Sida HQ and country offices and 
implementing organisations. 
 
OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM 
Ensure mine action expertise internally in Sida: 
OPTION A: Establish expertise in Sida HQ through employing a staff member with mine action 
background or training of existing staff. 
OPTION B: employ external experts on a consultancy basis to assist with monitoring and quality 
assurance of programmes.  
OPTION C: a combination of the above allowing Sida staff familiar with mine action policy issues to 
draw from specific technical expertise when required. 
 
Enforce policy priority on linking mine action to development: 
OPTION A: In cooperation with GICHD develop programmatic guidelines for implementing 
organisations, thereafter arranging workshops for awareness raising and training. 
OPTION B: Encourage implementing organisations to employ more staff with a development 
background and/or bring in consultants to develop an action plan for linking mine action programmes to 
development initiatives. 
OPTION C: Both of the above plus make this linkage an explicit  requirement of funding proposals and 
future programmes. 
 
Update Sida’s mine action policy according to subsequent developments in the sector and develop an 
action plan for policy implementation with clear assignment of responsibilities with different units in 
Sida HQ and embassies. 
OPTION A: Maintain a separate mine action policy with an action plan. 
OPTION B: Mainstream mine action in other policies and strategies (humanitarian, country strategies, 
etc.) 
OPTION C: Both. 
 
Develop clear strategic principles for how to uphold quality and measurability in programmes 
supported, e.g. through clear criteria for country selection (seriousness of contamination, avoid 
‘orphans’ and coordinate with other donors, or coherence with other Sida programmes?). Include such 
principles within a future revised policy on mine action. 





Policy choices: Consider whether political objectives (e.g. fulfilling obligations to Mine Ban Treaty) or 
humanitarian/development objectives should direct decisions on investments and country priorities in 
relation to mine action. 
8.3.3 Strengthening coherence and coordination 
IMMEDIATE STEPS 
Mine action should be included in the reporting format for country programmes in countries where 
Sida supports this sector, and possible synergies between mine action and other interventions should be 
described. 
Mine action should be mentioned under one or more of the future thematic areas (e.g. under 
‘recovery’ or other relevant themes) for Sida’s humanitarian assistance to be decided following 
recommendations from the evaluation of Sida’s humanitarian assistance. 
Sida’s current monitoring procedures for development programmes should be adapted as necessary 
and used for monitoring of mine action projects and programmes. 
Mine action should be put on the agenda (where relevant) at donor and partner meetings in the 
framework of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles, as well as coordination, alignment and 
harmonisation in accordance with the Aid Effectiveness Framework. 
OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM 
Mine action should be strategically placed in strategies for humanitarian, development, stabilisation 
and reconstruction programmes to ensure that the sector (where relevant) becomes visible in mainstream 
programme documents. 
8.3.4 Ensuring relevance and effectiveness 
IMMEDIATE STEPS 
Sida should continue to allocate a proportion of its funding available for mine action to the key 
UN agencies, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. The allocation should be specifically for mine action 
(and not mixed with, for example, support to violence reduction) in order to ensure linkage to Sida's 
mine action policy.   
 
Sida should continue to support GICHD. It could consider a change to core support for GICHD with 
a single Swedish contribution to core costs.  However, GICHD must improve its reporting and 
strengthen its dialogue with Sida in order to better communicate the results of its activities. GICHD 
knowledge products must also be clearly needs related. GICHD must maintain its impartiality and 
neutrality. 
 
In its dialogue with implementing partners, Sida should encourage the attachment of socio-economic 
expertise in the implementing organisations’ recruitment of key staff including managers. This should 




not be additional staff but replacement of existing staff working e.g. with community liaison or 
management at different levels. 
 
More systematic requirements to progress and results reporting should be introduced in order to 
ensure that all objectives are reported on. The comprehensive LFA formats applied by DDG could be 
used as a model for this. Sida should enforce these requirements and not approve reports only 
addressing output level and technical aspects. New funding should not be allocated until satisfactory 
reporting from previous phase is in place. 
 
 
OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM 
Sida should also consider more stringent requirements for reporting from global organisations so 
that the results of mine action interventions in terms of impact, including humanitarian and development 
impact, are more clearly displayed. As a first step, Sida may wish to consult other like-minded donors 
on how best to approach this issue. 
 
Sida should consider choosing focus countries after assessing seriousness of contamination and then 
ensure linkages to other Sida humanitarian and/or development programmes where possible 
 
Sida should require all implementing partners to introduce socio-economic surveys for needs 
assessments and develop baselines to provide data from which to monitor results. Reporting on 
development related progress and challenges should be a standard requirement. GICHD could be asked 
to develop guidelines for this drawing from the experience of implementing organisations. 
 
Sida should push for a focus on programmes which target most vulnerable groups (clear their areas 
first and other places later). 
8.3.5 Optimising impact and sustainability 
IMMEDIATE STEPS 
Sida should follow the roll-out of DDG and MAG’s new tools for impact assessment closely and 
maintain a dialogue with them at country level in order to gather experience and documentation.  
Sida should encourage DDG and MAG to keep a high level of information between them and 
exchange ideas, tools and experiences on impact monitoring. 
 
Sida should liaise with GICHD to strengthen its coordination of methodological development related 
to impact monitoring in mine action, enabling it also to draw from the other initiatives that are on-going 
and perhaps ultimately lead to the creation of IMAS giving guidelines for impact monitoring.  The 
addition of external expertise in impact monitoring could also be considered. 
 
A joint impact assessment could be launched by a group of likeminded donors in cooperation with the 
GICHD to provide more documentation of the results of mine action programmes. GICHD could follow 
up with a set of guidelines for project cycle management in mine action, including baseline studies, 
indicators, impact monitoring etc. 
 




OPTIONS FOR MEDIUM TO LONG TERM 
Effective tools for documentation of outcome and impact should be required in all phases of the 
programme cycle from baseline indicators through to impact assessment. 
Capacity building strategies should become a standard requirement in all mine action programmes 
supported by Sida, and these strategies are based on negotiations with national mine action authorities 
(or de facto national authorities) in order to ensure ownership and transparency. 
 
Reporting on progress on capacity building and impact should become mandatory in annual reports. 
 
All programmes should be required to develop strategies for sustainability and exit including 
benchmarks for exit or for re-assessment of exit dates. 
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Sida is one of the leading bilateral agencies in financial support to mine action in 
developing countries. During the time period 2001-2009 Sida has contributed with 
approximately 1 billion Swedish Kronor to mine action projects and programs in more than 
17 countries. In the year 2000, an external evaluation of Sida’s support was conducted 
covering the period 1990-2000. The findings and recommendations from that evaluation 
subsequently fed into the development of a Sida policy paper “Sida’s support to mine 
operations”, established in 2001. The policy paper outlines the need for ownership, long 
term engagement, exit strategies, and the support to national capacity. The integration of 
mine action with other contributions within development cooperation is also of priority. 
Support to the coordination function for UN’s mine action,  to long term financing of mine 
action as well as to work for poor countries’ participation in the international work of mine 
action are also highlighted in the policy.  
 
Sida has financed mine action through the appropriation for humanitarian assistance as 
well as from country and regional/global frames under the appropriation for long-term 
development cooperation. The main bulk of the funding has been directed to the areas of 
awareness/mine risk education and mine clearance. The support has been channelled  
through four main partners: INGOs (such as Mines Advisory Group, MAG, Danish 
Demining Group, DDG and others), the UN (such as UNMAS, UNDP/BCPR, UNICEF), 
international advocacy such as Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining-
GICHD, and Geneva Call) and to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB.  
 
In view of the current development of a Government policy on security and development 
(due in mid-2010) and with 10 years of contributing to the implementation of the Ottawa 
Convention on a mine free world the issue of mine action is at cross roads. Not only have 
global achievements been made in clearing land, reducing the number of victims and 
fatalities of landmines. The area of mine action also face increased competition from a 
number of pressing needs in the aftermath of conflict, all connected to the variety of 
perceived threats to safety and security from the individual, where each country and area 
has its own contextual specifics.  
 
In order to prepare for Sida’s future strategic direction within mine action, the past and 
current level of effectiveness, results and lessons learned need to be systematized and 
reviewed serving as an input to Sida’s future policymaking. An external evaluation of 
Sida’s support is therefore prioritized during the first two quarters of 2010.  
 
2. Objectives  
 




The overall objective is to provide Sida with a comprehensive assessment of the support 
to mine action in order to feed into the future direction of Sida’s engagement in mine 
action.  
 
The specific objectives are to assess the following aspects of Sida’s support: 
 
i) Relevance and usefulness of the support with Sida’s policy paper for mine operations. 
The policy centers around issues such as promoting a long term perspective, national 
capacity and structures, the integration of mine programs in development cooperation and 
the need for exit strategies. 
 
ii) Outcome at an overall level: the results found from the projects and programs, focusing 
on relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target 
groups for the support (for instance, the use of cleared land, agriculture, communications, 
social effects etc.), 
 
iii) Outcome of support to methods development and knowledge management: the results 
of the Swedish support to the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD. The 
focus shall be on relevance, effectiveness and sustainability aspects of the Swedish 
support, taking into account both the core support from MoFA and the project support from 
Sida, 
 
iv) Outcome on country level: an assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness 
and sustainability aspects of Sida’s support to two of the larger recipient countries looking 
specifically at the implementing channels used in each country.   
 
v) Identification of lessons learned and recommendations: based on the above, identify 
lessons learned, challenges and recommendations for Sida’s future engagement in mine 
action, 
 
The primary intended users of the evaluation within Sweden are Sida management and 
staff, management and staff at MoFA engaged in issues linked to Swedish support to mine 
action and policy formulation, but also management and staff at MSB.  
 
The secondary intended users are the implementing partners, e.g. UN agencies, MAG and 
DDG, not least with a focus on the two country studies.  Another secondary intended user 
is GICHD, as to allow GICHD with an external review of Sweden’s contribution to the 
Centre’s work. 
 
3. Scope of work 
 
The scope of work encompasses a comprehensive review of Sida’s support to mine 
action, completed and ongoing agreements, including policy compliance between 2001-
2009. The evaluation shall serve as an important input for Sida’s future direction of its 
support to mine action. The review shall include the following chapters: 
 
3.1. Policy compliance-relevance  and usefulness 
 




In terms of policy compliance, the evaluation shall look at to what extent Sida has followed 
its own policy and the usefulness of said policy. Has sufficient attention been paid to the 
main issues in the policy? (ref to 2, ii). Has compliance been assured? Has the policy been 
useful in the planning of contributions,  assessments and follow-up?   
 
3.2. Assessment of outcome on the overall level of support 
 
With regards to the assessment of the outcome on an overall level from the contributions 
financed by Sida, a distinction between mine action with a development focus and 
humanitarian mine action103 shall be made as to review and examine the respective 
clusters of support in line with its characteristics, including  the OCD/DAC evaluation 
criteria for Conflict prevention and Peace building activities and Humanitarian assistance in 
complex emergencies, respectively104. Issues to be covered are relevance, effectiveness, 
sustainability, the outcome and possible impact on the target groups for the support (for 
instance, the use of cleared land, agriculture, communications, social effects etc).  
Examples of concrete results shall be highlighted as well as where concrete results are 
absent. In both cases explanations shall be sought and analyzed. Evaluations already 
performed of specific programs shall be an important source of information.  
 
3.3 Country case studies 
 
Specific country level studies shall be undertaken in two of the larger recipient countries 
for Swedish funding.105 The countries chosen for the field studies are Iraq and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The focus shall be on the outcome and possible impact of 
Sida’s support;  assessing relevance, effectiveness, cost efficiency and sustainability with 
an outlook on the long-term socio-economic impact (where possible). Any relevant 
information in terms of identified challenges to mine action within the Swedish support in 
the respective country shall be provided to the evaluation team by Sida’s country team.   
 
3.4 The support to methods development and knowledge management -GICHD  
 
The assessment of the support to GICHD implies focusing on the Centre’s ability to spare-
head methods development in mine action, its strategic direction, the internal 
measurement of results and a general assessment of the outcome of the Centre’s work. 
Specific attention shall be paid to the contributions financed by Sida. 
 
3.5 Lessons learned and recommendations.  
 
The evaluation shall be formative and forward looking in the sense that it shall be able to 
draw conclusions regarding the outcome and possible impact of the overall Sida support to 
mine action during almost a decade and its linkages to compliance, usefulness  and 
relevance of Sida’s mine action policy.  
                                                   
103 Where mine clearance and other activities are pursued with the main purpose of access for humanitarian aid and the 
return of refugees and IDP’s. 
104 OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards (2006), Guidance for evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex 
Emergencies (1999), Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities (2008),  
105 Iraq, Lebanon, DRC, Afghanistan, Sudan. 





The conclusions on outcome shall be able to feed into a set of lessons learned for the 
above clusters as well as recommendations to Sida’s future direction of its support to mine 
action, most likely to be integrated in Sida’s response to the new Government Policy on 
peace and security, expected in mid 2010 
 
3.6 Issues of specific importance 
 
In the evaluation, not least within the country case studies as well as for the support to 
GICHD it is of importance to assess the coordination process between national and 
international stakeholders responsible for mine action and implementing channels for 
Sida’s support at the operational level. Assessing the ownership aspect of the various 
contributions within mine action shall also be prioritized for the evaluation team. To what 
extent are the national bodies overseeing coordination, planning, and prioritization of the 
support? What results can be detected from capacity building of management and staff 
within the national bodies? Another issue in relation to coordination is whether 
beneficiaries have been involved in the planning and prioritization process and linked to 




The methodology shall consist of both desk studies, field studies and interviews with 
stakeholders.  The country studies include field visits. When looking at GICHD’s work a 
visit to Geneva is also foreseen and included in the budget. The evaluation shall follow the 
standard evaluation criteria in accordance with the OECD/DAC Glossary of key terms in 
evaluation and results based management and the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality 
Standards. The specific evaluation criteria for Humanitarian assistance and Conflict 
prevention and Peace building respectively, and as refered to under 3.2 shall be followed. 
The evaluation will hence apply the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, 
sustainability and efficiency; focusing on outcome and to the extent possible, impact. 
 
The methodology shall to a large extent be based on first and foremost a document review 
of Sida’s support to mine action through the quantity of contributions. Interviews with key 
informants such as Sida, MFA, MSB and Sida’s main partners is foreseen. A stakeholder 
mapping analysis shall be pursued as part of the contribution to the overall findings and 
recommendations. The field studies are complementary as to explore and validate issues 
and findings in the desk study. In the field studies, the Evaluation team shall engage with 
relevant stakeholders, national bodies for mine action, Sida’s partners’ in mine action in 
the actual country and the intended beneficiaries of the support. The inclusion of a 
perception study/focus group approach in each country shall be considered. The feed back 
in form of the final report to the participants in the perception study/focus group is 
compulsory work of the consultant. A gender sensitive approach, including balance as 
regards participants in the above approach and overall analysis shall be ensured and 
documented in the report.  
 
Sida’s Department for Human Security shall establish a reference group for the evaluation, 
to meet at two occasions for the review of the reporting from the evaluation team. The 
group will consist of representatives from the following teams: Humanitarian, Global 




programs, and the 2 teams for the countries chosen for field studies. Sida is undertaking 
an evaluation of the humanitarian assistance at the same time as the review of mine 
action. Synergies shall be sought between the two evaluation processes as a substantial 




An inception report should be submitted 2 weeks after signing of the contract. The 
inception report, no more than 15 pages, should clearly state the purpose and 
methodology of the evaluation as interpreted by the evaluation team; why the evaluation is 
being done, how it will be pursued and who the primary intended users of the evaluation 
are. Furthermore should the inception report present an approach and methodology, 
including detailed description of the methodology, research strategy, and analytical 
approach specifying how the analysis will be performed, evaluation questions, description 
of sources of evidence, and data collection process and methods to be used. The 
inception report should also include a work and time plan, with key activities and plans for 
field work, report submissions and dissemination activities. No field work will commence 
until the inception report is approved. The inception report shall contain a specified budget, 
based on the general budget for the assignment (see Annex on Budget).  
   
The evaluation team shall submit a first draft in English to Sida not exceeding 50 pages, 
including an executive summary and  the country studies but excluding any annexes. For 
guidance on evaluation report structure, see Sida’s Evaluation Manual (2007). Sida shall 
comment on the draft report within 10 working days. After receiving Sida’s comments, the 
Consultant shall finalize the report, taking into account Sida’s comments. The final report 
shall not exceed 50 pages and be submitted to Sida for publication and dissemination. It is 
the responsibility of the consultants that the report is professionally edited. The Consultant 
shall include the costs for a presentation of the evaluation at a seminar in Stockholm in 




The evaluation is planned to take place from February-May 2010.  
 
Inception phase: February 
Desk study: February-March 
Field studies 2 countries + GICHD in Geneva: March-April 
Preparation of report: April-May 
Final report and presentation: June 
 
7. Composition of the evaluation team 
 
The evaluation team shall consist of one team leader and 1-2 team members, preferably 
both male and female, covering the following area of expertise: 
 
- substantial evaluation expertise of development cooperation 
- documented experience in the area of development cooperation in settings of post-
conflict  




- documented knowledge of mine action 
- documented knowledge of humanitarian assistance 
- documented experience in conflict sensitivity and do no harm 
- documented experience in gender analysis 
- documented experience in livelihoods 
- documented experience of processes involving strategic planning, including exit 
strategies, capacity building and aid effectiveness 
 
For the Team Leader, qualified and documented experience in the above areas equivalent 
to a minimum of 10-15 years is requested. For the respective team members, an 
equivalent of a minimum of 5-10 years of qualified and documented experience in the 
above areas is requested.  
 
8. Documentation provided 
 
Sida’s policy for mine operations (2001) 
Overview of Sida’s support to mine action 2000-2009 
Sida’s contribution to humanitarian mine action (Sida Evaluation 2001) 
Relevant material on contributions to mine action shall be provided (decisions, reorts, 
evaluations between 2001-2009) 




Annex 2 – List of persons consulted 
 
IRAQ 
Name Position Organisation 
Mufleh Talouzi Programme Manager MAG 
Mark Thompson Technical Operations Manager MAG 
Andy Crump Technical Field Manager MAG 
Katie Foster Desk Officer MAG 
Meredith Wotten  MAG 
Atoor Merkail Community Liaison Manager MAG 
Soran Hamawandy Technical Advisor UNDP Iraq 
Zagros Fatah Director General KRG Ministry of Planning  
 Governor  Erbil Governorate 
Kent Paulusson  Chief Technical Advisor UNDP Iraq 
Ulrikka Josefsson Sida Country Representative to Iraq Sida 
Roger Fasth Desk Officer Danish Demining Group 










Name Position Organisation 
Sebastien Cazenave Programme Manager MAG 
Harouna Ouedraogo Programme Manager UNMACC 
Asa Palmgren Deputy chief of mission Swedish Ambassy 
Brandon Mills Mechanical Team leader MSB 
Alexander Thomas Medical coordinator MSB 
Gabor Beszterczey Country Representative DCA 
Matthew Willner Reid Programme Officer MAG 
Habibulhaq Javed Chief of Operations UNMACC 
Andy Mattingley Operations Manager DCA Kalemie 
Christofer Warme Operations Manager MSB 
Marcel Kabeya Head of Office Unicef Mbangdaka 
John Singa Head of Office a.i. FAO Mbandaka 
Willy Ntuba Database manager FAO Mbandaka 
 Head of Office WFP Mbandaka 
Pascaline Boketsu Programme Officer Caritas Mbandaka 
Dr Louis Mpia Head of Office WHO 
OCHA representative a.i. 
WHO Mbandaka 
OCHA 
 Civil affairs MONUC Mbandaka 
Alexis Kisubi M&E expert WFP Kabalo 
Ali  Abdoul Salami Project Director WFP Kabalo 
Roger Mwanba Mutanga Programme Officer FAO Kabalo 
François Bitha Shabani Supervisor IRC Kabalo 
 Territory Administrator Kabalo 
Laurent Wilondja National Survey & MRE Coordinator DCA Kalemie 
Joseph Lubarika Food Security Programme Officer DCA Kalemie 
 Captain FARDC Kalemie 




Salim Raad Deputy Programme Manager UNMACC 
Habibulhaq Javed  Operations Manager UNMACC 
Åsa Palmgren Desk Officer SIDA DRC 
Josef Huber Regional Operations Manager Goma UNMACC 
Langlis Langois Regional Operations Manager 
Lubumbashi 
UNMACC 
Rana Elias IMSMA Manager UNMACC 
Henrik Rydberg Seconded Information Advisor MSB 
Brian Lewis Programme Manager Mechem 
Johan Strydrom Deputy Programme Manager Mechem 
Pieter Kock Development Advisor to SYLAM Mechem 
Andy Mattingley Programme Manager  DCA 
Mathew Willmer-Reid Programme Officer MAG 
Neil Arnold Technical Operations Manager MAG 
Peparim Field Technical Advisor MAG 
Steve Saffin Operations Director The Development Institute 
Andrew Rose Country Manager The Development Institute 
Charles Frisby Chief of Staff UNMACC 
  




Sida and other organisations 
 
Name Position Organisation 
   
Louisa Calais Desk officer Swedish MFA 
Pernilla Tradgårdh Desk officer Dept for Human Security, Sida 
Henrik Hammargren Director of Human Security Dept for Human Security, Sida 
Maria Lundberg Desk officer, Global Programmes Dept for Human Security, Sida 
Francois Landiech Desk Officer, DRC Humanitarian Dept., Sida 
Petra Smitmanis Dry  DRC Team, Sida 
Henrik Mungenast  MENA/Iraq Team, Sida 
Katarina Kotoglou  Evaluation Dept, Sida 
Alf Eliasson Head of Development Cooperation, Sida Embassy of Sweden, Tbilisi, 
Georgia 
Doris Attve  Humanitarian Dept., Sida 
Frederick Frisell Senior Programme Officer Conflict/Humanitarian Team, Sida 
Daniel Desk Officer, Mine Action Embassy of Sweden, Kinshasa, 
DRC 
Ian Mansfield Deputy Director GICHD 
Ted Paterson Head of Policy, Research & Evaluation GICHD 
Håvard Bach Head, Operational Methodology Section GICH-D 
Klaus Ljoerring Pedersen 
 
Representative Horn of Africa & Armed 
Violence Reduction 
DDG 
Fredrik Pålsson Operations Advisor DDG 
Sara Sekkenes Head of Mine Action Unit UNDP BCPR 
Justin Brady Acting Chief of Programme Planning and 
Management Section 
UNMAS 
Martin Damary Managing Director Geneva Call 
Judy Grayson Head of Mine Action Unit UNICEF 
Melissa Sabatier Clearing for Results Project Manager UNDP Cambodi                 UNDP  Cambodia 
Adam Komorowski,  
 
Desk officer Africa MAG 
Marie Mills Mine Action Advisor MSB 
Emilio König Mine Action Advisor MSB 
Magnus Bengtsson Mine Action Advisor MSB 






Tasneem Mowjee Team Leader Development Initiatives, UK 




Annex 3 – Key stakeholders in mine action 
The United Nations 
There are 14 UN agencies that are included within the United Nation's Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group on Mine Action. Three key members are UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF to each of whom Sida 
has channelled non-earmarked funds over the period under review.  
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office 
of Rule of Law and Security Institutions.  UNMAS is the focal point for mine action in the UN system.  
It is responsible for ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated UN response to landmines and 
explosive remnants of war through collaboration with 13 other UN departments, agencies, funds and 
programmes.  In peacekeeping and emergency settings, UNMAS establishes and manages mine action 
coordination centres in mine-affected countries, plans and manages operations, mobilizes resources and 
sets mine-action priorities in the countries and territories it serves. While advancing its vision of a world 
free from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war, UNMAS contributes to DPKO's 
efforts towards implementing sustainable peace through justice and security.  During the period under 
review, Sida has contributed between SEK 5-7 million a year to UNMAS' mine action programme as 
un-earmarked support.   
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) contributes to mine action through its country offices and 
its New York-based Mine Action Team within the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.  Its key 
role in relation to mine action is to assist mine-affected countries establish or strengthen national and 
local mine action programmes.  In certain circumstances, UNDP also manages some or all of the 
elements of mine action programmes and may undertake specific mine action projects. Because 
landmines and explosive remnants of war are an obstacle to sustainable development, UNDP includes 
mine action in the mainstream of its broader development programmes. During the period under review, 
Sida has funded UNDP's mine action programmes through un-earmarked contributions of SEK 10 
million a year to the UNDP Mine Action Team. 
The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) supports children in mine-affected countries globally through the 
development and implementation of mine risk education and survivor assistance projects and through 
advocacy for an end to the use of landmines, cluster munitions and other indiscriminate weapons. Sida 
contributed SEK 27.5 million to UNICEF in un-earmarked contributions between 2003 and 2009. 
The UN's role in relation to mine action is guided by the UN Inter Agency Policy on Mine Action and 
Effective Coordination (2005) and, more recently, the UN Inter Agency Mine Action Strategy (2006). 
This document sets four ambitious objectives: 
1 Reduction of death and injury by at least 50% (by 2010). 
2 Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80% of 
the most seriously affected communities. 
3 Integration of mine-action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in 
at least 15 countries. 




4 Assist the development of national institutions to mange the landmine/ERW threat and, at the same 
time, prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.106 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Since the early years of mine action, NGOs have played a central role in mine action, driving 
advocacy and lobbying for the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as setting the agenda in clearance, victim 
assistance and mine risk education. While the number of NGOs involved in mine risk education, 
victim assistance and political campaigning has increased during the last decade, there remains a 
core of around a dozen international NGOs directly involved in mine clearance.  Although small in 
number, these operational NGOs have played a significant role in the development of technical and 
operational mine clearance. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
ICRC works to alleviate the suffering of mine victims and mine-affected communities: at the local 
level, it focuses its efforts on providing curative care and prosthetic services to mine victims, specialised 
training in the management of war wounds, including sessions on how to treat mine injuries. It also 
conducts mine/UXO risk education programmes to help reduce the threat to those living in a 
mine/UXO-contaminated environment.  
At the national and international levels, ICRC works closely with Governments, international agencies 
and non-governmental organisations to universalise and implement the Amended Protocol II to the 
CCW and the MBT. ICRC regularly organises and participates in national and regional conferences to 
promote understanding of and adherence to these and other international humanitarian law (IHL) 
instruments. It also assists Governments in developing national legislation to implement their IHL 
obligations. Sida’s annual contribution to the ICRC appeal includes the specific field of “victims’ 
assistance”, even if not earmarked for that purpose. Consequently it is not included in Sida’s annual 
statistics for mine action  
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining  
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is a Swiss foundation 
established in 1998 that supports the elimination of anti-personnel mines and the reduction of the 
humanitarian impact of other landmines and explosive remnants of war.  The Centre provides 
operational assistance, knowledge and standards development, and support to the implementation of 
international law relating to mine action. In relation to the MBT, GICHD has observer status at the 
meetings of States Parties and, since 2001, has been mandated by them to provide the Implementation 
Support Unit (ISU). The Centre also has close relations with a large number of stakeholders within the 
field of mine action, including the UN, national governments, and operational mine action actors. In 
2009, for example, the Centre undertook activities (in the form of training, research, workshops or 
technical advice) in 64 countries.107  Swedish funding is provided from the MFA and Sida through core 
and programme funding respectively. 
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Mine affected states – States parties 
Mine affected States (as well as States Parties without a mine problem) who have committed 
themselves to the Mine Ban Treaty have a number of obligations.  As well as the more well-known 
obligations such as ceasing production, stockpiling and use of Anti Personnel landmines, as well as 
clearing all known mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, the States Parties also have the 
right to seek and receive assistance from other States parties and are committed to a number of 
obligations.   
Mine affected states – States not parties 
Mine affected States who have not committed themselves to the Mine Ban Treaty still have 
essentially the same fundamental humanitarian problem as the states parties, but without the same 
legal obligations. A number of states not parties have, however, received significant support from 
International organisations in mitigating the problems within their states.  These include Lao PDR, 
Lebanon, Kosovo, and Sri Lanka. 
Mapping and analysis 
A mapping and analysis of the main mine action stakeholders is shown in the table on the next 
page.
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Annex 4 – Desk Study Summary 
Over the evaluation period, Sida support has been provided to at least 20 countries and 5 multilateral 
agencies with funding coming from a mix of humanitarian and development appropriations.108  
Including all these in the evaluation is not realistic given the time available - and a number of the inputs 
have also been relatively minor. Nonetheless, both Sida and the evaluation team have considered it 
important that the evaluation takes as comprehensive a perspective as feasible. Therefore, in addition to 
DRC and Iraq where field visits have been undertaken, the team has included a mapping of inputs to 
other countries where the Swedish support has been significant. These are Afghanistan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Somalia, Sudan, Nicaragua and Lebanon. The information summarised below 
is drawn from the documentation provided to the team by Sida and a number of implementing partners. 
Relevant background information has been drawn from the Land Mine Monitor. 
Overall observations 
Sida has supported mine action in the desk study countries through two main channels: (a) multilateral 
organisations (including UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Deming, and the NGO Geneva Call which works with non-state actors) and (b) international NGOs, in 
particular SRSA/MSB, MAG and DDG with whom Sida has had a long cooperation.   
The focus of the support has generally been directed towards capacity building of National Mine Action 
Authorities and Centres and to a mix of survey, manual demining, EOD and ERW, and Risk Education. 
The exact mix has depended upon the country needs/context. Sida's support also appears to have related 
to the extent of the mine problem, with the implication that the support has been focused on countries 
with significant mine challenges.   
This two pronged approach enables global coverage - with support to UN agencies being provided 
through un-earmarked contributions.  This flexible approach has been appreciated by the agencies 
concerned.  In the case of UNDP, it has enabled the support to reach more than 20 countries in 
accordance with the priorities set out in the UN's Inter-Agency Coordination Strategy. 
In the case of the INGO funding, the support has corresponded to Sida's policy basis and, to the extent 
that the team is able to assess it, has corresponded to national contexts, including humanitarian needs.  
The team finds the mix of multilateral and bilateral support to be appropriate as it enables a very wide 
coverage (in line with the UN's global mandate) while also providing the means to support certain 
countries more directly using experienced INGOs. 
The support appears relevant with respect to Sida's policy, although a higher focus could have been 
placed on a number of Sida's cross cutting issues and priority themes, including development and 
gender.   
While development impacts are being increasingly highlighted, the team finds that the documentation 
that has been reviewed has not highlighted these aspects to a significant degree.  There are some 
examples worth highlighting (e.g. DDG in Somalia).  However, even where development has been 
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prioritised as an objective (as in UNDP programmes), it appears to be either difficult to report concrete 
impacts or M&E mechanisms have been insufficiently targeted towards them.  
While women and children are typically referred to in contextual descriptions as part of proposals, the 
team found that gender aspects of mine action were not specifically highlighted in much of the 
documentation reviewed. In some cases, (e.g. MSB in Somalia), the employment of women in risk 
education teams was noted as a good way of increasing access to women in communities.   
The team has experienced difficulty in identifying clear evidence of impact (as opposed to outputs) from 
the documentation reviewed.  
In general, the reporting from INGOs has been more comprehensive and result orientated than that of 
UN agencies. In relation to the support channelled through the UNDP Mine Action Teams, reporting is 
provided on a country by country basis and focuses almost exclusively at the activity and output level.109  
Aside from demonstrating that a programme is active, the value of this in relation to deliverables against 
Sida's Mine action Policy is questionable. An alternative approach is provided by UNMAS in its annual 
reports which, while not donor specific, do appear more outcome related.110 
The team thus places a premium on the availability of quality documentation (especially project 
proposals and reporting). As this varies considerably in practice, the team suggest that Sida consider 
standardising its proposal and reporting requirements for INGOs so that they include a greater focus 
on a broader range of results, including development outcomes. This will also assist Sida's task of 
appraising proposals and monitoring their implementation. 
1 Afghanistan 
Sida has supported Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Afghanistan with SEK 71 million between 2003-
2010 to implement capacity building of the (UN) Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan and other mine 
action related activities, 
The Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan recorded at least 12,069 casualties from mines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) between 1999 and 2008, including 1,612 killed and 10,457 injured. Land Mine 
Monitor assesses that the casualties are likely to be under-reported due to the difficult terrain, ongoing 
insecurity which impedes access for data collectors, and because fatal casualties were often not reported 
from 1999–2002. The overwhelming majority of recorded casualties were civilians. The casualty toll in 
2008 was less than half the level in 2001. It is estimated there are up to 60,000 survivors. Demining 
organizations released more than 250km2 in 2008. Funding in the same year amounted to USD 105 
million from 18 donor countries.111 
Extensive mine/ERW risk education (RE) conducted over the last 10 years by approximately 15 
organizations reached up to 3.5 million people a year. Risk reduction has focused on communities, 
internally displaced persons, and returning refugees. In 2003, RE began to focus more on community-
based activities and behavioural change strategies. School-based RE programmes have also been 
developed. However, it has been found that RE programmes need more understanding of the problem 
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and to work more through established institutions. It has also been assessed that the challenges of 
Afghanistan's development situation 112  
Sida’s support has been provided to Danish Demining Group (DDG) beginning in 2002 with the initial 
phase for establishment of a quality assurance system, Total Quality Management (TQM) within the 
Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) in collaboration with UN Mine Action Centre for 
Afghanistan (UNMACA). The aim of TQM was to support the development of a reliable and 
independent Afghan institution able to survive the transition from UNMACA to national ownership and 
guarantee the safety of de-miners and those using the cleared land. The project has aimed to build a 
strong structure with capacity to manage the technical, operational and managerial aspects of a national 
institution. The support was extended several times until 2008. Since October 2008, Sida has supported 
DDG’s project on clearance of ERW in the Northern region and capacity building for national staff to 
expand the national operational mine clearance capacity.  
Building the national capacity for mine action management is relevant as it contributes to developing 
Afghan security and development. UNMACA and DDG had identified the need in Afghanistan for a 
quality assurance system to secure that the national mine action management meets international 
standards. DDG’s emphasis on building of national capacity for managing mine action was in line with 
Sida's policy for mine action and the selected provinces in the North are priority areas for the Swedish 
cooperation in Afghanistan. The national strategy for mine action, Afghan Compact has the aim that 
70% of the hazard areas in Afghanistan are to be cleared by 2010 – which amounts to 2956 suspected 
hazard areas. DDG’s objective of clearing 21 suspected hazard areas contributes to the national aim for 
mine action in Afghanistan. 
Both projects train local personnel and thus contribute to building and sustaining a national capacity for 
management and operational mine action in Afghanistan. This is supported by DDG's practice of using 
only national staff in their clearance teams and most staff in administration and management is also now 
national, which makes for sustained efforts and organizational development. It appears, however, that 
the transition to full national control has not been totally successful due to issues of corruption.  
UNMACA has therefore proposed that the top positions in the MAPA be kept by international staff until 
2013. DDG have established an Internal Development Cell to ensure continued training until then.113 A 
GICHD assessment in 2008 concluded that "MACA had a strong management team which had initiated 
“excellent” reforms, although it still did not have, and should formulate, a formal, written strategy and 
medium-term plan."114 
An assessment of impact is difficult to make because of the tendency to focus on outputs rather than 
outcomes.  It is, however, noted that there has been a considerable through-put in terms of people 
trained and that areas have been cleared which has increased access. Community liaison is prioritized by 
DDG which should facilitate a participatory approach. The inclusion of women in liaison teams helps 
the team to reach women in communities.  However, the impact on development of these aspects is 
unclear from the documentation. The development of an Impact Monitoring Manual by DDG should 
increase the visibility of results. 
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According to Land Mine Monitor, three-quarters of impacted communities are located in 12 of the 
country’s 34 provinces and mines and ERW still pose a formidable challenge to the country’s social and 
economic reconstruction. Mine and ERW contamination is particularly concentrated in central and key 
food-producing eastern provinces, affecting towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farm 
and grazing land, and roads. The extent of contamination makes battle area clearance and/or demining a 
prerequisite for most infrastructure and major construction projects.115 
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The national mine action centre (BHMAC) reports 459 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
casualties (214 killed and 245 injured) recorded between 1999 and 2008. In 2006, 1,889 km2 was 
suspected to be contaminated.  A general assessment of the mine situation in BiH conducted by 
BHMAC in 2007 identified 1,631 mine/ERW impacted communities. Most impacted communities are 
in rural areas where people depend economically on contaminated land.116 
Sida has supported UNDP's Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) between 2003-2008 with SEK 
22 million. IMAP's overall objective is to accelerate restoration of socio-economic activities, while at 
the same time consolidating the national mine action structures (BHMAC) and their capacity to 
effectively execute mine action coordination over the long term. The latter includes adoption of a 
revised National Mine Action Strategy and a revised Mine Action Law and provision of communication 
and technical equipment to the armed forces’ demining unit. IMAP also included an objective for 
clearance of up to 1.5 km2 of mine contaminated land (selected based on its value to development and 
repatriation) which was extended by a further 0.5 km2 in 2008. It is unclear from the documentation 
reviewed whether this output has been fully met. 
Sida's support to mine action in Bosnia-Herzegovina is relevant in terms of Sida's country strategy 
which mentions mine action as a pre-condition precondition for the return of refugees and displaced 
persons and development of rural areas.  The Bosnia-Herzegovina Mid Term Development Strategy also 
has mine action as a priority sector. The documentation reviewed indicates that the expected outputs 
have to a large degree been met, although it is not possible to assess the impact of these results on the 
socio-economic development and security for the communities concerned. It is unclear whether this is 
because of a lack of assessment. Regarding sustainability, BHMAC was reported by Sida to be 
receiving 95% of its funding from the Government by the end of 2007, and the aim was for full national 
funding by the end of the IMAP in 2008. The extension of the project in 2008 was to cover a phasing 
out of Sida’s support to the IMAP.  
3 Nicaragua 
Sida has supported the Organization of American States (OAS) in collaboration with the Inter-American 
Defence Board (IADB) on mine action in Nicaragua starting in 1996. Between 2000-2006, Sida's 
contribution amounted to SEK 43 million.117 The choice of supporting mine action in Nicaragua appears 
relevant taking into account that the country was at the time one of Central America's most mine 
contaminated countries and that access to productive but contaminated farming land would contribute 
towards poverty reduction goals. 
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Nicaragua was contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of armed 
conflict between 1979 and 1990. More than 1,000 mined areas were recorded or identified, mostly 
located in the border areas in the north and south of the country, the majority along the Honduran 
border. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 117 mine/ERW casualties of which 27 
had been killed and 90 injured. In total, Nicaragua has reported 1,236 casualties since 1980. It has 
consistently carried out mine/ERW risk education since 1999, which has been evaluated and assessed 
regularly. Starting in 2006, the coverage of risk education activities and the number of beneficiaries 
began to decrease to just two departments of the country, corresponding to the reduction in 
contamination.  As of March 2009, 1,107 of Nicaragua’s 1,145 registered survivors had received regular 
rehabilitation services and 450 had also received socio-economic reintegration services with support 
from the OAS. Efforts to improve national capacity were limited, however, though Land Mine Monitor 
noted some improvements in quality and access to emergency and continuing medical care and physical 
rehabilitation services in 2008.118  In June 2010, Nicaragua declared itself land mine free. 
The objective of Sida's support was to facilitate productive use of land and increase security for the 
population in two municipalities in Northern Nicaragua by removing and destroying mines in 
accordance with international standards.  This was to be accomplished based on information provided 
by the Nicaraguan Army and the population in accordance with the Nicaraguan Demining Plan, 
reducing the risk of mine injuries and deaths amongst mine affected communities, contributing to 
economic and social reintegration of victims, and prevention of incidents through mine awareness 
activities.  Between 2002-2005, Sida's support covered 70 deminers and 30 personnel involved in 
logistics, medical assistance, and management.  
The limited reporting from OAS on the Swedish contribution that the team has seen provides an 
overview of key contextual factors and outputs. In relation to humanitarian needs, it notes that the 
rehabilitation support provided has been targeted at victims whom, with out help, would have few 
chances for rehabilitation and reintegration into productive life in their communities.119 Land Mine 
Monitor further reports that a study conducted on behalf of the OAS by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC) in 2006/2007 found a direct 
relationship between mine clearance in previously affected areas and subsequent improvements in 
various development indicators, such as health, access to education, and access to water and 
electricity.120 
4 Cambodia 
Sida has supported the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in collaboration with UNDP between 
1996 and 2005. The focus of the support has been on capacity building in relation to use of Mine 
Detection Dogs (MDD) as well as in relation to the Centre's organizational development. The Swedish 
contribution was channelled through a CMAC Trust Fund managed by UNDP and in cooperation with 
the Swedish Armed Forces. Between 2001 and 2005, a total of SEK 59 million was disbursed.  In 
addition to this direct support, GICHD has also been involved in strengthening the mine action effort in 
Cambodia, including through the PAT project (with Sida funding).   
According to the Land Mine Monitor, Cambodia remains one of the world’s most mine and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) affected states, including cluster munitions remnants. Clearance of mined areas 
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has increased sharply in recent years with the adoption of new methods and equipment while land 
reclamation by farmers and cancellation of suspected land through survey has drastically increased land 
release. At least 7,300 mine/ERW casualties were recorded between 1999 and 2008 of a total of more 
than 60,000 casualties since 1979. Extensive risk education has been conducted for over 10 years, 
implemented by CMAC, NGOs, and the Government. The approach has shifted from awareness-raising 
to risk reduction, with stronger integration into mine action, and links with development. In April 2009, 
Cambodia submitted an initial request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for 
mine clearance, which put forward an estimate that 672km2 of mined areas remained for full clearance.  
Although this was subsequently revised downwards to 648 km2, the scale of the challenge is obvious 
and Cambodia’s mine and ERW problem still represents a major obstacle to social and economic 
development.121 
The mine action effort in Cambodia has been extensively studied and reviewed.  In late 2004, a joint 
donor evaluation (also supported by Sweden) recommended a number of changes aimed at increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness.  This included a competitive demining trust fund and refocusing and 
streamlining of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), which was judged at the time to be 
"weak and ineffective…….and largely ignored".122  The evaluation appears to have sparked a debate on 
a number of important issues, including the relation to development and the involvement of 
communities in defining the extent of the mine problem.123 
The main objective of Sida's support has been to reduce the level and impact of mines in a transparently 
prioritized, cost-effective and safe manner, so that the maximum number of people can go about their 
lives free from the threat of mines, thus permitting reconstruction, re-integration and development 
activities to take place in a safe environment and contribute to further significant progress towards the 
target of zero mine victims by 2020. In addition, the support was to establish appropriate and effective 
coordination and regulatory structures and processes, install planning and resource mobilization 
mechanisms in line with national development priorities, and strengthen management systems and 
strategic planning processes. The ultimate aim of this has been to enable CMAC to fulfil its mandate as 
the national mine action service provider.  
CMAC has improved in this respect after a difficult period (including corruption) in the early part of the 
decade when a number of donors froze their support. Part of Sida's response to this was to ask GICHD 
to provide advisory services to the CMAC, for which it established the Permanent Advisory Team 
(PAT). By 2003, CMAC was assessed to be making good progress, although it was judged that 
continued technical support would be necessary. It was agreed that this should be provided by 
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).124 This two pronged approach - combining support to CMAC through 
the UNDP Trust Fund and technical advice through NPA - appears relevant in the circumstances. Sida's 
close involvement (including through regular consultations with CMAC and UNDP) appears very 
appropriate given the risks to the investment already made and the need for improvements in the 
Cambodian response to mines in the country. The minutes of these meetings show that, while CMAC 
reported against its output targets, there was no substantive discussion of outcomes or overall impact.  
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Sida has supported mine action in all three regions of Somalia through MSB and DDG. Between 2004-
2009, the total funding made available amounted to SEK 51,8 million. 
Registered human costs in relation to mines are difficult to document in Somalia, especially in the most 
violent areas surrounding Mogadishu. Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties 
(832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 
2008.125  In Somaliland, Landmine Monitor identified 814 casualties (207 killed, 500 injured, and 107 
unknown) between 2000 and 2008.126 A Landmine Impact Survey in Puntland has, however, shown that 
151.000 people live in 35 mine-affected communities.127  In South Central, the situation is probably 
much more acute than this, particularly following the Ethiopian intervention and subsequent withdrawal. 
This points to the need for mapping of ERW and training of local personnel to enable clearing of mines 
in order to minimize human costs and reduce socio-economic effects of mines in Somalia. Under the 
UN Inter-Agency Strategy, UNDP/UNOPS are building national capacity and authority for mine action 
in Somalia and, given the different security situation, distinctions are made between the three main 
regions. 
MSB operations in Puntland and South Central Somalia have focused on building national capacity for 
management of mine action and reducing the number of injuries caused by mines through mapping, 
clearance and preventive information work, reducing the socio-economic effects of mines, and 
increasing possibilities for international humanitarian assistance for the local communities.  MSB has 
operated in both Puntland and South central with EOD training and demolition for the Puntland Mine 
Action Centre and setting up the IMSMA at the South Central MAC and the field office in Baidoa as 
well as training and mapping, EOD, MRE, and medical assistance. The activities in South Central were 
planned for a three year period from 2007 with a transition period of co-financing with UNMAS (50% 
each) from May 2009 until November 1st 2009 where UNMAS was to take over full responsibility. 
MSB's inclusion of female EOD operators, medical and MRE staff has helped enable access. 
The Somaliland mine action programme is managed by UNDP Somalia. In 2007, GICHD concluded 
that the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC) was not performing effectively, due partly to 
insufficient UNDP inputs.128 Since 2006, support from UNDP has included subcontracting for technical 
services from MSB amongst others. Technical training has been provided to upgrade the skills of the 
police EOD teams 
MSB’s objective of building a strong national capacity for management of mine action in Somalia is 
relevant in relation to Sida’s policy and the UN strategy. From the documentation reviewed, it appears 
that difficulties have been experienced in continued upgrading of EOD levels and improvement of skills 
- which questions effectiveness and whether it has been possible to sustain the national mine action 
capacity. The first training of national personnel in Puntland was concluded but not granted extension. 
The second project in South Central region was implemented, but at a slower pace and at a smaller scale 
than intended due to the fragile security situation in the area around Baidoa. The impact of the 
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involvement is difficult to assess since no impact report appears to have been provided by MSB. The 
reporting includes details of outputs; for example, 26.000 persons in the South Central region benefited 
from Mine Risk Education in schools and refugee camps. Overall, the quality and content of the 
reporting from MSB has varied considerably and will have made it difficult for Sida to monitor 
implementation. 
DDG has been funded by Sida on three occasions within the period, most recently in relation to survey, 
EOD and MRE tasks in Mogadishu, building upon existing DDG experience and presence in the city (as 
the only mine action agency apart from AMISOM EOD personnel).129 The aim has been to increase 
ERW clearance and continue to deliver MRE and information on ERW risks to residents, IDPs and 
agencies.  DDG also provides a call-out facility in order to assist a safe return.  DDG's programme 
document states that monitoring will be undertaken to assess the impact on returnees and other groups - 
target groups, including children, are highlighted. DDG developed an Impact Monitoring tool in 2008 to 
support this and uses MRE staff to undertake monitoring Cooperation and coordination is provided with 
UNMAS, the Somali Mine Action Centre and humanitarian agencies. It is also stated that results and 
lessons learnt will be fed into the IMSMA database managed by the Somali MAC.   
The team consider that the overall quality of the DDG's project documentation is very good and 
provides sufficient information for decision-making and monitoring (including some outcome 
monitoring). It provides a good basis for dialogue with Sida and helps Sida's decision-making and 
follow up. Sida's assessment of the 2009 proposal, for example, considered the relevance to the context 
(Sida assessed this to be highly relevant), DDG's previous work in the area and the results (outputs) 
achieved, and its capacity to carry out the work (including risks).130 
In Somaliland, Sida supported DDG activities have included survey, manual demining, EOD, and use of 
mine detection dogs. In its report on the 2004 programme, DDG notes that it had established a local 
staff of 102 people and was coordinating its work with the Somaliland Government, the Somaliland 
MAC and other mine action operators. The report notes that the threat appeared to be low level and 
reducing - although population movements were pushing people to settle on land previously the scene of 
conflict, including around Hargeisa.  DDG has targeted these groups in addition to supporting the 
national mine action authorities.  The team considers that the reporting provides a useful overview of 
results (outputs and outcomes), lessons learnt, and challenges.131 
Given the governance difficulties in Somalia and the activities of non-state actors, Somalia has also 
been a focus for the NGO Geneva Call (which is core funded by Sida). From 2002 to 2005, 17 Somali 
factions signed the NGO Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines and have 
pledged to undertake stockpile destruction. 
6 Lebanon 
Sida has supported mine action activities in Lebanon between 2004 and 2009 through MSB in 
cooperation with UNOPS and UNMAS in support of UN’s Mine Action Coordination Centre and UN 
aid delivery by identifying and mapping security risks and areas. In addition, support for EOD 
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competency has been provided to ICRC in Lebanon. A total of SEK 65.5 million have been made 
available during that time period. 
Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially cluster 
munitions remnants, after 15 years of civil war and conflict with Israel. The 2006 conflict resulted in up 
to 500,000 unexploded submunitions being scattered across more than 1,000 cluster strike sites. At the 
beginning of 2009, the UN and NGOs reported major funding shortages to clear the remaining 
submunitions, which have resulted in closing operations and less clearance. The Lebanese National 
Mine Action Authority, a government body, is responsible for mine action policy. MACC SL was 
handed over from the UN to the Lebanese government and became the Regional Mine Action Centre 
(RMAC) in January 2009.132 
MSB has supported UN’s Mine Coordination in Lebanon with a Mine Detection Dog specialist in 2004 
– 2005 through UNOPS, and support to UNMAS for quality assurance of mine detection dog activities 
in 2007 – 2008.133 Following the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000 a considerable mine action effort 
was initiated, which however faded out a couple of years later because of inadequate funding. The 
problem was actualised again after the conflict with Israel in 2006 resulting in serious contamination 
with cluster munitions, and this attracted renewed funding from donors. MSB’s support was in the form 
of providing technical assistance through the deployment of a Mine Detection Dog Quality Assurance 
Officer. Similarly, the MSB provided an EOD expert to the ICRC from 2007.  
In 2009 Sida provided support to MSB for continuation of the support to the Lebanese Mine Action 
Centre (LMAC) through an allocation of SEK 6.5 million, following the transfer of the responsibility for 
overall coordination of all mine action activities in Lebanon from the UN to LMAC and the Lebanese 
Army. LMAC had requested support from MSB to clearance of specific sites in densely populated areas 
in the border region with Israel, where only MSB’s machines were able to operate. This appears thus 
very relevant and aligned with priorities of national mine action authorities. This support is a 
continuation of MSB’s activities in southern Lebanon since 2006 originally on request from UNMAS 
and supported by Sida through allocations in 2006, 2007 and 2008. UNMAS has expressed satisfaction 
with MSB’s contribution and it is evident from the reporting made available to the Review Team that 
MSB had effectively delivered results and added value through technology, expertise and resources not 
available to the Lebanese authorities. 
7 Sudan 
Sida has supported mine action activities in Sudan through MSB from 2004 to 2008 and DDG in 2008 – 
2009 with a total of SEK 40.9 million.  
‘Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of more 
than 20 years of armed struggle between the government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the 
south, mainly the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. A Landmine Impact Survey was 
completed in 16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAS) estimating 
that total residual contamination covered 107km2. UNMAS began mine action operations in 2002 in the 
Nuba Mountains with international and local NGOs carrying out demining and risk education. More 
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than 44km2 of land have since been released and a further 29,000km of road verified. Mine action 
centres have been set up in Khartoum in the north and in Juba in the south’.134 
The MSB programme started as support to national and regional mine action centres in Khartoum, 
Rumbek and Nuba Mountains through UNMAO with the objective of strengthening national capacity. 
Funding from Sida was extended for 2006 – 2008 and again for for 2008 – 2011 with a concentration on 
fewer intervention areas and supporting the plan for nationalisation of UNMAO in 2011. The support 
has been directly requested by UNMAO and there is no doubt that it has been regarded as highly 
relevant. The high focus on capacity building and also the support for the nationalisation process of 
UNMAO can be seen as steps towards achieving sustainability of the programme. 
DDG started operations in Sudan in 2006 and obtained funding from Sida for a two-year project from 
2008 in South Sudan. The project was aimed at supporting the repatriation process for refugees and 
IDPs in South Sudan by providing a safe environment for the returnees and communities, and 
facilitating the work of humanitarian organisations. The Sida supported project was evaluated by a team 
fielded by the GICHD in early 2010, and it was found to have been relevant at the outset, and effective 
in reducing risks for returnees, other community members and staff of humanitarian organisations. 
Efficiency could be improved, and the likely sustainability of operations would benefit from firmer 
approaches to transition of activities to national organisations and the formulation of an exit strategy. 
The evaluation recommended continued support from Sida for a next phase with clearer plans for 
activity transfer and exit considerations.135 
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Annex 5 – Outline Evaluation Matrix 
 




1. Relevance and 
usefulness of the support 
with Sida’s policy paper for 
mine operations.  
• How does Sida’s policy paper compare with 
mine action policies of other leading 
organisations? 
• How has Sida responded to the guidelines 
included in its own policy?  
•  Has this policy been useful and 
appropriate?  How has the implementation 
of the policy been monitored and 
compliance assured? 
Document review: Mine 
action policies of other 
donors and organisations 
How useful is the guidance given by the policy in 
areas of  
• promoting a long term perspective? 
• strengthening national capacity and 
structures? 
• integration of mine programs in development 
cooperation? 
• development of exit strategies? 
Document review: Sida 
policy and guidelines 
Interviews with MOFA/Sida 
staff 
Interviews with implementing 
organisations 
2. Outcome at an overall 
level: the results found from 
the projects and 
programmes 
 
 RELEVANCE  
To what degree and in what manner have 
humanitarian mine activities supported by 
MOFA/Sida been relevant to  
• partner countries' needs and priorities, as 
expressed in the national development 
recovery and development strategies? 
• needs and priorities of population groups 
residing in or displaced from mine affected 
areas?  
• Particular interests and needs of women and 
men of the affected population groups? 
Document review: Project 
documents, progress 
reports, evaluations etc. 
related to MOFA/Sida 
supported projects and 
programmes 
 
Analytical matrix to ensure 
comparability of data at 
overall level 
 
Interviews with stakeholders 
EFFECTIVENESS  
• To what extent have the objectives of the 
intervention been achieved?  
• To what extent is the release of land 
according to planned objectives?  
• To what extent are the interventions 
fostering development of local capacities? 
• To what extent are activities previously 
hindered by landmines, in operation? 
• What are the lessons learned in previous 




planning and implementation efforts? 
SUSTAINABILITY 
• To what extent have activities led to the 
development of an adequate national 
organisational capacity in the field of mine 
clearance?  
• Where capacity is lacking, what 
supplementary mechanisms are needed to 
strengthen the national capacity? 
• How effectively has the issue of exit 
strategies been dealt with by the 
implementing partners and Sida? 
POSSIBLE IMPACT WITH TARGET GROUPS 
• What will be the likely impacts of the 
programme?  
• What are the results at outcome level (initial 
impacts)? 
• To what extent has the living condition of the 
mine-affected population improved? 
3. Outcome of support to 
methods development and 
knowledge management: 
the results of the Swedish 
support to the Geneva 
Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining, GICHD.  
 
Assessing for core support from MOFA and 
project support from Sida: 
• How has the RELEVANCE of activities 
supported been ensured in relation to overall 
challenges in the mine action sector and 
pertinent needs in projects and 
programmes? 
• How EFFECTIVE has the support been in 
relations to meeting objectives and 
agreements between GICHD and 
MOFA/Sida? 
• To what extent and in which way has the 
GICHD dealt with the SUSTAINABILITY of 
the Swedish supported activities in relation 
to reaching a visible impact on methods 
development and knowledge management 
in the mine action sector? 
Document review: Project 
documents, agreements, 
strategies, progress reports 
of the GICHD 
 
Interviews at GICHD 
 
Interviews with selected 
project managers in the field 
4. Outcome on country 
level: Sida’s support to two 
of the larger recipient 
countries selected for field 
visits 
To what degree and in what manner have the 
implementing partners ensured that:  
• Activities are RELEVANT to needs and 
priorities of the recipient government and the 
affected population groups? 
• Activities are COST-EFFICIENT in relation 
to cost level in country and similar activities 
by other organisations? 
• Activities are EFFECTIVE in meeting their 
objectives according to agreed time 
schedules? 
• Activities are SUSTAINABLE in alignment 
with future priorities and needs of the 




Interviews with MOFA/Sida 
staff 
 
Interviews with implementing 
partners: project and 
programme managers and 
staff 
 










recipient government and the existing 
capacity? 
• What are the particular capacities and 
weaknesses of the implementing partners 
supported by MFA/Sida compared to other 
mine action organisations in the country? 
• How do the results of the implementing 
partners compare with results obtained by 
other mine action organisations in the 
country? 
• How have the interventions taken account of 
gender issues in their planning and 
implementation? 
Interviews with actual and 
potential beneficiaries 
 
Interviews with mine action 
authorities and other 
relevant government 
departments 
5. Identification of lessons 
learned and 
recommendations for Sida’s 
future engagement in mine 
action, 
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
Sida-supported mine action programme? 
• What lessons can be learned from the 
programmes in relation to Sida’s priority 
areas and how could they be used in future 
Sida engagement?  
Possible use of SWOT. 
Otherwise will be subject for 
interviews and focus groups. 
6. The coordination process 
between national and 
international stakeholders 
responsible for mine action 
and implementing channels 
for Sida’s support at the 
operational level.  
• To what extent and how has ownership of 
interventions been established with the 
national authorities and to what extent are 
the national mine action authorities 
overseeing coordination, planning, and 
prioritization of the support? 
• What results can be detected from capacity 
building of management and staff within the 
national bodies? 
Interviews with national 
mine action authorities. 
7. Involvement of 
beneficiaries in the planning 
and prioritization process 
and linked to that whether a 
gender and age perspective 
has been integrated in the 
contributions 
 
• Partners to demonstrate consultative 
mechanisms, especially to see extent of 
local ownership in prioritisation, planning 
and implementation and the impact of this in 
operations. 
Possible use of SWOT. 
Otherwise will be subject for 
interviews and focus group 
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related to mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Nicaragua and Lebanon: 
• Proposals and funding assessments by implementing partners 
• Decision and assessment notes by Sida 
• Agreements and contracts between Sida and implementing partners 
• Updates, progress, and evaluation reports by implementing partners 
• Financial and accountant statements 
 
 
